

# **THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE**

**COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE  
NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE**

**Academic Year 2008–2009**



**SYLLABUS**

**FOR**

**NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING**

**19 November 2008–10 March 2009**

November 2008

College of Naval Warfare  
Naval Command College

**NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING STUDY**

**SYLLABUS**

**FOREWORD**

This syllabus and study guide contains both an overview and detailed description of the National Security Decision Making Study. Prepared for the College of Naval Warfare and the Naval Command College, it provides detailed session-by-session assignments and study guide material for daily class preparation. Administrative information is also included.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
FOREWORD .....	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	ii

### NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING STUDY

1. Overview.....	1
2. Objectives .....	1
3. Course Frameworks .....	2
4. Organization of the Study .....	2
5. Requirements .....	3
a. Individual Student Responsibilities .....	3
b. Workload.....	3
c. Required Readings .....	3
d. Case Preparation .....	3
e. Verbal and Written Assignments .....	3
f. Graded Activities .....	3
g. Exam/Paper Return Dates .....	4
h. Grading Criteria .....	5
6. Plagiarism .....	5
7. Seminar Assignments .....	6
8. General Schedule of Seminar Meetings .....	6
9. Faculty Office Hours .....	6
10. Key Personnel Contacts.....	7

### ANNEXES

A. National Security Decision Making.....	A-1
B. Senior Leadership Seminar.....	B-1
C. Policy Making and Process.....	C-1
D. Security, Strategy, and Forces .....	D-1
E. National Security Decision Making Final Exercise.....	E-1
F. Winter Trimester Planning Schedule.....	F-1
G. NSDM Primer/SSF Paper Instructions .....	G-1
H. NSDM Faculty Bios .....	H-1

## NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING STUDY

**1. Overview.** The National Security Decision Making (NSDM) Department educates military officers and U.S. government civilians in effective decision-making and leadership on security issues, particularly those involving force selection and planning challenges, within national resource constraints. The Department provides instruction in: the strategic planning and selection of future military forces and their potential use as a tool of national power; the nature of economic, political, organizational, and behavioral factors affecting selection and command of military forces; and in using expanded critical thinking skills to formulate and execute strategy to achieve desired outcomes within complex national security organizations. The NSDM Study is an executive development course designed for the College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College. Major emphasis is placed on the preparation of officers and civilians for senior-level command and staff assignments. Selection of concepts and materials is predicated on the belief that an effective career executive does not apply discrete disciplines, but rather is required to synthesize many disciplines relevant to different situations. Moreover, the appropriate point of view is an integrative one that seeks a balanced use of reasoning based on both an academic and professional foundation. For this reason, the NSDM Study employs a multi-discipline approach, synthesizing selected concepts from economics, political science, strategy, leadership, psychology, and other related disciplines. All instruction seeks to utilize the broad experience of the student body and focuses on making and implementing critical decisions within the national security environment. Areas selected for special attention are:

- The changing domestic and international economic, political, and military environments affecting national security.
- Major joint military force planning concepts, issues, and choices.
- The structure and process for planning and programming joint military forces and the interface of that process with the federal budgeting process.
- A conceptual understanding of the tools for critical thinking and deciding among complex defense issue alternatives.
- The context of and political, organizational, and behavioral influences on national security decision making and implementation.
- Regional issues, interests, and cultural factors that affect the U.S. policy making process
- Selecting leadership strategies to achieve key goals within complex national security organizations.

The principal methodology of the NSDM Study emphasizes active learning in a seminar environment. Concepts are studied and applied to cases representing real and complex issues. Cases offer a unique opportunity for parallel learning. A single case can explore a critical issue or concept and, at the same time, allow application of appropriate decision making frameworks.

**2. Objectives.** Our goal is to provide the student with a highly professional and useful learning experience. The intent of the NSDM Study is not the mastery of particular techniques, but rather

it is the expansion of the student's personal philosophy of what constitutes an integrative, balanced, executive point of view. Our joint learning objectives are to:

- a. Increase understanding of the context and domestic and international political, organizational, and behavioral phenomena that influence national security decision making and implementation.
- b. Increase ability to perform effectively as a senior-level decision maker, commander, or member of a staff in the national security decision making structure.
- c. Apply the results of critical thinking and analysis to decisions and implementation involving complex, resource-constrained national security issues.
- d. Increase understanding of key concepts and issues that impact on, and are useful in making strategy, choosing and programming future joint military force structure, and addressing planning challenges.

**3. Course Frameworks.** The NSDM Study encourages the student to develop two general and related frameworks:

- The first conceptual framework involves assessment of the complex factors critical to development of strategy, the sizing and structuring of future forces, and the allocation of scarce defense resources.
- The second conceptual framework identifies the context and political, organizational, and behavioral influences that shape decision making in large, complex national security organizations.

**4. Organization of the Study.** In pursuit of these objectives, the NSDM Study is divided into the following three major courses, which are taught in parallel fashion during the trimester; followed by the National Security Decision Making Final Exercise (FX):

- |  |             |
|--|-------------|
| a. Senior Leadership Seminar             | 15 Sessions |
| b. Policy Making and Process Course      | 26 Sessions |
| c. Security, Strategy, and Forces Course | 26 Sessions |
| d. NSDM Final Exercise                   | 10 Sessions |

Specific focus, objectives, guidance, and reading assignments for all sessions in the NSDM Study are contained in Annexes A through E of this Syllabus. These Annexes provide the basis for programming daily course work and should be read before the introductory session of each course and module. The National Security Decision Making Box (NSDM Box) and issued textbooks contain all of the required readings for the course.

## 5. Requirements

a. *Individual Student Responsibilities.* Students are expected to prepare fully for each instructional session and to participate actively and positively in classroom discussions. Learning requires the students' active involvement. A tough-minded, questioning attitude and a willingness to vigorously enter into discussion are central to the Department's learning method.

b. *Workload.* Study requirements have been structured to provide for a generally even workload throughout the trimester. Some peaks will naturally occur, and students are urged to discuss any perceived overloads with the appropriate instructor. Advanced planning and careful allocation of a scarce resource, time, will help mitigate these peak workloads. Past experience has indicated the total course requirements will involve a weekly average workload of about 45 hours of in-class and out-of-class work, as reported by students in past end-of-course questionnaires.

c. *Required Readings.* All required readings listed in the Annexes are important to the development of course concepts and to the quality of seminar discussion. Supplementary readings provide additional material for a more in-depth development of specific topics but are not expected to be read for the seminar session. Required readings are all provided in the NSDM box. Supplementary readings are available through the College library.

d. *Case Preparation.* Cases identified in the Annexes should be prepared for seminar discussion in accordance with instructions by individual faculty members. Assessments should be completed in advance so the discussion can focus on the concepts involved and the potential solutions of the issues in the cases.

e. *Verbal and Written Assignments.* Each course has verbal and written requirements that provide the opportunity for feedback and interaction among faculty and members of the class. Some of these assignments are not assigned a grade, but give individuals the ability to assess their comprehension of course material and assess progress in the NSDM Study. The following is a composite listing of the ungraded course requirements:

Course	Requirement	Type Effort	Due Date
SLS	Paper Topic	Written/Individual	9 Dec
SSF	Paper Topic	Written/Individual	17 Dec
SSF	Paper First Draft	Written/Individual	27 Jan
FX	Seminar Progress Brief	PowerPoint/Seminar	4 Mar

f. *Graded Activities.* An overall grade will be assigned to CNW students for the NSDM Study based on graded requirements for each of the three courses. The activities and weights assigned are as follows:

Course	Requirement	Type/Basis of Evaluation	Date	Weight
PMP	Midterm Examination	Individual. Ability to demonstrate mastery of course concepts in a logical and concise way. Completed in class	18 Dec	10%
SSF	Security, Strategy, and Forces Paper	Individual. A major strategy and/or force planning issue. Topic approved by 17 Dec.	10 Feb	28%
PMP	Final Examination	Individual. Ability to apply course concepts in a logical and concise way to a case study. Completed in class.	12 Feb	18%
SLS	Senior Leadership Seminar Paper	Individual. Ability to analyze, research, and articulate on some aspect of senior leadership relevant to your future leadership opportunities. Topic due by 9 December.	19 Feb	28%
FX	Exercise	Seminar. Ability of seminar to apply SSF, PMP, and SLS concepts and present a coherent, professional PowerPoint presentation reflecting the seminar's unique NSS, NMS, and supporting force structure.	23 Feb - 10 Mar	16%

g. *Exam/Paper Return Dates.* The exams and paper will be graded and returned to students by close of business on the following dates:

PMP Midterm Examination	5 Jan
SSF Paper	23 Feb
PMP Final Examination	24 Feb
SLS Paper	2 Mar
FX Grade Assigned	5 Mar

h. *Grading Criteria.* The overall policy for grading students at the Naval War College is contained in Naval War College Instruction 1520.2M (with Change #1). The most salient point in this instruction is:

“Historical evidence indicates that a grade distribution of 35%-45% ‘A’s’ and 55%-65% ‘B’s’ and ‘C’s’ can be expected from the overall War College student population. While variations from this norm might occur from seminar to seminar and subject to subject, it would rarely if ever be expected to reach an overall ‘A’ to ‘B/C’ ratio of greater than or equal to an even 50/50 distribution.”

Grading of the NSDM examinations will be consistent with the following standards:

Letter Grade	Numeric Range	Numeric Equivalent	Description
A+	97-100	98	Work of very high quality.
A	94-<97	95	Clearly above average graduate work.
A-	90-<94	92	
B+	87-<90	88	Expected performance of the average graduate student.
B	84-<87	85	
B-	80-<84	82	
C+	77-<80	78	Below the average performance expected for graduate work.
C	74-<77	75	
C-	70-<74	72	
F	0-<70	65 Or lower	Unsatisfactory work.

Grades assigned by instructors for papers and examinations will be expressed in whole numbers and in letter grades and their numeric equivalent from the scale above.

The FX grade will be determined by a three-member faculty team and assigned to the seminar as a group. Each seminar will be given the opportunity to grant additional credit to a limited number of students whom the seminar believes contributed in a significant and constructive way to the FX process. A detailed description of this process will be provided in the FX guidance memorandums.

Final course grades will be expressed as the unrounded numerical average, to two decimal places, along with corresponding letter grades with pluses or minuses, as appropriate.

In all grading decisions, each student has the right to appeal a grade, first to the instructors, then to the Course Directors, and finally to the Department Chair. This appeal procedure must begin within one week of receipt of the grade from the instructor. Such a review may either sustain the grade, lower it, or raise it.

**6. Plagiarism.** Occasional incidents of plagiarism require that we bring this matter to your attention. Plagiarism is defined in NWC Instruction 5370.A as:



a. Duplication of an author's words without *both* quotation marks *and* accurate references or footnotes.

b. The use of an author's ideas in paraphrase without accurate references or footnotes.

Students are expected to give full credit in their written submissions when borrowing another's words *or* ideas. Failure to do so will lead to severe disciplinary action. It is the *student's* responsibility to resolve any questions regarding the use of another's words or ideas *prior* to submitting written products. The use of your own ideas and words from a previous paper must also be fully footnoted. When in doubt, confer with your instructor *prior* to submission of your work.

**7. Seminar Assignments.** Each student is assigned to a seminar group representing a balanced distribution of services/agencies and functional expertise. Three faculty members are assigned to each seminar, one for each of the three courses of the NSDM Study. Student seminar, classroom, and faculty assignments are published separately.

**8. General Schedule of Seminar Meetings.** Seminars generally meet in the morning on Mondays through Fridays. Classes are normally 90 minutes long, except on days when selected topics require an extension of class time. A course planning schedule containing meeting dates and times is contained in Annex F of the syllabus. A weekly schedule is promulgated as well, and reflects schedule revisions made necessary because of late changes, such as additional visiting speakers, etc.

**9. Faculty Office Hours.** The faculty will be available to assist in mastering the course material, to review progress, and for counseling as required. Faculty office hours also provide an excellent opportunity to review assigned tasks, to discuss general problems, and to make recommendations for improvement of the course. Students are urged to use this opportunity. Faculty members are generally available throughout the week when not teaching, however, many also teach electives, participate in war games, instruct groups outside the War College, and travel for course development purposes. To ensure most efficient use of limited student time, it is suggested that a mutually agreeable time be arranged beforehand.

**10. Key Personnel Contacts.** If you require additional information in your studies or if interpersonal problems develop in a course that cannot be dealt with to your satisfaction by your instructor, please contact one of the following individuals:

Chair of the Department	Prof. Joan Johnson-Freese Room: C-206 Tel: 1-3540
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Executive Assistant of the Department	Prof. Kevin P. Kelley Room: C-206 Tel: 1-3540
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Security, Strategy, and Forces Course Director	Prof. Thomas R. Fedyszyn Room: C-319 Tel: 1-6453
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Policy Making and Process Course Director	Prof. Albert Shimkus Room: C-319 Tel: 1-7096
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Senior Leadership Seminar Course Director	Prof Mary Raum Room: C-328 Tel: 1-3509
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NSDM Final Exercise Director	Prof. Derek Reveron Room: C-321B Tel: 1-6449
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Academic Coordinator	Mrs. Margaret B. Jones Room: C-206 Tel: 1-4746
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## **NSDM-1      NSDM COURSE OVERVIEW**

**A. Focus.** The National Security Decision Making Department course educates military officers and U.S. government civilians in effective decision-making and leadership on security issues, particularly those involving force selection and planning challenges, within national and theater resource constraints. This session will address how the course is organized to achieve its objectives.

### **B. Objectives**

- Provide an overview of the course and its objectives.
- Identify key graded and ungraded events that will occur during the trimester.
- Identify key NSDM Department leaders to assist students in knowing who they can turn to with questions, issues, and suggestions.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Read the first seven pages of the syllabus and Annex F in order to familiarize yourself with the basic course content, objectives, requirements, and schedule.

### **D. Required Reading**

1. College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College National Security Decision Making Syllabus, Winter 2008-2009, pp. 1–7 and Annex F.

## **NSDM-2      INTRODUCTORY SEMINAR**

**A. Focus.** This session is intended to provide an opportunity for faculty and students to introduce themselves, to address important administrative issues, and to provide an overview of the content of each subcourse and the Final Exercise (FX).

### **B. Objectives**

- Identify the backgrounds and experiences of the faculty and students.
- Discuss social and administrative matters.
- Present an overview of the content of each of the three subcourses and the FX.
- Provide an opportunity for the Seminar Leader to solicit volunteers for seminar leadership positions.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The NSDM syllabus annexes provide an overview of the content of each portion of the NSDM curriculum and specify the requirements for each individual seminar session. Reading the first few pages of each annex will provide the student with insight into how the course will unfold and the requirements placed on the student.

### **D. Required Reading**

1. College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College National Security Decision Making Department Syllabus, Winter 2008–2009. Annex A through Annex E, scan the first few pages of each.

### **NSDM-3      INTERNATIONAL OFFICER SECURITY PERSPECTIVES**

**A. Focus.** The international students at the Naval War College are an important part of the class and bring fresh perspectives that are of great value to all students. This session provides a forum for the international officers to relate their views on the international security environment—threats, challenges, opportunities, and strategic alternatives. Students should consider how the viewpoints expressed in the briefing relate to their own perspectives, including where those viewpoints converge or diverge. With assistance from NSDM faculty members, the international officers will form groups based on regions, assess the security environment, and then brief their colleagues on their viewpoints.

#### **B. Objectives**

- For the international officers, work with their fellow NCC students to assess the security environment and prepare a briefing to present their perspectives.
- For the U.S. students, attend these presentations and gain insight from the viewpoints of the international officers.
- All students will use the briefings and discussion as background to prepare for the regional sessions to follow and for the FX security assessment.

#### **C. Required Readings**

No readings are planned for this session. Students are expected to actively engage in the question and answer period after the presentations.

#### **D. Follow-On Sessions**

In addition to the large group briefing in the auditorium, each region will also conduct a region-specific informal lunch session to allow students, particularly those assigned to seminars from that region, the opportunity to discuss issues of interest in greater depth. The schedule and locations for these sessions will be announced at a later date.

## **NSDM-4      NSDM FX AND COURSE REVIEW**

**A. Focus.** This session provides the opportunity to review the seminar's FX presentation and the feedback provided by the faculty panel during FX-9. Additionally, this final session offers the faculty teaching team and seminar a dedicated session to review subcourse concepts and address end of course questions as well as any administrative or curriculum based issues.

### **B. Objectives**

- Review faculty panel feedback provided to the seminar leader following FX-9.
- Review major subcourse themes and their value to the practicing security professional.
- Address end of course administrative issues as required.

**C. Guidance.** Discuss faculty feedback on the seminar's FX presentation. Review the major themes of SSF, PMP, and DMI in the context of future value to the practicing security professional. Each subcourse provides important skills required to successfully participate at the intermediate and senior, strategic level of national defense. Lacking an understanding of the concepts from any one of the three subcourse will place the student at a significant disadvantage as a practitioner in the national security policy environment. Each student should understand the relevance of each subcourse and how mastering these skills contribute to a successful military or civilian career in national security.

**D. Required Readings.** Review feedback on the seminar's FX presentation and be prepared to discuss with the seminar and the teaching team. This feedback was provided to the seminar leader following the presentation in session FX-9.

## ANNEX B

### SENIOR LEADERSHIP SEMINAR STUDY GUIDE

**1. Scope.** The Senior Leadership Seminar (SLS) is designed to enable you to examine and contemplate the innumerable challenges and “enduring tensions” that characterize leading at the senior (O-6 to O-8 or SES-1 to SES-3) level. Leading is an intensely personal endeavor; one each of us must do in our own way. Thus, you will need to decide for yourself what you need to learn more about and then dedicate yourself to learning it as you prepare yourself for your next leadership opportunity, be it command or in direct support of the commander. SLS will largely focus on the study of well-known senior leaders as a means to explore the issues and problems they faced, as well as how they approached those challenges. In that study, the SLS course will rely upon each student to bring their insights about leadership, based on individual experience as well as personal reflections from the readings, to highlight the most important elements that should or might be taken from the case studies.

Unlike many of the courses at the Naval War College, the SLS does not present or suggest a framework to facilitate student understanding or comprehension. Instead, SLS offers three broad areas for consideration when examining the leaders presented during the course. All leaders were imbued with certain personal traits or “essential characteristics” that, for want of a better descriptor, we call the *content* of leadership. Leaders are always faced with situations or conditions that require them to make difficult choices, which form the *context* of leadership. Finally, leadership is a practitioner’s art—leaders do certain things in particular ways, which can be grouped under the broad heading of the *processes* of leadership.

**2. Course Objectives.** SLS will strive to give you an opportunity to continue your personal growth as a leader and to rekindle or energize your professional curiosity about the subject in all its vicissitudes and vagaries. In that regard, SLS presents readings and case studies that will stimulate discussion about the various aspects of senior leadership that are different than leadership at junior and mid-grade levels. Toward that end, the overall objectives of SLS are to:

- Synthesize and examine the “essential characteristics” displayed by leaders that enabled them to motivate and inspire their subordinates during difficult or trying times and, in so doing, discuss their applicability to senior leaders today.
- Analyze the dilemmas and paradoxes confronted by leaders in the case studies offered and, in so doing, discuss how those “enduring tensions” influence and affect the decisions faced by senior leaders today.
- Evaluate the various practices and methods used by leaders in the past to successfully (or not) deal with the challenges of their time and, in so doing, discuss what tools or leadership are needed or appropriate for senior leaders today.

**3. Session Objectives.** The senior leadership curriculum flows through five primary divisions of study.

**DIVISION 1.** SLS 1, 2, 3. Introduction to SLS; Ideas About Leadership; and Civil Military Relations/Ethics.

- Elicit from each student, their personal insights and observations about leadership at the senior level.
- Examine thoughts and insights important to senior leadership positions
- Assess a variety of leadership theories and concepts
- Focus on the distinctive aspects of leader theory relative to a variety of situations and organizational diversity
- Assess the interaction between the armed forces and society and how this is relative to military leadership
- Analyze civil military relations and its important role to professionalism, harmony between civilians and military and military effectiveness, and briefly discuss the important role of constitutional balance.

**DIVISION 2.** SLS 4, 5, 6. General Lee and General Bragg; General Petraeus.

- Study the virtues and vices of leadership in war.
- Analyze why there can be both success and failure in leadership of individuals operating within the same environment
- Think about and discuss the difficulties of leading in the environment of counter insurgency.
- Analyze the need for change in a leader role as well as the impacts of experience, team members and adaptation.
- Assess leadership in a joint, multinational interagency environment

**DIVISION 3.** SLS 6, 7. Indira Gandhi; Nelson Mandela and FW deKlerk.

- Evaluate and discuss leading in a national context.
- Study content issues of power, religion, culture and ethnicity and their role in political leadership.
- Assess the intense challenges of power and control in a leader's role during a time of military threat.
- Concentrate on the importance of distinct philosophies of leadership at the international level.
- Apply the concept of building relationships between individuals with stark contrasts in experience and viewpoints and visions.

**DIVISION 4.** SLS 8, 9, 10. Admiral Rickover, General LeJeune, Admiral Zumwalt.

- Evaluate a senior leader in a strategic environment where the main thrust is dealing with advanced technologies.
- Discuss sense of purpose and leadership style
- Evaluate the concepts of leadership and organizational change in the military/civilian environment



- Analyze the personal strategy, tactics and techniques employed to implement large organizational change
- Assess the problems and pitfalls of leading to build an integrated organization.
- Discuss the attributes and issues of leading in times of domestic unrest

**DIVISION 5.** SLS 11, 12, 13, 14. Louis Gerstner and IBM, Sean O’Keefe, The USAF and the C-17; Rumsfeld and Gates.

- Become more versed in the means and ways of leadership in the private corporate sector.
- Evaluate the components essential to effective crisis leadership in a large organization.
- Assess the importance of the role of the leader as civilian in the military system.
- Evaluate a case that describes how one individual overcomes obstacles of a failing executive government system
- Become acquainted with the complexities of leading in the military acquisitions environment, the culture of replacement and understanding the intricacies and details of the leader for responding to changing fortunes in complex and dynamic environments.
- Assess the importance of negotiation in the role of senior leadership
- Discuss the concepts of leader legacy, being a reformist and the importance of strategy as a force of leadership.

SLS 15. Conclusion and Review

- Synthesize the themes of the course: senior leadership and the multifaceted issues facing a senior military leader today.
- Synthesize the content and insight derived by students in formulating and creating a paper about leadership in the military.

**4. JPME II Learning Areas.** The SLS course contributes to the attainment of the following JPME II learning area objectives: 1.b, 2.b, 4.e, 5.f, 7.a, and 7.b.

**5. Course Structure.** SLS sessions will normally be conducted once, but occasionally twice, a week. The reading requirements, as a consequence, may be heavier than that of NSDM’s two sister courses to enable a deeper study of the material to be discussed during each seminar session.

**6. Course Study Guide.** The SLS study guide provides an overview for each session and identifies the focus, discussion guidance, and reading assignments for each session. In addition to required readings, each session’s study guidance will offer suggested “supplementary readings” for those of you who wish to explore a leader or some topic in greater detail. Discussion guidance should be used to organize your thoughts about the material presented, raise important questions in your mind, and offer areas to explore more fully with your fellow students to gain their perspectives and insights as you develop your own ideas about the material.

**7. Course Requirements.** You are expected to read all material assigned and come to seminar prepared to offer your insights about how or why the vicarious experiences you gain from your study of a past leader may be of value to contemporary senior leaders who confront similar or

wholly different problems or challenges. Each student will author a 15-18 page research paper, fully and properly cited, on some aspect of senior leadership you consider important and relevant to your future leadership opportunities.

**8. Course Material.** All course material is provided to you in your NSDM box. Course materials include a syllabus, the required readings, and case studies for each seminar session.

**ANNEX B**  
**SENIOR LEADERSHIP SEMINAR**  
**STUDY GUIDE**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>SESSION</b>		<b>PAGE</b>
SLS-1	Introduction to the Senior Leadership Seminar .....	B-6
SLS-2	Ideas About Leadership .....	B-7
SLS-3	Civil-Military Relations and the Profession of Arms .....	B-8
SLS-4	Robert E. Lee and Braxton Bragg .....	B-9
SLS-5	General David H. Petraeus.....	B-10
SLS-6	Indira Gandhi .....	B-12
SLS-7	Nelson Mandela and F.W. DeKlerk .....	B-14
SLS-8	Admiral Rickover.....	B-16
SLS-9	General John Archer Lejeune .....	B-18
SLS-10	Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.....	B-20
SLS-11	Lou Gerstner at IBM .....	B-21
SLS-12	Sean O’Keefe .....	B-23
SLS-13	The USAF and the C-17 .....	B-24
SLS-14	Rumsfeld and Gates .....	B-25
SLS-15	Course Wrap-up and Student Reflections.....	B-26

## **SLS-1 INTRODUCTION TO THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP SEMINAR**

**A. Focus.** This seminar session will review the goals of SLS laid down in the introduction to this section of the syllabus and in the faculty's introductory reading for this seminar. Your SLS professor will make clear his/her expectations of each student's contributions to seminar discussion and analysis of the case studies that constitute the heart of the course. SLS, as implied in its name, is a course about senior leadership. Hence, one of the key objectives of this seminar session is to elicit from each student their personal observations and insights about the key elements or notions that are integral to successful leadership at the senior level. Your SLS professor will also explain and discuss the research paper that will be used to assign your SLS grade and address any questions that you might have about that endeavor.

As noted in the SLS-1 reading, leadership is a multifaceted challenge that is arguably quite different at the senior leadership level. While the skills and knowledge derived from a career of leading at the junior and mid-grade levels are indispensable to future success as a senior leader, they are not in of themselves sufficient to succeed at the next level. Yet, as we all know and understand, there is no template or mold that can be used to prepare leaders for the challenges that confront all senior leaders. Thus, the SLS seminars that will follow this session are intended to search for insights and discuss the collective wisdom of the students who constitute each seminar that will enable each person in their own way to determine how they will lead their organizations in the future. As Field Marshall Slim said in his musings about senior leadership, each must find and trust his own style of leadership and recognize that "no imitation was ever a masterpiece." Hence, this seminar session is intended to establish a precedent wherein each student shares his/her thoughts about the case study under examination and offer those insights he/she believe important to understanding the unique problems and opportunities resident in senior leadership positions.

### **B. Required Reading**

1. Ratcliff, Ronald and Mary Raum. "Introduction to the Senior Leadership Seminar," Naval War College faculty reading, Newport, RI. August 2008.
2. Slim, William. "Higher Command in War," *Military Review* 70, Issue 5, May 1990 10-21.
3. Collins, J. Lawton. "Leadership at Higher Echelons," *Military Review* 70, Issue 5, May 1990 33-45.

### **C. Supplementary Readings**

1. Nye, Roger H. *The Challenge of Command* (Wayne, NJ: Avery, 1986).
2. Taylor, Robert L. and William E. Rosenbach, eds. *Military Leadership – In Pursuit of Excellence* 5<sup>th</sup> Ed. (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press/Perseus, 2005).
3. Connelly, Owen. *On War and Leadership – The Words of Combat Commanders From Frederick the Great to Norman Schwartzkopf* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

## **SLS-2 IDEAS ABOUT LEADERSHIP**

**A. Focus.** This session introduces a variety of leadership theories and concepts through an on-line site. In conjunction with this overview you will be watching a film or clips from films chosen by your seminar facilitator as a point of departure for the leaders and their environments in senior leadership seminar sessions three through fifteen. This session also builds upon the objectives of SLS-1 to begin to formulate your collective insight about leadership beyond the junior and mid-grade military level.

The on-line site reviews most modern theory relative to leadership from the early 1900's to the present. Each category presented is distinctive in focus and all are imperative to guiding your thinking about how to lead in a variety of situations and levels of diversity. You will be using this theoretical history for insights throughout the seminar.

The films selected are powerful and multidimensional portrayals of situations in politics, at war, in survival, in growth, as retribution and guiding rebirth. Represented are different historical eras of Roman power, World Wars I and II, to the modern role of war guided by the influence of terrorists.

### **B. Required Readings and Films**

1. Hawkins, Charles F. "Toward a Theory of Military Leadership," (Military Conflict Institute, Virginia Command Function Monograph, n.d.) <http://www.militaryconflict.org/leader.htm>.
2. "Leadership Theories," [www.changingminds.org](http://www.changingminds.org). (A short review of several prominent leadership theories) Hard copy will be distributed.
3. One film will be selected by your faculty for this unit.

### **C. Supplementary Readings**

1. Rost, Joseph Clarence. *Leadership for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. (New York, Praeger publishers, 1991).
2. Browne, C.G. and Thomas S. Cohn. *The Study of Leadership*. (Danville, Ill, Interstate Publishers and Printers, 1958). Available on-line at Questia, <http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=53323973>.
3. Madrid, Richard and Ton, Tammy. "Bridging Past and Present: Models of Leadership in Ancient Greece and the United States." Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association. March 16-19, 2006. (Albuquerque, 2006). Available on all academic research web site <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/pmlaapareserachcitation/0/9/7/6/0pages97600/p97600-5.php>.

### **SLS-3 CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE PROFESSION OF ARMS**

**A. Focus.** The term "civil-military relations" refers broadly to the interaction between the armed force of a state as an institution, and the other sectors of the society in which the armed force is embedded. The primary determinant of US civil-military relations is, of course, the Constitution. But individuals have established precedents as well, no one more so than George Washington in instituting balanced U.S. civil-military relations.

Civil-military relations presuppose differences between the leaders, institutions, values, prerogatives, attitudes and practices of a society at large and those of that society's military establishment. What differentiates the US military from the rest of society? The military claims to be a profession along the lines of medicine and the law? Is it? Why or why not? How do you respond to those who claim that the military has become a self-interested occupation and a bureaucracy rather than a true profession?

The state of civil-military relations in a polity can be judged as better or worse in terms of three criteria: 1) harmony between civilians and the military; 2) the resulting military effectiveness; and 3) constitutional balance. Some argue that "good" civil-military relations exhibits some combination of the following: 1) comity and a low number of disagreements between civilian and military decision makers; 2) success in war and peace and the absence of policy-strategy "mismatches"; and 3) a lack of encroachment by either party to civil-military decisions on the "turf" of the other. Are these criteria useful? If so, how would you assess the current states of US civil-military relations? Do the precedents of military professionalism set by Generals Washington and Marshall continue to be useful examples for a liberal, democratic society?

#### **B. Required Readings**

1. Owens, Mackubin T. "Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain After 9/11," *American Enterprise Institute*, 2009.
2. Hartle, Anthony D. *Moral Issues in Military Decision Making*. Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004, pp. 10-21.
3. Jones, Megan. "George Marshall," Cambridge MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government case study, Harvard University, 1983, pp. 1-11.
4. Calhoun, William M. "George Washington and the American Precedent in Civil-Military Relations," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College revised faculty paper, August 2008.

#### **C. Supplementary Readings**

1. Huntington, Samuel. *The Soldier and the State*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.
2. Feaver, Peter. *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.

## **SLS-4     ROBERT E. LEE AND BRAXTON BRAGG**

**A. Focus.** One of the great misconceptions about the American Civil War is that Confederate generalship was uniformly superior to that of the Union during the first years of the conflict. In fact, there was only one successful Confederate field army, the Army of Northern Virginia, led by Gen. Robert E. Lee. The other major Rebel field army, the Army of Tennessee, stumbled from defeat to defeat, giving up huge swaths of territory to Union forces. From the spring of 1862 until the Confederate debacle at Chattanooga in November, 1863, this army was under the command of Gen. Braxton Bragg. While Lee won victories that saved the Confederacy and lowered the morale of the Union, Bragg snatched defeat from the jaws of victory at Perryville and Murfreesboro, was maneuvered out of Tennessee by a Union army, won a sterile victory at Chickamauga, and was finally routed at Chattanooga, after which he was relieved of command and “kicked upstairs.”

In this course, we take the tack of ancient biographers such as Plutarch, studying well known leaders to identify the virtues to be emulated and the vices to be avoided. What were the virtues and vices of each man? Both Lee and Bragg operated within the same political environment. They were both highly regarded by Jefferson Davis, the Confederate president. The raw material of Confederate soldiery was the same in both cases. So why was one successful while the other failed?

### **B. Required Readings**

1. Gallagher, Gary W. “‘A Great General is So Rare’: Robert E. Lee and the Confederacy,” in Gary W. Gallagher and Joseph T. Glatthaar, eds., *Leaders of the Lost Cause: New Perspectives on the Confederate High Command* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2004).
2. Robinson, James I. “Braxton Bragg: The Lonely Patriot,” in Gallagher and Glatthaar, *Leaders of the Lost Cause: New Perspectives on the Confederate High Command* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2004).

### **C. Supplemental Readings**

1. Connelly, Thomas. *The Marble Man: Robert E. Lee and His Image in American Society* (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1977)
2. Gallagher, Gary, ed. *Lee: The Soldier* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996)
3. -----, *Lee and His Generals in War and Memory* (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1998)
4. McMurtry, Richard M. *Two Great Rebel Armies: An Essay in Confederate Military History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989)
5. Woodworth, Stephen. *Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990)

## **SLS-5      GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS**

**A. Focus.** Counterinsurgency is hard. Until recently, counterinsurgency doctrine was neglected, yet we have been engaged in very complex counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan for the last five years. In 2006, General Petraeus led the joint Army and Marine Corps effort to rewrite counterinsurgency doctrine. Unlike doctrine development models of the past, and because he understood the complexities and the nature of effective counterinsurgency operations, the team that developed this new doctrine was diverse and reflective of the joint, interagency, and multi-national nature of our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This new way of prosecuting counterinsurgency has proven quite effective and it is built on the premise that “military forces that successfully defeat insurgencies are usually those that overcome their institutional inclination to wage conventional war” and that in a COIN, “the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly, usually wins.” With the new doctrine developed and the transformation of how we fight COIN underway, GEN Petraeus was appointed as Commander of Multi National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and his assumption of that command coincided with the adaptation of the surge strategy of 2007. That strategy and our efforts throughout 2007-2008 are generally seen as a positive turnaround.

When contemplating the assigned readings, among the issues that might arise: Why did it take American leadership so long to understand the need for change in terms of COIN doctrine? Why was General Petraeus able to develop so quickly the joint and interagency doctrine to prosecute COIN? Was it his personal experience, the team he assembled to craft the doctrine, the universal understanding by 2005 of the need to adjust our way of fighting COIN, or a combination of these factors? Would there have been a “surge” without General Petraeus? How effective was he in communicating and “selling” the new Iraq strategy to lawmakers and to those implementing and executing the strategy? What happens when experience works against us, and senior leaders fail to adapt – compare LTG Sanchez’s tenure as the commander of forces in Iraq and GEN Petraeus’ tenure. Finally, what are the leadership factors unique to this type of command? In reflecting on this last question, one might consider the special challenges that arise in a Joint, Multi-National, and Inter-Agency environment when attempting to build strategic consensus or to build and maintain relationships.

### **B. Required Readings**

1. Sennott, Charles M. “The Generals Knowledge,” *London Sunday Times Article*, June 29, 2008.
2. FM 3-24/MCWP3-33.5. *Counterinsurgency*, December 15, 2006. Forward and Introduction.
3. Petraeus, David H. General, USA, Commander Multi-National Forces. “Iraq, Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq,” September 10, 2007.
4. Petraeus, David H. General, USA, Commander Multi-National Forces. “Iraq, Letter to the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Civilians of Multi-National Forces – Iraq,” September 7, 2007.



5. Petraeus, David H. General, USA, Commander Multi-National Forces. "Iraq, Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq," April 8, 2008.

### **C. Supplemental Readings**

1. Petraeus, David H. LTG, USA. *Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq*, Military Review Article, January, 2006. Available on-line at [http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/april\\_2006/4\\_06\\_2\\_pf.html](http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/april_2006/4_06_2_pf.html)

2. West, Francis J. (Bing). *The Strongest Tribe* (New York, Random House, August 2008) Chapters 15, 16, 17, and 19.

3. Yingling, Paul, LTC, USA. *A Failure in Generalship*, April 27, 2007 (Armed Forces Journal <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com>)

## SLS-6     INDIRA GANDHI

**A. Focus.** Few countries are more diverse than India. Religion, culture, ethnicity, politics, and caste all form human fault lines. The power of some of these divisions was reduced and other strengthened during the British colonial period – the days of the Raj. From the early 1900s India experienced a growing sense of nationalism, which eventually manifested itself in such different ways as the non-violent protests of Mahatma Gandhi to the creation of the Indian National Army, native Indians who fought against Great Britain and the allies during World War II. In 1947, despite efforts to preserve British India's territorial integrity, independence split the subcontinent into India and Pakistan. Some of India's greatest political leaders achieved prominence during these times of intense challenge. Among the most powerful and well-regarded of these individuals was Jawaharal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of independent India. Born into a wealthy and Anglophile household, Nehru was a young firebrand who watched his father embrace the independence movement after British efforts to put down nationalist demonstrations became more and more severe. Indira Gandhi, Nehru's only child was born into a political maelstrom. Young Indira often saw her closest family arrested and jailed, socialized with the leading political intellectuals of her day and watched her mother and aunt fight each other to see who would have the most influence over her father. Indira quickly revealed herself to be a person of fascinating contradictions. She possessed undeniable leadership skills, yet for most of her life willingly assumed subservient roles. She believed strongly in education, yet did poorly in school; she promoted peace, but led India to its greatest military victory; she loved democracy, but when threatened by political scandal, declared a state of emergency and was accused of being a dictator. Originally placed in power by party leaders who believed she would be easy to control, Indira Gandhi quickly made it plain that it was she who was to do the controlling.

Indira Gandhi faced major challenges during each of her years in power. China and Pakistan presented military threats. The Kashmiri border was in dispute. The relationship with the United States was always difficult at best. India faced extensive poverty, food shortages and a lack of education. Her political enemies were implacable and her family relationships were a mixture of comfort and difficulty. Increasing numbers of armed and religious groups were constant threats to both herself and her efforts to build a national Indian identity. Eventually, some of these threats would claim her life.

### **B. Required Readings**

1. Norton, Richard J. "Resolute Action and Bold Decision: Prime Minister Gandhi," Naval War College faculty paper, Naval War College, Newport, RI. August 2008.

### **C. Supplementary Readings**

1. Carras, Mary C. *Indira Gandhi: In the Crucible of Leadership*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979.)
2. Mohan, Anand. *Indira Gandhi: A Personal and Political Biography* (New York: Meredith Press, 1967)
3. Sahgal, Nayantara. *Indira Gandhi: Her Road to Power* (New York: Frederick ungr Publishing Co., 1982)

4. Hart, Henry C., ed. *Indira Gandhi's India: A Political System Reappraised* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1976).
5. Malhotra, Inder. *Indira Gandhi: A Personal and Political Biography* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1989).
6. Kalhan, D.N. *Indira Gandhi: Three Years As Prime Minister* (New Delhi: S. Chand & CO., 1970.)

## SLS-7 NELSON MANDELA AND F.W. DE KLERK

**A. Focus.** While Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993, Nelson Mandela is clearly the more internationally known and revered individual of the two. Biographies abound and at one time mere rumors that Mandela was ill were enough to send ripples through South African stock markets. When the South African presidency passed from de Klerk to Mandela in 1994, with de Klerk then serving as Vice-President, apartheid was officially a thing of the past. It took both individuals to accomplish that shared goal. DeKlerk, however, represented the old guard and Mandela the new, and history has awarded accolades accordingly.

This case focuses on both the virtues and vices of the two men individually and the relationship of the two men together that allowed a rare systemic revolution of power by relatively peaceful means. Nelson Mandela transformed from a street fighter and fugitive to a statesman and diplomat during his twenty-seven year imprisonment. F. W. de Klerk initiated reforms to include concessions to non-whites in 1989-1990 which could never have been predicted based on his upbringing, his party platforms, or his prior actions. These two men changed a country and influenced the world.

“It was this desire for the freedom of my people to live their lives with dignity and self-respect that animated my life, that transformed a frightened young man into a bold one, that drove a law-abiding attorney to become a criminal, that turned a family-loving husband into a man without a home, that forced a life-loving man to live like a monk. I am no more virtuous or self-sacrificing than the next man, but I found I could not even enjoy the poor and limited freedoms I was allowed when I know my people were not free.” Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1994) 624.

“For too long, we clung to a dream of separated nation-states when it was already clear that it could not succeed. For that we are sorry. Yes, we have often sinned...But that we were evil, malignant, and mean, to that we say no.” F. W. de Klerk, October 9, 1992, in a speech in the Afrikaner town of Winburg, cited in David Ottaway, *Chained Together*, (New York: Random House, 1993) 63.

### B. Required Readings

1. Glad, Betty and Robert Blanton. “F.W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela: A Study in Cooperative Transformational Leadership,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Summer 1997; 27, 3.
2. Johnson-Freese, Joan. “And the 1993 Noble Peace Prize Goes to.....,” Naval War College faculty case study, Newport, RI, July 2008.

### C. Supplemental Readings

1. Mandela, Nelson. *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1994).
2. Ottaway, David. *Chained Together*, (New York: Random House, 1993).

3. Lieberfeld, David. "Nelson Mandela: Partisan and Peacemaker," *Negotiation Journal*, July 2003.

4. "Nelson Mandela: The Man Behind the Symbol," Kennedy School of Government Case program, C114-96-1337.0, 1996.

## SLS-8 ADMIRAL RICKOVER

“Ignorance is not bliss; it is oblivion.” H.G. Rickover

**A. Focus.** There is a significant difference between ideas and accomplishments, or between science and engineering. Where science supplies the ideas, engineering realizes those ideas. Nowhere today is the chasm between science and engineering epitomized more than in nuclear energy.

Following World War II, Rickover felt long before anyone else that being first and staying ahead in nuclear energy was important to the nation’s safety. He acted as if he was personally responsible to the nation itself for his work. In the same way, he could often be a difficult person to work either with or for. He could be rough and abrasive. He could shout and scream. Even to his own people he could be harsh. Personal dominance, power, and fear were his tools, and he used them to further the nation’s lead in nuclear power.

Rickover had a particular disdain for management theories. To him, others relied on such because they simply did not know the business they were trying to run. He also stressed that the future of mankind depended on its control of technology, which in turn demanded discipline.

Rickover offers a unique opportunity to study a senior leader in a strategic environment whose main thrust is dealing with advanced technologies. If success is measured by accomplishments, what made Rickover so successful? What can we learn from his sense of purpose? What can we learn from his leadership style? Finally, with a renewed interest in nuclear power to ease our nation’s energy crisis, what lessons from Rickover’s story must we never forget?

### B. Required Readings

1. Rickover, Admiral H. G. “Doing a Job,” (speech delivered at Columbia University in 1982), source: <http://www.govleaders.org/rickover.htm>.
2. Allen, Thomas and Norman Polmar. *Rickover: Controversy and Genius, A Biography*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), Chapter 13, pp. 276-285.
3. Baker, CAPT Bud. “The Rickover Story: A Compilation of Selected Works,” Naval War College faculty reading, September 2008.
4. Rickover, Admiral H. G. “Energy Resources and Our Future,” (speech delivered in St Paul, MN on 14 MAY 1957), source: <http://www.energybulletin.net/node/23151>.

### C. Supplemental Readings

1. Rickover, Admiral H. G. “Thoughts on Man’s Purpose in Life,” (Speech transcript with Q & A), *Council on Religion and International Affairs*, September 1982.
2. Duncan, Francis. *Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990).

3. Allen, Thomas and Norman Polmar. *Rickover: Controversy and Genius, A Biography*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).
4. Allen, Thomas and Norman Polmar. *Rickover: Father of the Nuclear Navy*, (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007).
5. Rockwell, Theodore. *The Rickover Effect: How One Man Made A Difference*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992).
6. Duncan, Francis. *Rickover: The Struggle for Excellence*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001).

## **SLS-9      GENERAL JOHN ARCHER LEJEUNE**

**A. Focus.** Following the conclusion of World War One the very existence of the United States Marine Corps was threatened more vigorously than possibly at any other time in history. Militarism was out of favor, the economy was in a shambles, and allegations of Marine Corps misbehavior in Haiti had become the subject of congressional debate. Many senior U.S. military officers, including some in the Navy were convinced the Marines were obsolete and the time had come to disestablish the Corps. Internally, the Marine Officer Corps was divided into distinct camps, each with a very different strategic vision for the Corps.

The duty of dealing with these issues and literally saving his beloved Marine Corps fell to Major General John Archer Lejeune, the 13<sup>th</sup> Commandant of the United States Marine Corps. His challenge was further heightened by allegations that his appointment was the result of conspiracy, unethical dealing and political subterfuge. To carry out his mission, Lejeune would have to chart a new strategic direction, forge new political alliances, tame such disparate personalities as General Smedley Butler, two-time winner of the Medal of Honor and Colonel Earl H. ‘Pete’ Ellis, a pioneer of amphibious warfare, and notorious alcoholic, who, at the time of his death, was on a secret intelligence mission to the Caroline Islands.

Few times task a senior leader as much as when an organization is at the crossroads of destiny. To stay the safe and familiar course is to guarantee disaster, yet every alternate pathway is fraught with risk and the real potential of failure. Under such conditions every bet becomes a strategic bet and leaders must decide which tools, tactics and techniques to employ. Today John Archer Lejeune has all but faded in to the mists of military history, yet the issues he dealt mirror and in some ways duplicate those facing military leaders today.

### **B. Required Readings**

1. Norton, Richard J. “John Archer Lejeune: The Cajun Who Saved the Corps,” faculty reading, Naval War College, Newport, RI. August 2008.

### **C. Supplementary Readings**

1. Lejeune, John A. *The Reminiscences of a Marine*, (Philadelphia: Dorrance & Co., Inc., 1930).

2. Miller, J. Michael, ed. *My Dear Smedley: Personal Correspondence of John A. Lejeune and Smedley D. Butler 1927-1928*. (Quantico: Marine Corps Research Center, 2002).

3. Bartlett, Merrill L. *Lejeune: A Marine’s Life, 1867 – 1942* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991).

4. Schmitt, Hans. *Maverick Marine: General Smedley Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History*, (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1987).



5. Thomas, Lowell. *Old Gimlet Eye: Adventures of Smedley D. Butler*, (New York: Farrar Rinehart Publishers, Incorporated, 1933).

6. Ballendorf, Dirk Anthony and Merrill Lewis Bartlett. *Pete Ellis: An Amphibious Warfare Prophet, 1880 – 1923*, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997.)

## **SLS-10    ADMIRAL ELMO R. ZUMWALT, JR.**

**A. Focus.** Few admirals have led their navy during times as trying or turbulent as those faced by Admiral Zumwalt during the early 1970's. Ascending to the top of the Navy during the waning years of the Vietnam conflict, he assumed command of an organization facing serious internal as well as external challenges that threatened its status as the world's finest maritime force. For many, he is best known for his efforts to eliminate Navy regulations that purported to support good order and discipline, but which in practice were more often unnecessarily demeaning and humiliating to enlisted and junior officer personnel. Less well known were his efforts to change Navy strategy and reconstitute a Fleet during a period of drastic budget cuts as the country withdrew its forces from Vietnam and brought the war to a conclusion.

Admiral Zumwalt's tenure and performance as the Chief of Naval operations was influenced by a confluence of social issues arising from national domestic turmoil and a changing national security landscape dominated by an ascendant Soviet Union that had built a Fleet capable of challenging American maritime dominance for the first time since the end of the Second World War. His efforts to change the way the Navy treated its people, while strongly embraced by the rank and file, were resisted by a number of senior and mid-grade officers in the Navy including Admiral Hyman Rickover, were reviled by several highly influential retired admirals, and often opposed by his predecessor, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral James H. Moorer) and the Secretary of the Navy for much of his tour, John Warner.

Despite his commitment to building an integrated navy that valued all of its members equally, the Navy suffered through a series of racial incidents that threatened the good order and discipline that Admiral Zumwalt sought to bolster at a time of great domestic social unrest. Further, his clear articulation of the steps needed to halt the degradation of the country's naval capability was opposed at nearly every turn by Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. Despite these obstacles, Admiral Zumwalt firmly left an imprint on the U.S. Navy that is reflected not only in the sailors who man the U.S. Navy today, but also in the makeup of the Fleet in which those sailors serve.

### **B. Required Readings**

1. Friedman, Norman. "Elmo Russell Zumwalt, Jr.," in *The Chiefs of Naval Operations*, ed. Robert William Love, Jr. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980).
2. Ratcliff, Ronald E. "Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. – the Promethean CNO," Naval War College faculty reading, October 2008.

### **C. Supplemental Readings**

1. Zumwalt, Elmo R. Jr. *On Watch: A Memoir* (New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Book Company, Inc., 1976).
2. Sands, Jeffrey I. *On His Watch: Admiral Zumwalt's Efforts to Institutionalize Strategic Change* (Alexandria, VA: Center For Naval Analyses, July 1993)

## **SLS-11 LOU GERSTNER AT IBM**

**A. Focus.** On April Fool's Day, 1993, Lou Gerstner took over as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) at IBM. On his first day of work he could not get into the headquarters building because he did not have a company ID. A cleaning person reluctantly let him in. Gerstner was about to lead this huge multinational technology company that manufactured and sold computer hardware and software. Within three years IBM went from being the second most profitable company in the world to losing \$13 billion. IBM was facing a monumental crisis. The previous CEO for nine years, John Akers, had just been "relieved of command." Gerstner had to act fast - IBM had only 90 days of operating cash left.

Gerstner had not even been one of IBM's top five candidates for the vacant CEO position. He had no computer industry experience. Previously, Gerstner was the CEO of RJR Nabisco (a conglomerate food and tobacco products company), headed the Travel Related Services group at American Express, and was a director at the management consulting firm, McKinsey Consulting.

Called "Big Blue," referring to its bold blue logo, IBM stood for fifty years as the icon of American business. It was a forward-thinking and superbly managed organization with a long history of financial success and innovation. It invested heavily in R&D and leading edge technology. Its culture was deeply rooted in strong values and its human resources policies set the standard for excellence for American industries. With its research, products, and admired work force, IBM was often described as a "national treasure."

During the 1980s, IBM's external environment was changing rapidly, driven largely by new technology and international competition. IBM responded by introducing the Personal Computer (PC) and concentrated on perfecting its business processes. By the end of the decade, personal computers had changed the way organizations used technology. It also changed what customers expected from their technology providers. There was extensive disagreement within IBM's leadership about the best strategy to respond to its deteriorating competitive position.

IBM's former CEO, John Akers, recognized the need for change and conducted a massive reorganization in 1988, including downsizing of 20,000 employees and closing 19 plants. By 1990 Akers' plan appeared successful. Decision cycles became shorter and the financial results improved. However, over the next two years, results once again deteriorated, this time precipitously. Stakeholders were skeptical and customers defected to competitors. The prognosis for IBM was bleak.

In January 2003, Lou Gerstner retired from IBM to be chairman of a private equity company, the Carlyle Group. IBM was now profitable. It had regained credibility and leadership within the industry. The stock value was \$80 per share, compared to \$13 when he took over. There is no question that Gerstner saved IBM. There is debate about whether the turn-around was attributable to leadership or financial re-engineering.

### **B. Required Readings**

1. Austin, Robert D. and Richard L. Nolan. "IBM Corporation Turnaround," Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA. Nov. 14, 2000.

2. Gordon, George G. "Industry Determinants of Organizational Culture," *The Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 16, No. 2, April, 1991. (Read pages 396-405.)

### **C. Supplemental Readings**

1. Gerstner, Louis V. Jr. *Who Says Elephants Can't Dance?: Inside IBM's Historic Turnaround* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc. 2002).

2. Carroll, Paul. *Big Blue: the Unmaking of IBM* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1993).

3. Garr, Doug. *IBM Redux: Lou Gerstner and the Business Turnaround of the Decade* (New York: Harper Business, 1999).

4. Slater, Robert. *Saving Big Blue: Leadership Lessons and Turnaround Tactics of IBM's Lou Gerstner* (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing, 1999).

5. "Gerstner: Changing Culture at IBM – Lou Gerstner Discusses Changing the Culture at IBM," Harvard Business School – Working Knowledge, December 9, 2002. Online: <http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/3209.html>

6. Sherman, Stratford. "Is He Too Cautious to Save IBM," *Fortune*, Oct. 3, 1994, Vol. 130, Issue 7, pg. 78.

7. Worth, Robert. "What Lou Gerstner Could Teach Bill Clinton," *The Washington Monthly*, Sept. 1999, Vol. 31, Issue 9, pg. 8.

8. "Gerstner Describes Bring IBM Back to Health," Stanford GSB (Graduate School of Business) News, Nov. 19, 2002.

Online: [http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/NEWS/headlines/vftt\\_gerstner.shtml](http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/NEWS/headlines/vftt_gerstner.shtml)

(Note: On-line video link, 30 minutes, RealPlayer required.)

## **SLS-12 SEAN O'KEEFE**

**A. Focus.** After the Cold War, the U.S. Navy sailed through a series of troubled waters. Increasingly, key members of congress and the executive branch were losing their trust and confidence in the Navy and its senior leadership. Concerns were expressed over their ability to manage resources after the demise of the \$5+ billion A-12 aircraft program with no results and no replacement. The 1991 Tailhook scandal continued to haunt the Navy and its leadership especially with concerns over inadequate inquiries. And the Navy was struggling to replace its successful Cold-War Maritime Strategy with a new vision and strategy to explain how it supports a new defense strategy and to justify its very existence. In 1992, with only a few months left in the Bush administration's term, Richard Cheney, then Secretary of Defense, appointed Sean O'Keefe as acting Secretary of the Navy, to take charge, restore trust and confidence, and set a new direction. O'Keefe had been serving as the Defense Department's comptroller and chief financial officer and was considered one of three trusted advisors to Cheney.

In 2001, after serving briefly as deputy director in the Office of Management and Budget, O'Keefe was appointed NASA Administrator, principally to fix the troubled International Space Station program and to bring management, especially over financial concerns, to the agency. Then in 2003, a tragic disaster strikes when the Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrated upon reentry, claiming lives of seven astronauts. NASA goes through an intense period of investigation and eventual reform. O'Keefe finishes his term at NASA by initiating the implementation of President Bush's vision for space exploration to the moon, mars and beyond. A responsibility of a senior leader is to respond to changing fortunes in a complex and dynamic environment.

### **B. Required Readings**

1. Lloyd, Richmond. "Sean O'Keefe: Taking Charge of a Rudderless Navy," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty case study, July 2008.
2. Lambright, W. Henry. Extracts from "Executive Response to Changing Fortune: Sean O'Keefe as NASA Administrator," Transformation of Organizations Series, IBM Center for The Business of Government, October 2005.
3. Johnson-Freese, Joan. Testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Space, Aeronautics, and Related Sciences Subcommittee, Hearing on "Reauthorizing the Vision for Space Exploration," 7 May 2007.

### **C. Supplemental Readings**

1. Hattendorf, John B. *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s*, Naval War College Newport Papers, No. 27, Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, September, 2006.
2. Johnson-Freese, Joan. *Space as a Strategic Asset*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

## **SLS-13 THE USAF AND THE C-17**

**A. Focus.** In the 1970's, the United States Air Force began planning for the future of its airlift force structure. At first it looked like the country would need two airlifters—one tactical and one strategic.

Planes like the C-7 and C-123 had provided tactical airlift during the Vietnam War but were aging. The C-130 was a newer tactical airlifter with the C-130A and B models being delivered in the 1960's, but would be nearing the end of its design life in the 1980's. The goal was to come up with a new tactical aircraft that could outperform the C-130. It would carry more cargo, takeoff and land on short, austere, semi-prepared surfaces, and cruise higher, faster, and longer. The concept became called the Advanced Medium Short-Takeoff-and-Landing Transport (AMST) and it moved from concept, to design, to prototype flights by 1976. Two prototype proofs of concept aircraft were built—one by Boeing, the YC-14, and one by McDonnell Douglas, the YC-15. Both prototypes performed well but funding became scarce and when the Carter administration came to power, the program was cancelled.

In addition to the tactical airlift mission, the Air Force was interested in upgrading its long range strategic airlift capability which was performed by the C-5 and C-141 aircraft. The C-141 had been delivered in the early 1960's and the C-5, in 1970. A series of studies in the mid-1970s documented the need for more strategic airlift. The military's ability to "get there in time" began to dominate thinking, giving rise to what became known as the National Strategic Mobility Dilemma.

Even though the AMST was cancelled, support was building in DoD for a new airlift aircraft. Since the nation couldn't afford two airlift aircraft, the desire was for this new aircraft to possess the short field capabilities of the AMST but also perform long range flight. A shift in airlift doctrine was underway and the plane that was to provide the answer to the challenges the United States faced in projecting power became the C-17.

The case will tell the story of how the C-17 almost died and how strong leadership brought it back to serve the country with distinction. The additional readings highlight the concepts of negotiation and reconciliation. As you read the case, think about the part they played in bringing this program from a point where it was nearly cancelled, to the point where the program produced one of the more successful aircraft ever built for the Department of Defense.

### **B. Required Readings**

1. Ducey, Roger H. "Direct Delivery; The United States Air Force and the C-17," Naval War College faculty paper, Newport, RI, October 2008.
2. Allred, Keith G. "The High Cost of Low Trust," *Harvard Business School Publishing and the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School*, June 2004.
3. Lax, David A. and James K. Sebenius. "The Manager as Negotiator; Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain," New York, NY, *The Free Press*, 1986.

## **SLS-14 RUMSFELD AND GATES**

**A. Focus.** To say that the last eight years have been demanding and turbulent for the Department of Defense and its leadership, both civilian and military, is likely understatement. In the center of this swirling pressure cell, at least until early 2009, have been two leaders of remarkable capabilities, and equally remarkable yet differing leadership styles. Donald Rumsfeld, former collegiate wrestler, Navy pilot, and four-term congressman, of “Rumsfeld’s Rules,” “snowflakes” and “transformation roadmaps” was Secretary of Defense (for the second time) from January 2001 until December 2006. During this period, his tenure and leadership were of course largely influenced by the attacks of 9/11 and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the eight months prior to 9/11, his initial time as a secretary intent on reform had not gone smoothly. But from the moment Rumsfeld helped rescue injured workers from the burning Pentagon, thoughts about his leadership dramatically changed. Did Rumsfeld change his leadership characteristics, or was he just a better “secretary of war” than he was a secretary of defense? What did Rumsfeld “get right,” and what will be long term impacts of his efforts to reform and even transform DoD? What is his leadership legacy concerning relationships with senior military leaders and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Robert Gates was sworn in as Secretary of Defense in December 2006. Gates, a former Director of Central Intelligence and president of Texas A&M, inherited two foreign wars and the war on terrorism, but also a Pentagon in some disarray with its relations with congress and other agencies no better. Within a few days, the “anti-Rumsfeld” secretary traveled to Iraq, stating “failure in that part of the world would be a calamity.” At the same time he clearly confirmed the U.S. commitment in Afghanistan. In short order, he also, as your third reading notes, “dispatched one CJCS, one VCJCS, two combatant commanders, two service secretaries, one service chief and one surgeon general, all for not heeding his call for operational focus on job one.” What can Gates realistically hope to accomplish in his likely short time remaining as secretary? What portion of his impact will depend on his leadership approach? Does the leadership style of either Rumsfeld or Gates truly make a difference? These and other questions concerning two senior civilian wartime leaders will be the focus of this seminar.

### **B. Required Readings**

1. Kaplan, Robert D. “What Rumsfeld Got Right: How Donald Rumsfeld remade the U.S. military for a more uncertain world,” *Atlantic Monthly*, July/August 2008, 64-73.
2. Kaplan, Fred. “The Professional,” (Defense Secretary Robert Gates as the “anti-Rumsfeld”) *The New York Times Magazine*, February 10, 2008, 40.
3. Wilkerson, Thomas L. “Sprinting Through the Tape,” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, July 2008, Vol. 134, 28-31.
4. Rumsfeld, Donald H. “Rumsfeld’s Rules: Advice on government, business and life,” *The Wall Street Journal*, January 29, 2001.

## **SLS-15 COURSE WRAP-UP AND STUDENT REFLECTIONS**

**A. Focus.** This two-hour session will provide you the opportunity to share your insights about leadership gained from your research paper, seminar discussions, and personal reflection during the SLS course. Formal presentations are neither required nor desired, but each student is expected to contribute their thoughts. The intent is to continue the ongoing conversation you have had with the seminar about the various aspects of senior leadership that are likely to be different and those elements that are enduring at all levels of leadership. You are encouraged to approach this session as if you were having a discussion with your subordinates and providing them with your observations and beliefs about leadership.

### **B. Required Readings**

None.

### **C. Supplemental Readings**

None.





## ANNEX C

### POLICY MAKING AND PROCESS STUDY GUIDE

**1. Scope.** The Policy Making and Process (PMP) course is designed to increase your understanding of the political, organizational, and behavioral phenomena that are relevant to national security decision making at the national level, at major headquarters units, and joint operational commands. This understanding will increase your future professional competence as senior-level participants in the national security community. The PMP course has two major parts. The first describes the international political system and the domestic political system. The second describes the U.S. national security system and key U.S. decision making processes.

The first part of the course is intended to provide a more thorough understanding of the complex environment within which national security policy is made. The initial sessions introduce a model that can help you understand and evaluate the factors that influence national security policy making and the processes through which the government makes national security policy. This is followed by lessons on international actors, the tools they use to exert influence on the United States and the constraints that may be imposed upon the United States by the nature and distribution of military, political, and economic power in the world. The influence of religion is a powerful force in world affairs and will be examined in two sessions. The next lessons focus on the main actors in the domestic political system: the Congress, interest groups, the news media, and public opinion. These sessions address the roles of the actors in the U.S. system of government and the various ways in which these actors strive to influence national security policy decisions.

The second part of the course examines formal policy processes inside the executive branch of government with particular emphasis on the National Security Council system and the various policy, planning, and resource allocation systems used in the Department of Defense. During this part of the course, each of four perspectives (or ways of looking at and analyzing the decision making process) will be examined in considerable detail because of the insight they provide. There will be separate sessions on the rational, organizational behavior, governmental-politics, and cognitive perspectives. These perspectives will also be applied to the formal policy processes that shape national security decision making.

The course will conclude with a “current policy analysis,” which provides an opportunity to use the model and the analytical perspectives to improve your understanding of the material and ability to identify key influences on a future policy matter. The final exam will require applying course concepts to analyze a case that will be similar in content and complexity to the current policy analysis case in the preceding session.

Case studies are used throughout the course as a vehicle for applying the model and associated course concepts to real-world situations.

As you conduct the NSDM Final Exercise, apply your understanding of the various actors and influences in the policy making process and your insights into group decision making while developing your seminar’s Final Exercise process and products.

**2. Course Objectives.** The objective of the PMP Course is to enhance your future professional competence as participants in the national security environment by increasing your understanding of:

- The context of the decision making process and the organizational, political, and behavioral influences on national security decisions, and
- The formal processes through which significant national security policy decisions are made.

**3. Course Structure.** The PMP Course will meet two to four times each week in a seminar format. Seminars require the active participation of all class members. Maximum learning during the trimester depends upon the sharing of expertise and experiences by all members of the seminar.

**4. Course Study Guide.** This PMP Study Guide is the primary planning document for the course. For each session it identifies the focus, objectives, guidance questions, reading assignments, and cases. Guidance questions should be used as an aid in preparing for class. Supplementary readings are listed for use by those who desire to explore a particular topic in greater depth.

**5. Course Requirements.** You are expected to complete all required readings prior to each session. There will be two exams: a mid-term essay and a final analysis of a case that involves situations drawn from the national security environment in which the typical graduate will be expected to perform.

**6. Course Material.** Course material is distributed and organized in an NSDM box. Course materials include a syllabus, selected readings and case studies, and the following case book for you to keep after use:

- NWC Faculty. *Case Studies in Policy Making*. 11<sup>th</sup> ed. Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2008.

**POLICY MAKING AND PROCESS**  
**COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE/NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE—2008/09**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>SESSION</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
<b>DIVISION I: THE INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS</b>	
PMP-1	Introduction to Policy Making and Process ..... C-4
PMP-2	Introductory Case Study: Lebanon Revisited ..... C-6
PMP-3	The International Political System (Part I) ..... C-8
PMP-4	The International Political System (Part II) ..... C-10
PMP-5	Religion (Panel Discussion)..... C-13
PMP-6	Religion..... C-14
PMP-7	Case Study: The United States and Russia - Rekindling the Cold War .. C-16
PMP-8	Interest Groups, Public Opinion, and the News Media ..... C-18
PMP-9	Domestic Political System (Lecture) ..... C-20
PMP-10	Congress and the Military ..... C-21
PMP-11	Case Study: The Next Tanker ..... C-23
PMP-12	PMP Mid-Term Examination ..... C-24
<b>DIVISION II: THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM AND PROCESS</b>	
PMP-13	Analytical Perspectives ..... C-25
PMP-14	The Rational Actor Perspective ..... C-28
PMP-15	The President and the Making of National Security Policy..... C-29
PMP-16	Defense Resource Allocation (Lecture)..... C-31
PMP-17	The National Security Council and Interagency ..... C-32
PMP-18	The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) ..... C-34
PMP-19	The Organizational Behavior Perspective ..... C-38
PMP-20	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) ..... C-40
PMP-21	The Governmental-Politics Perspective..... C-43
PMP-22	Case Study: Iraq and the Bush Administration, 2003..... C-45
PMP-23	The Cognitive Perspective ..... C-46
PMP-24	Case Study: The 1973 Arab-Israeli War ..... C-48
PMP-25	Current Policy Analysis ..... C-50
PMP-26	PMP Final Examination..... C-51

## **PMP-1 INTRODUCTION TO POLICY MAKING AND PROCESS**

**A. Focus.** With all national security organizations facing important questions about their roles and missions, as well as force size and composition, it is important that key participants in those organizations understand the environment in which these issues will be addressed. The Policy Making and Process (PMP) course is designed to increase your understanding of the major political, organizational, and behavioral phenomena that are relevant both to national security decision making at the national level and at major military commands. Knowledge of these phenomena will increase your ability to continue to develop as an effective leader, staff officer, and participant in this vital process.

### **B. Objectives**

- Describe the general requirements and content of the PMP course.
- Identify the elements of the input-output model for use as a tool for case analysis.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 2a, 2c, and 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Analysts build models to help them analyze and understand complex issues. The PMP input-output model seeks to do the same for national security decisions. How might such a model be helpful to you as a participant in the national security decision-making process?

2. The Powell speech describes the “political” aspects of decision making at the national security level. What new skills and perspectives does the Powell speech imply you will need as you move up the triangle?

3. What are the responsibilities of the various elements in our government as articulated in the *Constitution of the United States*? How do the principles established in this document affect the national security decision-making process? How do they affect the organizations in which you serve?

4. What are the key decisions in the “Retreat from Beirut” video? Who were the key actors? What factors affected the decision-making process? At what point was a massive failure of U.S. policy inevitable?

### **D. Required Readings**

1. PMP Faculty. “An Introduction to Policy Making and Process,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, August 2008. (Introduces the input-output model and provides general guidance concerning the PMP course.)

2. Powell, Colin S. “The Triangle Analogy,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College reprinted excerpt from a 6 June 1990 address. (A speech to NWC students discussing the role of politics from the point of view of former CJCS General Powell.)

3. *The Constitution of the United States of America and The Declaration of Independence*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997. (Scan and retain. Distributed as a small pamphlet in the NSDM selected readings box.)

#### **E. Case**

1. “Retreat from Beirut.” During the second half of this session, a Public Broadcasting System documentary entitled “Retreat from Beirut” will be shown in class. This video and the required reading on Lebanon for PMP-2 will be the basis for classroom discussion during PMP-2.

#### **F. Supplementary Readings**

1. Hilsman, Roger. *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1992. (Describes the “political process” of decision making and provides a realistic description of how Washington actually works in making defense and foreign policy. Available in the NWC library—JX1417.H54 1992.)

2. Duncan, W. Raymond, Barbara Jancar-Webster, and Bob Switky. *World Politics in the 21st Century*. New York: Longman, 2001. (This text provides a good overview of many of the factors and issues that will be examined in the PMP course. It offers a decision-making model that is similar to the PMP model. One of the authors was on the NSDM faculty during the early 1990s. Available in the NWC Library—JZ1305 .D83 2004.)

3. Wittkopf, Eugene R., ed. *The Future of American Foreign Policy*. New York: St. Martin’s, 1994. (Collection of essays on domestic and international influences on U.S. foreign policy. Available in the NWC Library—JX1417.F88 1994.)

4. *The Federalist Papers*. James Madison, John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton wrote these commentaries in 1787–88. The articles were published in New York newspapers in a successful attempt to sway the voters of the Empire State to ratify the Constitution. The Federalist Papers can be accessed at <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/const/fed>.

## **PMP-2 INTRODUCTORY CASE STUDY: LEBANON REVISITED**

**A. Focus.** One of the principal objectives of the PMP course is to increase awareness of relevant political, organizational, and behavioral concepts useful in the analysis of national security cases. An example of such a case was the Reagan administration's responses to the growing violence in Lebanon in the early 1980s. To dampen continuing conflict and increase the chances for an overall Arab-Israeli peace settlement in the Middle East, the Reagan administration actively employed the diplomatic and military resources of the U.S. government during 1982–84, but was ultimately unable to control events in Lebanon. When American military forces were withdrawn in February 1984, many wondered how the Reagan administration had become so deeply involved in the Lebanon crisis.

### **B. Objectives**

- Explain a complex national security case using the input-output model.
- Describe the major factors that influenced the decision(s) in this case.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2a, 2c, 3c, and 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Which international and domestic factors affected the president's decisions? Did any of these factors change over time?
2. What were the dominant factors that drove the decision to redeploy the Marines?
3. Did actions taken in Washington constrain the performance of military officers at the operational level? If so, in what ways?
4. Should military officers consider political, social, and economic factors when advising their military and civilian superiors?

### **D. Required Readings**

1. Childress, Bobby, L. revised by Albert J. Shimkus. "The Use of Case Studies in the NSDM Curriculum," Newport, RI.: Naval War College faculty paper. August 2008. (Provides background on the application of case studies.)
2. Hall, David K., and William R. Farrell. "Lebanon Revisited," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, March 1997, with excerpt from *Foreign Service Journal* (June 1984).

### **E. Supplementary Readings**

1. Friedman, Thomas L. *From Beirut to Jerusalem*. New York: Doubleday, 1989. (This *New York Times* reporter gives a very readable personal account of the Middle East, including the tragedy of Beirut. Available in the NWC Library—DS119.7.F736 1989.)

2. U.S. House Committee on Armed Services. *Adequacy of U.S. Marine Corps Security in Beirut, Hearings*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983. (The report of the Investigations Subcommittee, Committee on the Armed Services, on their investigation into the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut on 23 October 1983. Available in the NWC Library—UG432.L4.A33 1983.)

3. Hammel, Eric. *The Root Redux: The Marines in Beirut, August 1982–February 1984*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985. (A story of the Marines involved in Beirut between August 1982 and February 1984, with emphasis on the August–October 1983 period and based upon participants’ viewpoints. Available in the NWC Library—DS87.H335 1985.)

4. Frank, Benis M. *U.S. Marines in Lebanon 1982–1984*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987. (Account of the deployment of Marines to Lebanon during the period 1982–1984, focusing on presence and operations conducted versus analyzing policy. Available in the NWC Library—VE23.F73 1987.)

5. *Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983* (The Long Commission). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984. (The report of the Long Commission on the investigation into the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut on 23 October 1983. Available in the NWC Library—UG432.L4.D62 1983.)

6. Esposito, John. *Islam and Politics*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1987. (An overview of contemporary politics in Islamic states. Available in the NWC Library—BP63.A4.N423.)

7. Pintak, Larry. *Beirut Outtakes*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988. (A correspondent’s experiences in Lebanon during the crisis. Available in the NWC Library—DS87.53.P56 1988.)

8. For a number of links that provide an overview of Lebanon today, see: <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/indiv/mideast/cuvlm/Lebanon.html>



### **PMP-3 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM (PART I)**

**A. Focus.** Despite the considerable military, economic, and diplomatic power of the United States, U.S. national security processes and policies are often shaped by the actions of other actors such as states, nations, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in a constantly changing international system. Current trends toward greater and more complex economic, political, and military interdependence within the international political system (IPS) suggest that international actors may gain even greater influence in future U.S. policy making. For effective participation in the IPS, U.S. policy-makers must understand the full range of instruments available to influence international behavior, and how these same instruments can be used by others to influence the United States. Studying the distribution of power in the international political system and the tools and rules used to exercise that power can give insight, and perhaps foresight, that can contribute to both better policy and better policy-making processes.

#### **B. Objectives**

- Identify and discuss key actors, tools, and rules in the international political system.
- Discuss how the international political system influences the U.S. national security decision making process.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1d, 2a, and 3e.

#### **C. Guidance**

1. The Teague reading provides a framework for analyzing the IPS. Teague identifies four areas of emphasis: principal actors in international politics, various forms of action available to actors, some rules that apply in the IPS, and current trends. How do these concepts help explain the workings of the international political system? What has changed in this system in recent years? What “actors, rules, and tools” in the IPS are most important? How do they interact?

2. Stigler offers a brief history and discussion of the structure of the United Nations (U.N.). This article introduces the four main purposes of the U.N. Charter: to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights, and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations. It addresses two main questions: What role does the United Nations play in the international system? How has the United Nations aided and obstructed U.S. foreign policy?

3. Greensburg describes how NGOs and other actors in the IPS have attempted to use the 2008 Beijing Olympics to advance their agendas. Various actors have attempted to link the Olympics to causes ranging from killing in Darfur, to unrest in Tibet, to human rights in China. This article illustrates many of the concepts discussed in the other readings. Who were the major actors in this situation? What were their sources of power? What tools were employed by various actors? What international rules were involved? How important is cooperation among various actors trying to influence state policy?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Teague, George E. "The International Political System," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, March 2002. (Provides a basic framework for understanding the principal actors, the rules that they operate under, and how they interact within the international political system.)
2. Stigler, Andrew L. "The United Nations in the International Arena," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2005. (Provides a discussion of the role of the United Nations in international politics and the U.N.'s effect on U.S. foreign policy.)
3. Greenberg, Ilan. "Changing the Rules of the Games," *New York Times Magazine*, March 30, 2008, p. 52-57. (Describes how NGOs and other IPS actors worked to influence China's policy on Darfur and other issues, using the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympic Games for leverage.)

#### **E. Supplementary Reading**

1. U.N. website, (<http://www.un.org/english/>)

## **PMP-4 THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM (PART II)**

**A. Focus.** The previous lesson discussed several important actors and rules in the international political system. In this lesson we note that since 1989–90 a number of actors, rules, and trends in the international scene have increasingly challenged policy makers. This session discusses the power of ideas and norms, selected developments in international law, the role of religion, and the spread of terrorism. Each of these developments has major implications for the making and conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

Though not easily measurable, ideas have always been important components of the international political system. Today, several important norms—ideas that govern behavior by shaping what actors believe is appropriate behavior—are in a state of flux. Rules about sovereignty have been eroded by the growth of attitudes favoring intervention for humanitarian causes. These developments will influence the nature, location and frequency of future military operations.

In addition, several factors appear to be leading to rapid changes in international law, including failing states, WMD proliferation, and terrorism and the potential need for preemptive actions against it. International terrorism itself is as old as world politics, but terrorists are now using new tools, organizational networks, recruitment techniques, and methods of execution. Many global actors are seeking new methods and greater levels of cooperation to deal with these evolving threats.

Religion has become a force to be reckoned with and affects issues ranging from national identity to terrorism. Under certain conditions, fundamentalism and nationalism can fuse with religious interpretations, producing dire consequences. This volatile mixture has created new actors and unleashed powerful emotions. Global actors are making difficult decisions about how to interact and what tools to use to help to shape the future. Similarly, the spread of new norms and developments in international law may require a concerted effort at shaping the marketplace of ideas. As the world becomes more complex, proficiency with the full spectrum of tools of power and influence becomes increasingly important.

### **B. Objectives**

- Identify post–Cold War concepts and organizations critical for analyzing the international political system. Analyze the current international political environment and some of its trends.
- Analyze new trends, actors, and rules in the evolving international political environment.
- Discuss how these factors influence the U.S. national security decision-making process and how that process should adapt to new conditions.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1d, 2a, and 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Garofano describes a series of developments bearing on the making of U.S. foreign policy. What are international norms? How are they created and what is their life cycle? What

are the implications of developments regarding norms of sovereignty and humanitarianism? What recent developments in international law could have a major impact on U.S. foreign policy and defense policy? Does international law merely reflect the norms of the most powerful states? Is religion becoming more important in international politics? If so, how might the United States respond and participate? Terrorism presents a host of challenges. Which of these challenges can be dealt with by the United States alone, and which require cooperation or coalition action? What is the relationship between religion and terrorism, and how can this relationship be addressed? Finally, is al Qaeda a new kind of transnational organization? How must the United States respond?

2. The essays “War on Evil” and “Hating America” were published in a collection of “The World’s Most Dangerous Ideas.” These essays invite “insightful critique and open debate” as the article introducing them in *Foreign Policy* magazine stated. How important are these ideas to the evolving international political system? “War on Evil” presents a particular view of evil, described as a Manichaeian view, which connects all evil to a single controlling source that cannot be redeemed. The author criticizes this particular idea of evil and paints a picture of the harm that this view creates. Whether the Manichaeian view of evil is accurate, is it reasonable to argue that it influences decision makers and thereby impacts U.S. policy? Does it matter that an informed observer believes that it does? What are the implications of the actions and attitudes that Wright attributes to President George W. Bush?

3. “Hating America” explores several reasons for a strong trend toward Anti-Americanism. These include the George W. Bush administration’s policy and its style, balance of power issues, and ideology. Does the size and power of the United States naturally generate resistance and even hostility? What types of global actors are likely to agree with the assertion that “today, the dominant reality in the world is the power of the United States, currently being wielded in a particularly aggressive manner”? Opposition to U.S. policy has been a politically popular position in many democracies. How useful is the notion that imagining a world without U.S. leadership should foster a more balanced view of the United States?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Garofano, John. “Actors, Rules and Trends in International Politics since 1989,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, December 2005. (Traditional thinking about international relations focused on large states, fixed national interests, and power relations. Ideas and internationally accepted norms, however, may be growing in importance. In addition, bad transnational actors like al Qaeda, trends in economic globalization, and trends in international law will all affect the constraints within which leaders make national security policy.)

2. Wright, Robert. “War on Evil,” *Foreign Policy*, Issue no. 144, (Sep/Oct 2004): 34-35. (Describes a “Manichaeian” view of evil and its apparent influence on U.S. policy.)

3. Zakaria, Fareed. “Hating America,” *Foreign Policy*, Issue no. 144, (Sep/Oct 2004): 47-49. (Discusses reasons for widespread Anti-Americanism and some of its potential influence.)

## E. Supplementary Readings

1. Lennon, Alexander T. J. *The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks*. MIT Press, 2003. (Available in the NWC Library through inter-library loan.)
2. Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. Columbia University Press, 1998. (Available in the NWC Library—HV6431 .H626 1998.)
3. Kirshner, Jonathan. "Political Economy in Security Studies after the Cold War." *Review of International Political Economy*, 5, no. 1 (Spring 1998): pp. 64–91. (Available from the NWC Library through inter-library loan.)
4. Rowe, David M. "World Economic Expansion and National Security in Pre-World War I Europe," *International Organization* 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999): pp. 195–231. (Available via <http://ejournals.ebsco.com/ArticleSearch-Criteria.asp?articleSearchType=text> accessed on 8 August 2008.)
5. Davenport, David. "The New Diplomacy." *Policy Review*, 116 (December 2002/ January 2003): pp. 17–31. (Available in the NWC Library Periodicals Collection ISSN 0146-5945.)
6. Dragnich, Alyssa K. "Jurisdictional Wrangling: U.S. Military Troops Overseas and the Death Penalty," *Chicago Journal of International Law*, 4, no. 2 (Fall 2003): pp. 571–580. (Available from the NWC Library through inter-library loan.)
7. Abbott, Kenneth W. "International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts." *The American Journal of International Law*, 93, no. 2 (April 1999): pp. 361–379. (Available from the NWC Library through inter-library loan.)
8. Stromseth, Jane E. "Law and Force after Iraq: A Transitional Moment." *The American Journal of International Law*, 97, no. 3 (July 2003): pp. 628–52. (Available from the NWC Library through inter-library loan.)
9. Zacher, Mark W. "The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force." *International Organization*, 55, no. 2 (Spring 2001): pp. 215–50. (Available from the NWC Library Periodicals Collection—ISSN 0020-8183.)
10. Enderlin, Charles. *Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995–2002*. New York: Other Press, 2002.
11. Pressman, Jeremy. "Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?" *International Security*, 28, no. 2 (Fall 2003): pp. 5–43.

## **PMP-5 RELIGION (PANEL DISCUSSION)**

**A. Focus.** Religion is a powerful force in world affairs, particularly with the rise of transnational terror networks claiming to draw inspiration and legitimacy from religion. Transnational ideologies and religions have the capacity to rally populations irrespective of national borders through mass communication. Deeper knowledge of the three great monotheistic religions (Christianity, Islam, and Judaism) helps with understanding their impact on the present world political environment. Each faith discussed is transnational and cross-cultural, is based in a concept of history, and has a strong moral and ethical component derived from sacred texts.

The panelists are scholars whose work concerns the three great monotheistic religions. Panelists will be able to address each other and the audience. However, the main purpose of this session is to allow panelists to respond to your questions. Some questions will be provided to the panel in advance, but time will be reserved for spontaneous questions. The panel discussion is followed by PMP-6, a seminar session dedicated to religion and its relation to international politics.

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand ways of investigating and classifying religion.
- Become aware of the beliefs, divisions, texts, and history of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.
- Understand the relevance of religion in formulating policy.
- Supports CJCS Learning Area 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. As you read, consider what questions you want to ask the panelists in order to acquire insights on each of the monotheistic religions in greater detail than the readings can provide.

### **D. Required Readings**

1. Young, William A. *The World's Religions*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 1994 (excerpted by David Kriebel). (Describes the basic beliefs, divisions, sacred history, and texts of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam).

### **E. Supplementary Readings**

1. Young, William A. *The World's Religions*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 1994. Contains information on the three religions beyond what was excerpted.

2. Fellows, Ward J. *Religions East and West*. 2nd ed. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace. 1998.

## **PMP-6 RELIGION**

**A. Focus.** This session complements the Religion Panel Discussion (PMP-5). This session highlights and examines the role of religion in international politics and the global war on terror, as an inherent component of today's global environment. In particular, this session addresses current events that pertain to some aspects of religion, and how these events and beliefs affect national security and decision making.

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand in greater depth the beliefs, history, texts, and theology of the three global monotheistic religions.
- Understand in greater depth how similarities and differences among these religious traditions affect international and regional politics.
- Understand the relevance of these monotheistic religions for U.S. national security policy, particularly with regard to countering violent religious extremism.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a and 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. How newsworthy are current events pertaining to religion(s)? How do these events and developments involving religion(s) affect national security and policy making? Some points to consider include the following:
2. What are the similarities and differences between the three monotheistic faiths?
3. How do religious extremists exploit their religion for achieving political goals?
4. How are religions used to promote non-violence and conflict resolution?
5. What is a theocracy? What countries are theocracies?
6. What is the difference between Sunni and Shi'ite Islam?
7. What is Islamic extremism? How has it manifested itself? What are the forces behind it?
8. What is Jewish extremism? How has it manifested itself? What are the forces behind it?
9. What is Christian extremism? How has it manifested itself? What are the forces behind it?
10. What are the virtues and vices of secularism or "religious politics"?
11. How do policies that offend religious sensitivities become potential security problems?

12. What is Salafism (often referred to in the West as Wahhabism)? How does it play a significant role in inspiring “radicalism” worldwide?
13. What is jihad? What does it mean, and why is it important to know about it?
14. Should the United States be willing to recognize and interact with a democratically-elected government that is based on religion? Why or why not?

#### **D. Required Reading**

1. Smith, Paul J. "Religious Foundations for Terrorism," *The Terrorism Ahead: Confronting Transnational Violence in the Twenty-first Century* by Paul J. Smith. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2007.

#### **E. Supplementary Readings**

1. Topical articles illustrating the role of religion in international politics may be introduced prior to the session.



## **PMP-7 CASE STUDY: THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA - REKINDLING THE COLD WAR**

**A. Focus.** Over fifteen years have passed since the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, but Russia still holds the interest of Washington policymakers. The Russian economy is booming due to profits from high-priced oil and natural gas exports. Some experts fear that this economic success is hiding a dark political movement that began under the Putin administration. Disputes with the United States over a variety of topics, ranging from the deployment of missile defense systems to nuclear energy control, highlights a growing chasm in the U.S./Russia relationship. Numerous actions by Putin inside Russia point toward a Russian political shift to a structure reminiscent of the former Soviet Union. Putin stepped down from the presidency in March of 2008, but remains in the forefront of Russian politics as prime minister. The case study discusses Putin's actions and Russia's desire to return to international prominence, and demonstrates how this and other events in the International Political System are influencing the future U.S. policy toward Russia.

### **B. Objectives**

- Illustrate the relationship between the international political system, domestic political system, and the national security system in national security decision-making.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2a, 2c, and 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Using the case study and the input-output model, analyze situational factors in the international political system that are impediments to a strategic partnership with Russia?
2. Which specific events or changes in the international political system (IPS) must the current administration consider when formulating future policy with Russia? What major IPS actors, rules, and tools are involved?
3. How did the IPS and domestic political system (DPS) affect President Bush's decision to push forward with deployment of a missile defense system in Eastern Europe? To advocate for NATO expansion?
4. What has changed within the IPS since Putin stepped down as Russian president? Is he still the dominant player in Russian politics?

### **D. Required Reading**

1. Struckman, Dana E., Colonel, USAF, "The U.S. and Russia: Rekindling the Cold War," in *Case Studies in Policy Making and Process*. 11th ed. Edited by Policy Making and Process Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2008.

## **E. Supplementary Readings**

1. Goldman, Stuart D., "Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests." *Congressional Research Report for Congress*, updated 31 May 2007.
2. "Russia's Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do," *Report of an Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations*, Copyright 2006, pp. 23-26.

## **PMP-8 INTEREST GROUPS, PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE NEWS MEDIA**

**A. Focus.** Public opinion represents one of the most potent forces found in the U.S. political landscape, yet it is not easily to energize or control. In many ways public opinion is the prize fought over by numerous actors in both the domestic political system and national security system. No leader, including senior military leaders, can simply dismiss public opinion as irrelevant. The majority of the U.S. public gets its knowledge of domestic and international events from mass media sources. Leaders in government and of an ever-increasing number of special interest groups are well aware of this fact and seek to use the media as a conduit to communicate and gain support for their agendas. This is not to imply the media is solely a passive participant in the process of forming public opinion. Great debates have raged regarding the role of the media in this process. The age-old, often uneasy, relationship between the media and the military also bears on the formulation of public opinion. The Department of Defense recently initiated a policy of embedding reporters with combat units in Iraq. This has added another dimension to the public opinion arena. This session focuses on public opinion, interest groups, the news media, and the complex ways in which they can interact.

### **B. Objectives**

- Analyze and discuss the strengths and dangers of public opinion, how public opinion is formed, and how it can impact the national security decision making process.
- Analyze and discuss how interest groups, think tanks, and public opinion influence national security decision making.
- Discuss how the national and international media may influence public opinion.
- Discuss the often uneasy relationship between the media and the military and how to balance the requirements of operational security and First Amendment rights. Additionally, discuss policy of embedding reporters with combat units, challenges associated with this policy, and what embedding may portend for the creation of public opinion in the future.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 2a and 4b.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Norton provides a broad look at the formulation and power of public opinion. How is public opinion formed? How powerful a force is public opinion? Is it a positive or negative force? Is the U.S. public sufficiently well-informed and wise to have a say in national security policies? In what ways is the U.S. public consistent? In what ways is it volatile? What are the implications of this article for political and military leaders?

2. Calhoun provides an overview of interest groups and think tanks. What are some examples of interest groups and think tanks active in U.S. politics today? Describe the various methods used by interest groups and think tanks to influence policy making. Which portion of

the U.S. public are they most likely to influence? What are some of the checks on the influence of these groups?

3. William Darley takes a different approach, and based on historical evidence, argues that the media's influence is actually quite limited when it comes to public opinion. Darley contends bold leadership and decisive action has a much greater influence on public opinion than slanted or biased media coverage. Do you agree? Is the public swayed by decisive action and the "rally 'round the flag" phenomenon? Do we mistakenly give more credit to the power of the media?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Norton, Richard J. "Public Opinion," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004. (Examines the sources, formulation, and aspect of public opinion.)

2. Calhoun, William M. "Interest Groups," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, June 2002. (Briefly discusses organized interest groups and their role in influencing decision makers and the formulation of U.S. policy.)

3. Darley, William M. "War Policy, Public Support, and the Media," *Parameters*, 2005. (Presents numerous historical studies that contend public opinion is influenced to a far greater degree by decisive leadership and action than by media coverage.)

#### **E. Supplementary Readings**

1. Erikson, Robert S., and Kent L. Tedin. *American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content and Impact*. New York: Longman, 2001. (Discusses the make-up of the U.S. public, how public opinion is formed and trends in public opinion analyses. Available as an Inter-library loan through the NWC Library).

2. Yankelovich, Daniel, and I. M. Destler. *Beyond the Beltway: Engaging the Public in U.S. Foreign Policy*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1994. (Examines post-Cold War developments in the United States and the significant increase in the importance of economic issues in the mind of the American people. Available in the NWC Library—E885.B49 1994.)

3. Graber, Doris A. *Media Power in Politics*. 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: *Congressional Quarterly*, 2000. (Reviews different manners in which media influences U.S. public perceptions and national policies. Available in the NWC Library—HN90.m3 M43 2000.)

## **PMP-9 DOMESTIC POLITICAL SYSTEM (LECTURE)**

**A. Focus.** PMP seminar sessions on the Domestic Political System (DPS) introduce and explore pertinent DPS actors, rules, and tools, including Congress, the federal budget, interest groups, public opinion, and domestic media. This session will provide an opportunity to hear from a Washington “insider” in the DPS, either a principal actor or someone closely associated with national security policy and decision making and the use of domestic rules and tools in this process. This will be an opportunity for you ask frank questions of, and receive candid answers from, an experienced practitioner in national security decision making and the domestic political arena.

### **B. Objectives**

- Identify and examine the domestic rule sets and tools employed by the speaker.
- Review the role that the speaker, rules, and tools might have in influencing policy decisions.
- Consider what, if any, impact these elements might have on military decision making.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1b, 1d, 3e, 4e, and 5c.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Those who have not participated in domestic political processes often have difficulty appreciating the complexity of the interactions between and among both houses of Congress, the American public, the domestic media, and a myriad of interest and lobbying groups. Approach this presentation with an eye toward how elements within the DPS use domestic rules and tools to assert influence on domestic and national security policy making. What tactics and strategies are they employing, why, and to what effect? While the lecture is important, the question and answer session that follows will be key in putting the speaker’s experiences in context. Before the lecture give some thought to potential questions, perhaps drawing on your experience with the legislature, Congressional staff, media, or the budget process in your previous positions.

### **D. Required Reading**

1. Prior to this session, faculty may hand out biographical information and articles relevant to the speaker and/or the topic he or she plans to address.

## **PMP-10 CONGRESS AND THE MILITARY**

**A. Focus.** As the noted constitutional scholar Edwin Corwin famously proclaimed, the U.S. Constitution and the separation of powers it outlines is “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy.” This session examines the role played by Congress in this struggle for power and influence in the national security domain. Congress’ powers are spelled out in Article I of the Constitution, at times with specificity but at other times more ambiguously. As a result, how, why, and when Congress exercises these powers is tied to its relationship with the executive branch as well as the domestic and international environment in which these decisions are made. This session explores changing processes and powers of Congress vis-à-vis the executive branch over time, the rules and tools that the legislative branch has at its disposal, and how it utilizes these capabilities in order to influence the national security and foreign policy making process.

### **B. Objectives**

- Comprehend the important role of the legislative branch in the policymaking process, its actors, rules, and tools, and the processes by which Congress introduces, develops, and enacts legislation as well as its oversight responsibilities vis-à-vis the executive branch.
- Analyze the special relationship between Congress and the U.S. military.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 2a, 3e, and 4b.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The first reading briefly describes the powers of Congress relative to national security as provided for in the Constitution. It also discusses some of the most critical legislative dynamics that affect how Congress operates. It is predominantly the prerogative of Congress, not the Executive Branch, to determine how taxpayers’ money is spent. Just as force planners attempt to answer the question of how much is enough, Congress answers the question of how much is authorized (given permission) and appropriated (given actual dollars). These numbers, which often conflict, are developed through the federal budget process. Some knowledge of this process is central to complete your understanding of how the U.S. government allocates defense resources. When involved in any part of the defense resource allocation process, you should be sensitive to the needs and peculiarities of the Congressional process. It is, after all, the culmination of the entire effort that confirms or changes all that has gone before. Some issues to consider in this session include:

- Why is enacting the federal budget so contentious and time-consuming?
- What are some of the national priorities that compete with defense?
- What factors and contexts make defense funding unevenly vulnerable, i.e., easy to cut in some ways and difficult to cut in others?

2. The second reading by ADM William Crowe reviews the vital role of Congress and the necessity of working with the Legislative Branch. The author describes the necessity and

difficulty of the armed services' relationships with Congress. He highlights how essential it is to have an understanding of how Congress works, as well as the advantageous nature of personal relationships with different lawmakers. In very candid remarks, ADM Crowe provides insight into the differences between the military officer and the lawmaker, and the effect this has in the complex world of turning ideas, initiatives, and interests into laws and budget documents.

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Turregano, LTC Clemson G. and LtCol Doug Mason. "The Constitution, the Congress, and the Federal Budget," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004. (Briefly discusses the origins of the Constitution and democratic thought as well as the role of Congress in the national security policy process.)
2. Crowe, William J. "Congress and Defense," Chapter 13 in *The Line of Fire*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993. (Discusses personal perceptions of practicing the "political arts" in dealing with Congress on national security matters.)
3. Prior to this session, faculty may hand out additional, current-events oriented articles.

#### **E. Supplementary Readings**

1. Hamilton, Lee H. *How Congress Works and Why You Should Care*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004. (Congressman Hamilton is a former legislator and co-chair of the 9-11 Commission. He provides a useful and brief overview of how Congress functions.)
2. Mann, Thomas E., and Norman J. Ornstein. *The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track* (Institutions of American Democracy Series). New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. (Mann and Ornstein are two of America's pre-eminent experts on Congress.)
3. Howell, William and Jon Pevehouse. "When Congress Stops Wars: Partisan Politics and Presidential Power," *Foreign Affairs* (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, September/October 2007), pp. 95-107. (The authors take issue with the Mann-Ornstein view, among others, that Congress has been unusually lax in exercising its oversight authorities.)
4. The House and Senate websites provide information on the history and legislative processes of each chamber (see <http://www.house.gov> and <http://www.senate.gov>). A good site for general information on interest groups is: <http://www.opensecrets.org/lobbyists/>.

## **PMP-11 CASE STUDY: THE NEXT TANKER**

**A. Focus.** This case study offers the opportunity to see how members of Congress answer to their constituents and must take into account the local effects of policy and procurement decisions. The President is elected by voters from across the nation and looks at issues in a broader context. He is supported by agencies of the federal government that are led by civilian appointees but are made up of civilian or military members who are expected to work within federal laws and departmental policies. Members of Congress review and make recommendations concerning programs and defense systems. Acting together they can also make laws. Because of the high stakes involved, the debate is lively and contentious, and often targeted by special interest groups who seek to influence the decision making process. One of the most powerful tools at each of these groups' disposal is the media, which can influence public opinion and the outcome of the decision making process.

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand the role of Congress in the procurement of defense systems.
- Understand how special interest groups including major corporations, seek to influence procurement decisions.
- Understand the role and power of the media during the debate of ideas involving procurement of defense systems.
- Understand the military officer's role in the procurement process.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 2a, 4a, and 4b.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The first reading is a case study used to demonstrate activity that takes place after the Department of Defense decides what it would like to procure. Congress, through a system of committees, authorizes and funds programs. These committees do not always reach the same conclusions. The case will allow us to analyze the effects of legislative inputs on the decision to procure the next-generation tanker aircraft for the United States Air Force. As you read this case, take note of the various inputs from different parts of the Input/Output Model and note the effects that these inputs have on the decision maker and the other actors involved.

2. The second required reading brings "The Next Tanker" case study up to date by including recent developments.

### **D. Required Readings**

1. Ducey, Roger H., Col Dana Struckman, and CDR John Segerson, "The Next Tanker," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, September 2008.

2. CDR John Segerson. "The Next Tanker Addendum," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper. Faculty will provide this reading to the seminars.



## **PMP-12 PMP MID-TERM EXAMINATION**

**A. Focus.** The PMP mid-term examination requires you to demonstrate mastery of the ways in which the international political system, the domestic political system, and various tools, rules, and norms associated with them affect U.S. policymaking on major national security issues. The criteria for evaluating your written responses are as printed in the NSDM syllabus.

### **B. Objectives**

- To evaluate your understanding of the course material presented in Division I of Policy Making and Process.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2c, and 3e.

### **C. Case.**

1. A case will be distributed prior to the examination.

## **PMP-13 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES**

**A. Focus.** There are a variety of different ways to explain how national security decisions are made. One perspective is that national security decision making is a rational process. From this perspective, policy choices are made by decision makers who carefully evaluate a wide range of possible options, understand the consequences of each option relative to well-defined national interests, and choose the option that best promotes those national interests. Other perspectives emphasize the different interests, experiences, and analytical capabilities of the various organizations and individuals involved in the decision-making process. These perspectives see decisions as resulting from organizational processes, imperatives, and pressures; from the interpersonal dynamics among key advisors; or from the personal convictions, values, or cognitive limitations of the decision maker. The Cuban missile crisis is used mainly to illustrate the usefulness of the four perspectives in analyzing policy choices, but also is an example of a major Cold War confrontation involving the risk of nuclear escalation.

### **B. Objective**

- Illustrate the analytical elements and assumptions in the rational actor, organizational behavior, governmental-politics, and cognitive perspectives on the decision making process.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 2c, 3e, 4b, and 4e.

### **C. Guidance**

It is important to remember that these analytical perspectives are tools employed by analysts to understand decision-making processes. They are not tools chosen by the decision maker to arrive at a decision.

Broad questions that might be addressed in seminar include the following:

1. What are the essential elements and assumptions in the rational actor perspective? Does the rational actor model fully explain the decisions in the Cuban missile crisis?
2. What are the essential elements and assumptions in the organizational behavior, governmental-politics, and cognitive perspectives? What insights into the Cuban missile crisis can be gained through these perspectives?
3. How can analytical perspectives be used by someone working within the national security arena?
4. In its ultimate approach to the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis, did the United States choose the most appropriate policy?

### **D. Required Readings**

1. Miskel, James F. "Four Perspectives on Decision Making," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2001. (An overview of four different ways of analyzing a national

security decision and the relationship of these perspectives to the Naval War College input-output model. This reading draws heavily upon a recently updated classic political science text, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow.)

2. Norton, Richard J., James F. Miskel and Keith Duncan. "The Cuban Missile Crisis," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, May 2001. (A concise summary of the Cuban missile crisis.)

3. Stigler, Andrew. "Kennedy's Blunder? Reappraising America's Options in the Cuban Missile Crisis," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, January 2004.

### **E. Supplementary Readings**

1. Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. 2nd ed. New York: Longman, 1999. (The Cuban missile crisis is analyzed from the perspectives of three different decision-making models. Available NWC library—E841.A44 1999.)

2. Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr., and Jacquelyn K. Davis, eds. *National Security Decisions—The Participants Speak*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990. (Oral history interviews with numerous participants in contemporary national security decision making. Available in the NWC Library—UA23.N2485 1990.)

3. Brugioni, Dino A. *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: Random House, 1993. (A detailed account of the Cuban missile crisis. Available in the NWC Library—E8841.876 1991.)

4. Wyden, Peter H. *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979. (An account, drawn heavily from survivors' narratives, of the CIA-backed invasion that helped set the stage for the missile crisis. Available in the NWC Library—F1788.W9.)

5. May, Ernest R., and Philip Zelikow. *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1997. (Transcripts of the audio tapes of EXCOM meetings during the Cuban missile crisis. Available in the NWC Library—E841 K4655 1997.)

6. Kagan, Donald. *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*. New York: Doubleday, 1995. (Contains a chapter on the Cuban missile crisis critically analyzing the Kennedy administration's policies before and during the crisis. Available in the NWC Library—D25.5 K27 1995.)

7. McMaster, H. R. *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that Led to Vietnam*. New York: HarperCollins, 1997. (Chapter on Cuban missile crisis summarizes the crisis and suggests how the lessons learned from the crisis may have affected policy in Vietnam. Available in the NWC Library—D8558 M43 1997.)

8. There are a number of extensive websites on the crisis, including:

- [http:// library.thinkquest.org/11046/](http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/);
- [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba\\_mis\\_cri/](http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/); and
- <http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/x2jfk.html>.

## **PMP-14 THE RATIONAL ACTOR PERSPECTIVE**

**A. Focus.** Rational choice theory emerged out of economics to become a widely used approach in the study of political science, sociology, psychology, business, and law. In political science, it has been applied to the study of both international and domestic politics. There has been a wide-ranging application of rational choice, covering everything from international security issues to voting behavior. Varying approaches and models are used because there is no agreement on a single best way to apply rational choice. However, generally speaking, when discussing how decisions are made, rational choice argues that individual choices (or choices by unitary actors) drive social and political outcomes. Governments, like individuals, have preferences and will order their alternatives in terms of these preferences for different outcomes. Being rational, individuals will select a strategy that yields the highest utility.

### **B. Objectives**

- Analyze the basic argument of rational choice theory and understand its implications for the study of decision making.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 2a, 2c and 4e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. What are the basic assumptions made by the rational actor perspective? Do the fundamentals of the approach have merit?
2. Do states tend to be more rational in some areas of foreign policy (such as economic policy, military acquisitions, human rights, etc.) than in other areas?
3. Are democracies more or less rational than nondemocratic states?

### **D. Required Readings**

1. Stigler, Andrew. "Rational Choice and International Politics," Naval War College faculty paper, August 2008.
2. Additional readings may be distributed prior to the seminar.

## **PMP-15 THE PRESIDENT AND THE MAKING OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY**

**A. Focus.** This session discusses the powers of the president in national security decision making, various management styles presidents have employed to get advice and information, the role of the National Security Council (NSC), and the changing relationship between the president and the Congress.

The Constitution provides the foundation for the president's responsibility for national security and foreign policy. Over the last two centuries, wars, emergencies, and other events have increased or decreased the power of the presidency. Since the Cold War, the increasing complexity of international problems has required that the president gain advice and information from a wide variety of expert sources, all while working within an expanding executive branch.

The National Security Act of 1947 established a formal body of advisors called the National Security Council. The law provides the president with an organization that provides advice, analysis, and interagency coordination on national security issues and policy formulation. The president maintains the ability to determine how the formal processes and principal advisors are utilized within his administration. Also, he possesses the ability to establish informal processes based on his leadership style and personality. The law also provides the president with an Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA). Selected by the president, the APNSA works as his personal advisor on national security policy. The president's professional and personal relationship with the APNSA and the role the APNSA played in the decision-making process has been different among presidential administrations.

Some presidents have relied heavily upon the interagency process of the NSC to frame the discussion by providing analysis and coordination of the issues and policy recommendations. Other presidents have made their decisions alone or after consultation with a small group of trusted advisors. Finally, some presidents have taken inputs and been directly influenced by personal contacts and international or domestic events that are seemingly unrelated or not directed related to the national security issue. Should national security decisions be the result of a rational process? Does the NSC and the APNSA provide such a tool?

The president's relationship with the Congress has also evolved over time. The president emerged as a prime mover behind foreign policy during the First World War. The office retained primacy on most security policy issues throughout the early Cold War. Congress increasingly limited presidential power after apparent foreign policy failures like Vietnam. Recent cases provide a prism through which to examine the relationship between the president and Congress and assess whether the president is, as the second reading puts it, "still dominant in foreign affairs?"

### **B. Objectives**

- Analyze the role of the president in formulating national security policy.
- Evaluate the interrelationships between the president and his key advisors within the formal and informal structures of the national security system.

- Understand the role of the National Security Council staff and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
- Understand the changing relationships between the president and the Congress on foreign policy issues.
- Assess the evolution of U.S. policy toward North Korea with respect to the above issues.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2a, 2c, 3e, 4b, and 4e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Williams and Sullivan discuss the role of the president in the national security decision making process and the responsibilities and function of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA). What tools and rules in the national security decision making process are available to the president? What is the function of the APNSA?

2. LeLoup and Shull ask whether the president is still dominant on foreign policy. They present a number of interesting graphs on the historical relationship. What do they look like if we draw the lines out to the current administration and Congress? They then assess four cases. Do they prove their point about the evolving relationship?

3. The North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, pressured the United States and other regional actors with nuclear blackmail in an effort to force the world towards a solution to his country's ongoing problems. The case study by Norton studies the policy options and the decision made by President Bush.

### **D. Required Readings**

1. Sullivan, Sean C. and David Williams. "Crafting Foreign Policy: Understanding the Role, Power and Style of the Chief Executive," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, August 2004. (A discussion on the president and the APNSA and their roles and responsibilities in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.)

2. LeLoup, Lance T. and Steven A. Shull. "Foreign Policy," Chapter 5 in *The President and Congress: Collaboration and Combat in National Policymaking*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999. (Assessment of this changing relationship over time and on four particular issues: Gulf War I, Cuba Sanctions in the mid-1990s, Nicaraguan Contras, and Panama Canal Treaties.)

3. Norton, Richard. "North Korea," in *Case Studies in Policy Making*. 11th ed. Edited by Policy Making and Process Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2008.

### **E. Supplementary Readings**

1. White House *National Security Presidential Directive-1* website, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm>. (Describes the makeup and responsibilities of President George W. Bush's National Security Council, as well as provides links to other Presidential Decision Directives and Executive Orders.)

## **PMP-16 DEFENSE RESOURCE ALLOCATION (LECTURE)**

**A. Focus.** The defense resource allocation process is the means by which the U.S. government decides determines strategy, considers and accepts risk, and develops and funds force structure that possess the capabilities necessary to execute national security objectives. The decisions made in this process govern the activities of every individual associated with the Department of Defense and affect the future capabilities of the U.S. armed forces. Therefore, it is important that you, as future leaders in the national security arena, understand at least the general structure and objectives of the process. This lecture provides an overview of the process for identifying requirements, developing programs responsive to those requirements, funding the programs in DoD's budget, and supporting the programs through Congressional budget decisions.

### **B. Objective**

- Analyze the policymaking process that is used by the U.S. government to devise strategy, identify requirements, develop programs, and provide resources for the nation's defense.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 2a, 2c, 4a, 4b, and 4c.

### **C. Guidance**

1. During the PMP course you will become familiar with the policymaking processes that govern how governments operate. This lecture will examine the components of DoD's defense planning and resource allocation processes and focus on the functional aspects of the process as the foundation for subsequent discussions in the seminar. We ask that you:

- Keep focused on the strategic picture that organizes how the DoD allocates resources using various mechanisms.
- Note where, and how, the components of the process interconnect.
- Note the key organizational players and the role each plays.

### **D. Required Reading**

1. Sullivan, Sean C. "Defense Resource Allocation – The Formal Processes in U.S. Defense Planning," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, 30 September 2007.



## **PMP-17 THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND INTERAGENCY**

**A. Focus.** The Interagency System assists the president in developing, coordinating, articulating, and implementing National Security Policy. A large number of departments and agencies beyond the Defense and State Departments have important national security-related responsibilities and are active participants in the Interagency System. Additionally, since all participants within the process can influence the outcome, even a policy decision that is primarily military in nature, can be directly affected by non-military agencies. Studying the system will increase your effectiveness within the process and is essential to your understanding of how foreign security policy is developed within the executive branch.

### **B. Objectives**

- Describe the general interagency structures and processes of the federal government.
- Identify the authorities and roles of the key federal departments and agencies with respect to national security policy making.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1d, 2a, 3e, and 4e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The Interagency System originates from the National Security Act of 1947 in response to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. How do the actions of our government after this intelligence and security failure compare with those following the fall of the Soviet Union and September 11, 2001?

2. As the reading points out, all of the members of the National Security Council are also members of the Homeland Security Council. What are the implications of this redundancy?

3. The Interagency Process has continued to evolve since its conception in 1947. In addition to the National Security Council, the National Economic Council and the Homeland Security Council now assist the president with the formulation of national policy. What are the pros and cons of continuing this expansion to address other pressing world problems such as health and the environment?

4. While the NSC Staff assists with monitoring the execution of policy decisions by other agencies and departments within the Executive Branch, it does not implement foreign policy. Is this a necessary restriction?

5. If required to participate as a member of a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC), what are some actions that can increase your potential for success? How should that success be ultimately measured?

### **D. Required Reading**

1. Whittaker, Alan G., Frederick C. Smith and Elizabeth McKune. *The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2007. (Excerpts). *You may be familiar with this reading*

*from your work in Joint Military Operations. If so, as you look at it again consider how your new understanding of the rational actor perspective may help explain the nature of the interagency process and the structure and processes of the NSC.*

#### **E. Supplementary Readings**

1. Each of the government agencies has an official website on the internet. A good site with links to many of these is: <http://www.usa.gov>.
2. Rothkopf, David. "Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power," New York, NY: *Public Affairs*, May 2005.

## **PMP-18 THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM (JSPS)**

**A. Focus.** As the principal military advisor to the president and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) shoulders a significant portion of the responsibility to develop strategic direction, strategic plans, and resource requirements for our national defense. JSPS is the planning system used by CJCS to achieve these objectives. This session focuses on JSPS and provides the opportunity to examine how JSPS works to shape the National Military Strategy (NMS), operational plans, and provide programming advice to the Secretary of Defense's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process.

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand the contribution of JSPS to the development of national security strategy and military strategy
- Comprehend the purpose of JSPS and how it contributes to the resource allocation process.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 2a, 2c, 4a, 4b, and 4c.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The resource allocation lecture described the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) in broad functional terms. Using this background information, this session provides a more detailed discussion of the major components of the formal defense planning process. In the first reading, the chairman's Title 10 responsibilities are delineated. The chairman is required to perform **strategic assessments**, provide **strategic direction**, prepare **strategic plans**, and provide **programming advice**. The people and organizations that participate, the documents produced, and the procedures and events that occur in JSPS, function together to assist the Chairman in the execution of his Title 10 responsibilities. The session also describes how JSPS interacts with other systems within the formal process, specifically the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) process.

2. The objective of the JSPS reading is to provide an understanding of this planning system and use this knowledge to discuss the system and its contribution to national security planning, strategy development, and joint military operations. JSPS is intended to be a rational process where goals and objectives are linked to resources, courses of action are developed and risk is assessed. Consider these questions as you read about JSPS:

- Are the right people participating and do they have the appropriate level of influence on the decision maker?
- Does the process require more or less centralization?
- Are the documents relevant, tightly connected to the process, and timely?
- Are feasible alternatives assessed and compared on the basis of cost-benefit?
- Are risks assessed and prudently distributed?
- Is feedback provided and considered in subsequent planning?

- How effectively do the various aspects of the system interact?
- Is the process well-directed? Does the decision maker provide appropriate guidance?
- Can the process anticipate change and respond appropriately?

3. The second reading, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), describes a new Department of Defense process developed to identify joint capability requirements and to then provide decision support for transforming the current military force to the force of the future. JCIDS is based on the concept that national defense and military challenges can be solved not only by the development and procurement of platforms, systems and equipment but also through changes in doctrine, training, and innovative leadership and organizations. Consider these issues as you read about JCIDS:

- How are strategic planning documents used in the JCIDS process?
- How are strategic assessments used in the JCIDS process? Are these assessment conducted by the multiple sources?
- Is JCIDS effective in developing responses to strategic requirements?
- Does JCIDS provide the Chairman an effective means to input into the development and procurement of platforms, systems and equipment?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Sullivan, Sean C. "Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, 20 July 2007. (This paper describes the JSPS process.)

2. Sullivan, Sean C. "Joint Capabilities Integration Development System and Functional Capabilities Boards," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, 20 July 2007. (This paper describes the development of capabilities-based planning and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System [JCIDS]).

#### **E. Supplementary Readings**

1. National Defense University. *Joint Forces Staff College Pub 1: The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000*. Norfolk, Va.: 2000. [http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/current\\_students/documents\\_policies/documents/jsogpub\\_1\\_2000.pdf](http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/current_students/documents_policies/documents/jsogpub_1_2000.pdf). (This document [also known as the "Purple Book"] is a textbook used by the Joint Forces Staff College. It discusses the complex system of joint planning and execution used by the U.S. military. Additionally it describes joint and combined organizations and their command relationships; outlines the tools and responsibilities of action officers on a joint staff; and provides reference to additional materials useful to a joint staff officer.)

2. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C., 16 March 2006, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>. (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America provides a strategic assessment of the world and describes U.S. national interests and objectives, threats to U.S. national interests, and provides a security strategy that protects U.S. interests and achieves U.S. national objectives.)

3. Secretary of Defense. *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington, D.C., 6 February 2006, <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2006.pdf>. (The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 defined the requirement for the QDR. The Department of Defense designed the QDR to be a fundamental and comprehensive examination of America's defense needs: potential threats, strategy, force structure, readiness posture, military modernization programs, defense infrastructure, and other elements of the defense program. The QDR Report is intended to provide a blueprint for a strategy-based, balanced, and affordable defense program.)

4. Secretary of Defense. *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, D.C., March 2005, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf>.

5. CJCS. *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004*. Washington, D.C., 2004, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other\\_pubs/nms\\_2004.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/other_pubs/nms_2004.pdf). (This document provides the United States National Military Strategy.)

6. CJCS. "Joint Strategic Planning System," CJCSI 3100.01A. Washington, D.C., 1 September 1999 current as of 12 September 2003, [http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs\\_directives/cdata/unlimit/3100\\_01.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3100_01.pdf). (This instruction provides joint policy and guidance for the function of the Joint Strategic Planning System [JSPS]. It describes the process governing the operation of the JSPS and the documents that are a product of the system. The instruction assigns responsibility for preparation and promulgation of these documents.)

7. CJCS. "Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Theater Engagement Plans," CJCSI 3113.01. Washington, D.C., 1 April 1998 current as of 17 April 2001, [http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs\\_directives/cdata/unlimit/3113\\_01.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3113_01.pdf). (This instruction establishes responsibilities and procedures for the management and review of Theater Engagement Plans submitted by regional Combatant Commanders to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for integration into the global family of engagement plans.)

8. DoD. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*. Washington, D.C., August 2005, [http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved\\_ccjov2.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved_ccjov2.pdf). (The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations describes how the Joint Force intends to operate within the next 15 to 20 years. It provides the operational context for the transformation of the Armed Forces of the United States by linking strategic guidance with the integrated application of Joint Force capabilities.)

9. CJCS. "The Functional Capabilities Board Process," CJCSI 3137.01C. Washington, D.C., 12 November 2004, [http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs\\_directives/cdata/unlimit/3137\\_01.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3137_01.pdf). (This instruction provides policy and guidance on the role, organization, process, interrelationships, management, and operation of the Functional Capabilities Boards [FCB]).

10. CJCS. "Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System," CJCSI 3170.01F. Washington, D.C., 01 May 2007, [http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs\\_directives/cdata/unlimit/3170\\_01.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3170_01.pdf). (This instruction establishes the policies and procedures of JCIDS. JCIDS supports CJCS and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council [JROC] in identifying, assessing, and prioritizing Joint military capability needs. Validated and approved JCIDS documents provide the Chairman's advice and assessment in support of his statutory requirement.)

11. CJCS. "Chairman's Readiness System," CJCSI 3401.01D. Washington, D.C., 10 December 2004. [http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs\\_directives/cdata/unlimit/3401\\_01.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/3401_01.pdf). (This instruction establishes uniform policy and procedures for assessing and reporting the current readiness of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review.)

12. CJCS. "Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council," CJCSI 5123.01C. Washington, D.C., 9 November 2006. [http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs\\_directives/cdata/unlimit/5123\\_01.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/5123_01.pdf). (This instruction establishes the Joint Requirements Oversight Council as an advisory council to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It delineates JROC composition and responsibilities and further defines the JROC role in the requirements and acquisition process.)

13. CJCS. "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander in Chiefs of the Combatant Commands, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System," CJCSI 8501.01A. Washington, D.C., 3 December 2004, [http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs\\_directives/cdata/unlimit/8501\\_01.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/8501_01.pdf). (This instruction describes participation by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders of the combatant commands, and the Joint Staff in the DoD PPBE process.)

14. CJCS. Joint Pub 5-0, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations." Washington, D.C., 13 April 1995, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new\\_pubs/jp5\\_0.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf). (This publication is the keystone document of the joint planning series. It sets forth fundamental principles and doctrine that guide planning by U.S. armed forces in joint and multinational operations.)

## **PMP-19 THE ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR PERSPECTIVE**

**A. Focus.** Government policy and behavior are often summarized as actions chosen by a unitary, rational decision maker. Governments, however, are not individuals but large and complex organizations that dominate the national security environment. Graham Allison describes governments as “a vast conglomerate of loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own.” Governments perceive issues through the sensors of component organizations, and those organizations define their alternatives on particular issues according to predetermined standard operating procedures and organizational biases. Government organizations tend to be bureaucratic and are characterized by hierarchical structure, formal lines of authority, degrees of specialization, and systems of standard operating procedures. Like all large organizations, government agencies develop their own unique culture. Culture has many positive influences including the development of a strong sense of mission among organization members. Yet, culture also presents significant challenges including selective attention to tasks that are part of the culture at the expense of other tasks. Culture also causes organizations to employ informal and unofficial processes. Understanding how organizations behave in general, and how they respond to change and crises in their environment, is essential for the national security executive. Translating that understanding to success in effective policy making will remain a continuous challenge for the organization’s leadership.

### **B. Objectives**

- Examine the behavioral characteristics and limitations of large national security organizations in formulating and implementing effective policies.
- Examine the government of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as an example of organizational behavior, and make comparisons to other governments.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 2a, 2c and 4e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Allison notes several reasons why the rational actor model is insufficient to understand why governments make the national security decisions they make. What does the rational actor model lack according to Allison? How does the organizational behavior perspective differ from the rational actor perspective? What are the implications of viewing government decisions from this perspective?

2. Organizational culture affects the performance of government agencies. How do these tendencies affect the national security decision making process?

3. What are the dynamics of the U.S. bureaucracy and the political executives (un-elected political appointees) who influence and carry out the administration’s policy? In general, how can these factors influence national security policies and decisions? When considered in concert with organizational culture, what are the implications for crisis response?

4. Do you have any personal insight into the culture of the organizations discussed in this session?

5. What insights from organizational behavior can be brought to bear on the “Saddam’s Delusions” case study?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Allison, Graham and Philip Zelikow. “Model II: Organizational Behavior,” Excerpt from Chapter Three in *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. 2nd ed. New York: Longman, 1999. (The authors provide an overview of organizational behavior and its impact on decision making processes.)

2. Mason, Douglas E. “Organizational Culture and Bureaucracy,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, March 2005. (A compendium of themes from political scientists regarding the impact of organizational culture and the federal bureaucracy.)

3. Kevin Woods, James Lacey and Williamson Murray, “Saddam’s Delusions: The View From the Inside,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2006, pp. 2-26.

#### **E. Supplementary Readings**

1. Goodsell, Charles T. *The Case for Bureaucracy*. 3rd ed. Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1994. (Provides an interesting counterargument to the negative views of public bureaucracies that are usually expressed. Available in the NWC library—JK421.G64 1994.)

2. Bolman, Lee G., and Terrence E. Deal. *Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice and Leadership*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997. (Presents a large complex body of theory, research, and practice on organizations and leadership. Available in the NWC Library—HD31 .B6135 2003.)

3. U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services. *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, Staff Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985, 354–370. (The “Locher Report,” which criticized organization and decision making procedures of DoD. Cited pages highlight organizational problems seen during contingencies including USS *Pueblo*, Iran hostage rescue, and Grenada. Available in the NWC library—UA23.3.D42 1985.)

4. Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration. *The United States Government Manual 1999/2000*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999. (The official handbook of the Federal Government. Provides comprehensive information on the agencies of the legislative, judicial and executive branches. Available in the NWC library—JK421.A3 1999–2000.)



## **PMP-20 PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, AND EXECUTION (PPBE)**

**A. Focus.** The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) uses the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process to develop and integrate defense policy, military strategy, service programs, and the DoD budget through the allocation of resources to meet the near-term and future warfighting needs of the U.S. military. The products of the PPBE process include strategic plans, programs, and ultimately a budget input to the president. This session focuses on PPBE, and provides a systems understanding of this process.

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand the purpose of PPBE and how it contributes to resource allocation.
- Assess opportunities where PPBE actors, leaders, staff and organizations, have the ability to influence the PPBE process.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 2a, 2c, 4a, 4b and 4c.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process reading presents an executive-level overview of PPBE in the context of the resource allocation process. PPBE is the SecDef's strategic planning and resource management system. In the Planning Phase, the process considers the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS) and develops strategic planning guidance used as a frame of reference for the determination and development joint capabilities. In the programming phase, the process determines programs that meet the required and validated capability needs of U.S. military forces. Programming inputs into the Budgeting Phase of defense planning where the services develop their Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) uses the PPBE process to develop the department's budget submission to the president. In the Execution Phase of the process, program performance and budget execution is evaluated and program or budget changes could result. PPBE is a complex and highly interactive process that is founded on extensive collaborative effort from numerous organizations and agencies within DoD.

2. PPBE is DoD's process where strategy capabilities and force structure are linked. Determine the objectives of each phase of the PPBE process and examine this system critically. Think beyond the details of the process and analyze the structure of the process regarding inputs and outputs. Evaluate the potential impacts of the Perspectives on this DoD system. Consider the following questions as you read about PPBE:

- Is strategy effectively used in the development of capabilities and programs?
- What time frame is defined as the future in the PPBE process? Is strategy used to drive programming?
- Is the relationship between JSPS and the Joint Staff and PPBE and the OSD staff effective?

- Does OSD provide the services with sufficient input and information regarding capability needs and programming guidance?
- What impact does the time requirement of budget deadlines have on the process?
- Does the Budget and Programming Review process achieve the intended objective of increased efficiency?
- How do the sub-cultures, organizational structures, systems of SOPs of the services interact with the PPBE process?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Sullivan, Sean C. "Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, 20 August 2008. (This paper describes the PPBE process.)
2. Sullivan, Sean C. "Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, 30 October 2007. The case details the acquisition process of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles.

#### **E. Supplementary Readings**

1. National Defense University. *Joint Forces Staff College Pub 1: The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000*. Norfolk, Va., 2000, <http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu>. (This document (also known as the "Purple Book") is the basic textbook used by the Joint Forces Staff College. It presents the "big picture" of the complex system of joint planning and execution used by the U.S. military. It describes Joint and combined organizations and their command relationships; outlines the tools and responsibilities of action officers on a joint staff, and provides reference to additional materials useful to a joint staff officer.)
2. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C., 17 September 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>. (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America provides a strategic assessment of the world and describes U.S. national interests and objectives, threats to U.S. national interests, and provides a security strategy that protects U.S. interests and achieves U.S. national objectives.)
3. Secretary of Defense. *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review* Washington, D.C., 6 February 2006, <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2006.pdf>. (The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 defined the requirement for the QDR. The Department of Defense designed the QDR to be a fundamental and comprehensive examination of America's defense needs: potential threats, strategy, force structure, readiness posture, military modernization programs, defense infrastructure, and other elements of the defense program. The QDR Report is intended to provide a blueprint for a strategy-based, balanced, and affordable defense program.)
4. National Defense Panel. *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*. Washington, D.C., December 1997, <http://www.dtic.mil/ndp/FullDoc2.pdf>. (This report was

required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. In addition to conducting a comprehensive assessment of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the National Defense panel was required to submit an independent assessment of alternative force structures for U.S. armed forces. This report provides recommendations to SecDef and Congress regarding the optimal force structure to meet anticipated threats to U.S. national security through the year 2010 and beyond.)

5. CJCS. *Service Transformation Roadmaps*. Washington, D.C., [http://www.dtic.mil/oai/ntv/service\\_transformation.htm](http://www.dtic.mil/oai/ntv/service_transformation.htm). (This website contains the transformation roadmaps for all of the U.S. Armed Services.)

6. Secretary of Defense. *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C., March 2005, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf>.

7. CJCS. *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004*. Washington, D.C., 2004. <http://www.ndu/library/docs/NatMilStrat2004.pdf>. (This document provides the United States National Military Strategy.)

8. Department of Defense. *The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)*, DoDD 7045.14. Washington, D.C., 22 May 1984, [http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d704514wch1\\_052284/d704514p.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d704514wch1_052284/d704514p.pdf). (This DoD Directive establishes the basic policy, procedures, and responsibilities for PPBS).

9. Department of Defense. Control of Planning Programming Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) Documents and Information. Washington, D.C., 27 March 2004, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/memos/ppbe.pdf>. (This DoD memorandum provides the policy for the disclosure of PPBE documents and information.)

10. CJCS. "Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Theater Engagement Plans," CJCSI 3113.01. Washington, D.C., 1 April 1998, [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3113\\_01.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/cjcsd/cjcsi/3113_01.pdf). (This instruction establishes responsibilities and procedures for the management and review of Theater Engagement Plans submitted by regional Combatant Commanders to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for integration into the global family of engagement plans.)

11. U.S. Code. <http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode>. (This website lists the laws in force as of December 20, 2004. Those that pertain to the U.S. Armed Forces are found under Title 10 and those that pertain to National Defense are found under Title 50.)

## **PMP-21 THE GOVERNMENTAL-POLITICS PERSPECTIVE**

**A. Focus.** In any environment where important decisions must be made and rigorous analytical solutions are difficult to obtain, politics will necessarily enter into the selection of alternatives. Power and influence are the tools by which policy decisions are often made. The unique characteristics of the national security bureaucracy dictate that participants must understand and exercise personal power and influence in order to be consequential. Personal power may be necessary, but is rarely sufficient to affect policy decisions. In the policymaking arena, success usually depends upon the assistance, or at least the cooperation, of others. With many advocates competing for limited resources, nor is formal authority alone adequate to accomplish one's mission, and issues seldom have a course of action so clearly superior that reasonable people could not disagree. Thus, the most effective individuals in this environment are those who understand the tools of power and influence; how these tools are acquired; and how they are used effectively. In this session, we discuss the tools of power and influence and analyze their sources and application.

### **B. Objectives**

- Describe the nature of power and illustrate the ways in which power and influence are applied on a situational basis to shape the national security decision making process.
- Comprehend and contrast the governmental-politics perspective with the other perspectives and how this perspective helps us better understand the art of policymaking.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 2a, 2c, 4b, and 5c.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The first reading provides an overview of governmental politics, explaining the types of power and influence that pertain and illustrating how these can be, and have been, applied to the policymaking process. Have you witnessed some of these dynamics? Were they effective? Why or why not? Have you applied any of them yourself, to greater or lesser effect? What professional, institutional, and ethical considerations arise in the application of such powers and influence, and how might one deal with them?

2. Halperin, Morton and Clapp describe how officials strategize and plan their approach to affecting policy decisions, how they employ and magnify their power and influence, and how they do so to influence the president and his staff. How important do you think it is to plan out a strategy before acting? What if there is not enough time to plan your strategy? Is it essential to be "in the loop" when decisions on policy are being made? What other tools might be used?

### **D. Required Readings**

1. Walsh, Kathleen. "Power and Influence in Governmental Politics," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, July 2008.

2. Excerpts from Halperin, Morton, and Priscilla Clapp. "Planning a Decision Strategy," *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,

2006. (The authors describe “the process of systematically working out a strategy designed to secure a desired government decision and action.” Among the key considerations in making this happen, the authors point out, is how the issue is framed and presented to the decision maker as well as who is involved [or not] in the process and why.)

## **E. Supplementary Readings**

1. Jefferies, Chris. “Bureaucratic Politics in the Department of Defense: A Practitioner’s Perspective.” Chapter 5.3 in *Bureaucratic Politics and National Security: Theory and Practice*. Edited by David C. Kozak and James M. Keagle. (Jefferies describes the players and rules of the game within the DoD. He concludes that, regardless of the formal structure, decision making is driven by the realities of governmental politics.)

2. Smith, Perry M. *Assignment Pentagon*. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1993. (A guide to the organizational culture and governmental politics of the Pentagon by an Air Force veteran of that institution. Available in the NWC Library—UA26.A745.S55 1993.)

3. Woodward, Bob. *Plan of Attack*. Washington, D.C.: Simon & Schuster, 2004. (As in most of Woodward’s works, this book outlines the policy and personality battles that took place among prime players in the administration prior to the start of the Iraq War in 2003.)

4. Cohen, Allan R., and David L. Bradford. *Influence without Authority*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1990. (A detailed handbook on the application of personal power in everyday business situations. Available in the NWC Library—HD58.9.C64 1990.)

5. Powell, Colin L. *My American Journey*. New York: Random House, 1995. (An autobiography by the former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell. Available in the NWC Library—E840.5.P68.A3 1995.)

6. Smith, Hedrick. *The Power Game: How Washington Works*. New York: Random House, 1988. (While now dated, many of the concepts and anecdotes collected in this classic tome remain relevant to policymaking battles ongoing today. Available in the NWC Library—JK271 .S577 1988.)

7. Garofano, John. “Governmental Politics and U.S. Decisions on Bosnia, 1991–1995.” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, February 2004.

## **PMP-22 CASE STUDY: IRAQ AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, 2003**

**A. Focus.** This session explores how the governmental-politics perspective can illuminate foreign policy decisions. The United States decision to invade Iraq in 2003 clearly ranks among the most critical foreign policy initiatives in recent years. Though our understanding of the respective roles played by various cabinet members is still unfolding, a number of works – authored by investigative journalists, scholars and senior cabinet officials – are now available to illuminate this complex decision-making environment. This case study includes a discussion of the case, followed by excerpts from some of the more influential and prominent books written following the invasion. The roles of the key players in the national security system, and the sources of their influence, should be a major focus of your examination of the case. Consider the unavoidable influence of personal perspective, government position and organization when assessing the excerpts presented.

### **B. Objectives**

- Explore the importance of the president and his advisors, and their interaction, in the formulation of foreign policy.
- Contrast the governmental-politics perspective with the other perspectives in analyzing a case study.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 2c, 4e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. How did the Bush administration assess the threat posed by Iraq? What role did individual cabinet officers and senior officials play?
2. The case contains excerpts from the memoirs of both CIA Director George Tenet and Undersecretary of Defense Doug Feith. What aspects of their recollections do you find striking or notable?
3. How important was the composition of the president's cabinet to the decision to invade Iraq?

### **D. Required Reading**

1. Stigler, Andrew L. "A Time of Our Choosing: Confronting Saddam," Naval War College faculty paper, July 2008.

## **PMP-23 THE COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE**

**A. Focus.** The cognitive perspective is concerned with the role of cognition. Cognition is the acquisition, organization and use of knowledge. Understanding cognition and its relationship to decision making is not confined to the work of cognitive psychologists. Social psychologists have used cognition extensively in their work on groups, as have neuroscientists. Many other disciplines also draw upon cognitive psychology, notably political scientists, who have extensively applied cognition to the political world, including decision making, voting behavior, group conflict, and many other areas. Recent research into the intuitive aspects of data processing and analysis has yielded useful insights as well. Psychologists also became interested in its application to politics and have made significant contributions as well. This merging of the fields of psychology and political science is known as political psychology.

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand the impact of cognition on decision making at the individual and group levels.
- Explore how mental processes can affect situational and policy analysis.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 2a, 2c and 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Mastors and Stigler provide an overview of the role of cognition and its impact on decision making. What is attribution theory and can we correct for the biases associated with it? What are heuristics and how can we avoid some of the pitfalls associated with them? How can we avoid anchoring? Are stereotypes important and can they be used to make better decisions? Can we correct for the inter-group competition that occurs between groups? What is the role of affect and cognition?

2. Gladwell offers insights into the role that intuitive reasoning and analysis can play in analytical tasks. What is the role played by intuitive reasoning? Where is it likely to be more or less accurate? How can these insights be applied to policy making?

### **D. Required Readings**

1. Mastors, Elena and Andrew Stigler “Understanding Ourselves: Psychological Concepts and Foreign Policy,” Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, July 2008.

2. Gladwell, Malcolm. *Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking*. Framingham, MA: Back Bay Books, 2002.

## **E. Supplementary Readings**

1. Janis, Irving L. "A Perfect Failure: Group Think and the Bay of Pigs," excerpts from *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982, 14-30, 35-47.



## **PMP-24 CASE STUDY: THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR**

**A. Focus.** In PMP-23 we examined the cognitive perspective, which concerns such things as the decision maker's own beliefs, biases, ethical values, emotions, personal experiences, and memories. This lesson provides a closer examination of the cognitive perspective and evaluates a case featuring non-U.S. decision makers.

### **B. Objectives**

- Explain the impact of the decision maker's personal values, beliefs and other cognitive elements on national security decisions.
- Contrast the cognitive perspective with the other perspectives in analyzing a case study.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2a, and 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Buckwalter provides case information on the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict. How did cognitive factors affect decisions in the war? Could any of the "solutions" suggested in this lesson have been used by the leaders of either side to improve their understanding of the situation and thus improve their decisions?

### **D. Required Reading**

1. Buckwalter, David T. "The 1973 Arab-Israeli War," in *Case Studies in Policy Making and Process*. 11th ed. Edited by Policy Making and Process Faculty. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 2008.

### **E. Supplementary Readings**

1. Norton, Richard J. and George E. Teague. "Cognitive Factors in National Security Decision Making," Newport, R.I.: Naval War College faculty paper, March 2002. (Describes cognitive factors that affect decision making and provides an overview of this increasingly recognized area of inquiry in studies of decision making. Available from Professor Richard Norton.)

2. Janis, Irving L. "A Perfect Failure: Group Think and the Bay of Pigs," excerpts from *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982, 14–30, 35–47. (Explains a number of U.S. foreign policy successes and failures according to the groupthink syndrome).

3. Hammond, John S., Ralph L. Keeney, and Howard Raiffa. "The Hidden Traps in Decision Making," *Harvard Business Review*, September–October 1998. (Discusses unconscious traps that mentally affect decision making and provides possible solutions to working around and with these traps. Available in the NWC Library periodical collection—ISSN 0017-8012.)

4. Guilmartin, John F., Jr. *A Very Short War*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. (A concise and readable account of the military action involved in the recovery of the SS *Mayaguez* in 1975. Available in the NWC Library—E865.G85 1995.)
5. Hudson, Valerie M., and Eric Singer. *Political Psychology and Foreign Policy*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992. (Psychological aspects of international relations and group decision making. Available in the NWC Library—JX1255.P64 1992.)
6. The National Security Archive of Georgetown University and the CIA have released internal probes by the administration and by the CIA Inspector General's following the Bay of Pigs fiasco. See <http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/winter98-99/art08.html>, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB>.
7. Keegan, Warren J. *Judgment, Choices, and Decisions: Effective Management Through Self-knowledge*. New York: Wiley, 1984. (Psychological aspects of management, problem solving, decision making, and strategic thinking. Available in the NWC Library—HD58.7.K42 1984.)
8. Vertzberger, Yaacov Y. I. *The World in Their Minds*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990. (Text addresses the issues of information processing, cognition, and perception as related to international relations and decision making. Available in the NWC Library—JX1291.V47 1990.)
9. Wetterhahn, Ralph. "Left Behind on Koh Tang," *The Retired Officer Magazine*, August 1996. (In November 1995, a United States recovery team is allowed to search the waters and land of the island of Koh Tang, in Cambodian waters, as part of Joint Task Force for Full Accounting [JTF-FA] and write the final chapter on the Mayaguez incident of May 1975. Available in the NWC Library periodical collection—ISSN 1061-3102.)
10. Zeckhauser, Richard. *Strategy and Choice*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991. (A compendium on the strategy of choice, coping with common errors in rational decision making and the strategic and ethical issues in the valuation of life. Available NWC library—HD30.23.877 1991.)
11. Goldgeier, James. "Psychology and Security," *Security Studies* 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997): 137–66. (An overview survey of cognition and national security decisions and values. Available in the NWC Library Periodicals Collection—ISSN 0963-6412.)
12. Mullen, John D., and Byron M. Roth. "Psychological Impediments to Sound Decision-Making." Chapter 2 in *Decision-Making: Its Logic and Practice*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991, 19–53. (Expands the discussion on cognitive traps that decision makers may fall into and various methods for recognizing and dealing with these factors. Available in the NWC library—BF 448.M84.)
13. Heuer, Richards J., Jr. *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*. Washington, D.C.: CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999, <https://www.cia.gov/csi/books/19104/index.html>.

## **PMP-25 CURRENT POLICY ANALYSIS**

**A. Focus.** Previous PMP case studies demonstrated that it is possible to use PMP principles to answer historical policy making questions, such as “why did President Reagan send Marines into Beirut the second time?” or “why did President Bill Clinton consider striking North Korea’s nuclear weapons facilities?” The ability to perform such analysis is quite useful for gaining insight into the interactions among the elements of the input-output model, and also useful for determining recurring patterns, strengths and weaknesses in policy making. However, as has additionally been demonstrated, the principles of PMP allow national security practitioners to also more accurately understand the forces at work in *current* decision making issues and to better weigh the probability that a given course of action may be selected over others. Feedback from our graduates confirms that these skills are required by the national security practitioner to deal with current issues in follow-on assignments. This session will present a contemporary issue facing U.S. policy makers, and provide some techniques for organizing an analysis and determining likely courses of action and potential decisions. The current policy analysis seeks to provide an opportunity to discuss current actors and influences, and the relationships among them. You will apply fully developed course concepts to evaluate the issues and suggest possible policy choices and outcomes.

### **B. Objectives**

- Identify and discuss the multiple and often competing influences that affect national security decision making on a contemporary policy issue.
- Identify realistic policy objectives and evaluate the likelihood of various policy decisions using the tools provided in the PMP course.
- Provide a final opportunity to apply PMP skills in the seminar environment prior to the PMP final exam.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2a, 2c, and 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. For this particular case, what are the most important domestic and international influences on U.S. national security leaders? Why are these influences important?
2. Do the international and domestic pressures affect all the actors in the national security system equally? What evidence do you find when you apply each of the four perspectives on national security decision making? What insights do you gain from each of the perspectives?
3. Having identified several possible alternative decisions that could be reached in the case, which do you think are the most likely to be selected? Be prepared to defend your answer in terms of the tools, techniques, and concepts we have examined in PMP.

### **D. Required Reading**

1. A case will be distributed in class prior to this session.

## **PMP-26 PMP FINAL EXAMINATION**

**A. Focus.** This five-hour session provides an opportunity for you to demonstrate your comprehension of the material presented in the PMP course. You will be provided a current policy case involving a pending U.S. government national security decision.

### **B. Objective**

- Synthesize the various concepts and theories presented in PMP Division I and Division II into a current policy analysis of U.S. national security decision making.
- Supports CJCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1d, 2a, 2c and 3e.


### **C. Required Reading**

1. A case will be distributed to the class prior to the final exam.

## ANNEX D

### SECURITY, STRATEGY, AND FORCES STUDY GUIDE

**1. Scope.** The Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF) course focuses on gaining a wider grasp of the various levels and aspects of national security, developing coherent guidelines for the formulation of national and military strategy, and examining the dynamic challenges that affect the selection of future military forces. This course will provide students with an appreciation of how the world works along with an understanding of the complex meanings of security, sources of national power and the myriad forces in the security environment in which they will operate. This is the foundation course upon which they will build national security strategy. The course is unique in that only here will students learn to appreciate the relationship between national strategy and military force planning (see figure 1). They will be required to comprehend how practitioners of national security think about the importance of strategy and how it affects the development of the military after next. The SSF course provides the substantive material on which the students will base their Final Exercise (FX) presentation.



**Figure 1**  
**Types of Military Planning**

The Security, Strategy, and Forces course concentrates on:

- Foundations of Strategy
- Security Environment
- Grand Strategy
- Force Planning
- Research, analysis, and clear writing

The course begins by introducing basic security concepts, offers alternative frameworks for strategic planning, and emphasizes the necessity to systematically link viable means to achievable ends in uncertain environments. We continue to rely on these fundamental concepts and frameworks throughout the course. We then examine the principal perspectives generally used to organize thinking about international relations. These perspectives influence not only assessments of the international security environment, but also how decision makers react to and shape that environment as they attempt to safeguard and advance U.S. national interests and objectives. Our concepts of national security, national interests, objectives, and specific goals provide the foundation for strategic and force planning decisions.

Building on the foundation of our study of international relations and national security, we then turn to an assessment of the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape. Initially, the course will cover those transnational forces having the greatest impact on national security: globalization and international terrorism. Then we examine regions of the world—the Middle East, Central and South Asia, the Pacific, Europe and Russia, Africa and the Western Hemisphere—with a view to both U.S. and regional concerns. Throughout all the sessions, particular emphasis will be placed on national and regional interests, current and future threats to those interests, and strategic alternatives to advance and protect those interests. Throughout the block, transnational threats and vulnerabilities, including terrorism, crime, health concerns, the environment, economics, and governance issues will be discussed. The block will serve as both an application of strategic thought to the various regions of the world, and a transition to the development of force planning alternatives in the context of those same regions.

Next, we focus on grand strategy and the U.S. National Security Strategy. Strategy can be viewed as a game plan or a roadmap that links means and ends. Given competing international goals, an uncertain security environment, and limited resources, a proper grand strategy protects and advances national interests. Though there are many possibilities, we systematically explore four representative grand strategies: strategic restraint (commonly called isolationism), balance of power realism, primacy and liberal internationalism. Within these strategies we will address the concepts, tools and techniques of the grand strategist, identifying all elements of national power. The course will cover the ways nations use military, economic, diplomatic and informational tools to enhance their national power and implement their national strategies. The notions of sovereignty, alliances, balance of power, deterrence and democratic peace will all be scrutinized. By examining the purposes, premises, and preferred political and military implications of each strategy, our students will be able to develop guidelines for future military force requirements.

The Security, Strategy, and Forces course culminates with the final section entitled Force Planning. We will introduce a model of the “Logic of Force Planning” and delve into the intricacies and subtleties of all elements of the force planning process from the perspective of a strategist. The course will not only expose the students to the extant strategic guidance, but will enable them to determine for themselves what constitutes good military strategy. The students will consider how the future of military competition, technology and transformation affect the development of the force planning process. The block will culminate in a force planning exercise. The emphasis throughout is on the role of strategy as a guide to planning future joint and combined forces, and the translation of that strategy into effective and relevant defense forces.

The preceding four blocks prepare students to transition directly to the culminating event of the National Security Decision Making curriculum, the Final Exercise. This exercise provides an opportunity to both synthesize and apply NSDM course concepts to the complex problems of developing national strategy and determining the size and mix of future forces.

**2. Course Objectives.** The overall objectives of the Security, Strategy, and Forces course are to:

- Assess complex factors critical to making strategy and selecting future forces.
- Comprehend the geostrategic landscape and international security environment and their impact on the development of strategy.
- Apply frameworks to guide the development of strategy, the sizing and structuring of future forces, and the allocation of scarce defense resources.

**3. Course Guidance.** Annex D is the primary planning document for the Security, Strategy, and Forces course. It provides the focus, objectives, general guidance for student preparation, and the required readings for each session. The diversity of the Security, Strategy, and Forces readings and cases provides not only an opportunity to examine concepts, but also an overview of current issues and alternative perspectives. Readings should be approached in the order listed, using the session guidance as an aid to drawing out the desired session objectives.

**4. Course Requirements.** Each student will prepare a thoughtful, well-developed and well-written paper that applies course concepts to a major strategy and/or force planning issue. For detailed guidance, see the Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF) Paper Instruction, Annex G in the NSDM syllabus. The SSF faculty member of the student's teaching team will be available to the student during topic selection and the development of the paper's thesis statement. The paper is due on 10 February. It should be of publishable quality, suitable for a professional journal.

**5. Course Materials (textbooks/publications will be found in the back of the NSDM box)**

Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed., 2004.

Security, Strategy, and Forces Paper Instruction (Annex G in NSDM syllabus)

Selected readings in Security, Strategy, and Forces.

Bush, George W. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2006.

Gates, Robert M. *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, 2008.

Lloyd, Richmond, ed. *Ruger Workshop: Defense Strategy and Forces: Setting Future Directions*, 2007.

Mead, Walter Russell. *Power, Terror, Peace and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk*, 2004.

Myers, Richard B. *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2004.

Roughead, Gary. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, 2007.

Rumsfeld, Donald H. *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 2006

**SECURITY, STRATEGY, AND FORCES  
COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE/NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>SESSION</b>	<b>PAGE</b>
 <b>DIVISION I: FOUNDATIONS OF STRATEGY</b>	
SSF-1 Introduction to Security, Strategy, and Forces.....	D-5
SSF-2 Theories of International Relations .....	D-7
SSF-3 International Political Economy and Globalization.....	D-9
SSF-4 Sources of Conflict .....	D-11
SSF-5 National Interests.....	D-13
 <b>DIVISION II: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT</b>	
SSF-6 Transnational Security Challenges .....	D-15
SSF-7 Terrorism .....	D-17
SSF-8 Greater Middle East .....	D-19
SSF-9 South and Central Asia .....	D-21
SSF-10 Asia-Pacific .....	D-23
SSF-11 Europe and Russia.....	D-25
SSF-12 Africa .....	D-27
SSF-13 Western Hemisphere.....	D-29
 <b>DIVISION III: GRAND STRATEGY</b>	
SSF-14 Grand Strategy and Power .....	D-31
SSF-15 Strategic Restraint.....	D-32
SSF-16 Balance of Power Realism.....	D-34
SSF-17 Primacy .....	D-36
SSF-18 Liberal Internationalism.....	D-38
SSF-19 National Security Strategy .....	D-40
 <b>DIVISION IV: FORCE PLANNING</b>	
SSF-20 Defense Strategic Guidance.....	D-42
SSF-21 Maritime Strategy .....	D-44
SSF-22 Logic of Force Planning and Risk .....	D-46
SSF-23 Capabilities-based Force Planning.....	D-48
SSF-24 Resource Constraints .....	D-50
SSF-25 Future of Military Competition.....	D-52
SSF-26 Course Wrap up .....	D-54



## **SSF-1 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY, STRATEGY, AND FORCES (SSF)**

**A. Focus.** The Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF) course focuses on gaining a wider grasp of the various levels and aspects of security, developing coherent guidelines for the formulation of national and military strategy, and examining the dynamic challenges that affect the selection of future defense forces. This course will provide students with an appreciation of how the world works along with an understanding of the complex meanings of security, sources of national power and the myriad forces in the security environment in which they will operate. This is the foundation upon which they will build national security strategy. The course is unique in that only here will students learn to appreciate the relationship between national strategy and military force planning. They will be required to comprehend how strategic guidance, strategic estimates and strategic concepts drive the required capabilities of the “military after next”. The SSF course provides the substantive material on which the students will base their Final Exercise (FX) presentation. Because gathering information, analyzing data, and producing a clear articulation of one’s ideas are critical skills for the successful leader, the graded event for this course will be a research and analysis paper.

### **B. Objectives**

- Introduce the objectives and scope of the Security, Strategy and Forces course.
- Examine alternative frameworks for developing strategies and future forces.
- Understand the purpose and procedures for the research and writing of the Security, Strategy and Forces paper.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1d and 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Many students have never been given the opportunity in their busy military careers to stop and ponder the world, being too busy addressing their day-to-day challenges. In this course, we want you to push back and “think big”. Leading strategic thinkers do this for a living and, from time to time, offer their thoughts about developments in international security that could well be the source of future conflict – but aren’t getting the attention they deserve. The article, “21 Solutions to Save the World” offers a thought-provoking list of answers to the question, “What would make the world a better place” from many of the world’s leading thinkers. Not surprisingly, some of their notions are front page headlines. However, many of them are much less obvious and show deeper insights into issues causing international anxiety. Do you understand the world well enough to make your own list? At the end of SSF, this type of thinking will be second nature.

2. Bartlett, Holman, and Somes describe a simple conceptual framework for organizing and evaluating the essential factors involved in making future strategy and force planning decisions. It includes ends, strategy, means, the security environment, resource constraints, and risks. Despite its apparent simplicity, it will be used as a guidepost during the SSF course to illustrate the complex relationships of the major factors tying strategy to force planning. While the course will illustrate the importance of determining required capabilities as a necessary step in the

development of a future military force, the article will also expose the students to both alternative as well as complementary techniques used by force planners. The Bartlett Model identifies “risks” as mismatches between elements of the “donut”. What are some of the possible mismatches that can occur? How would you modify Bartlett’s model to help you to better understand the formulation of strategy and the planning of future forces?

3. Owens examines how strategy influences the conduct of military operations, theater engagement and diplomacy, and the selection of military forces. Broadly conceived, strategy is an instrument of policy in both war and peace. There are several levels of strategy: “grand” or national strategy, military strategy, and theater strategy. In general, strategy describes how the national instruments of power, including military means, are applied to achieve national ends. As such, it constitutes a continual dialogue between policy on the one hand and such factors as geography, technology, and resources on the other. Strategy is a necessary component of force planning. This relationship is introduced in a course framework entitled “The Logic of Force Planning”, which will be used extensively in the final portion of the course. In the absence of strategy, bureaucratic and other non-strategic factors may come to dominate the size, shape and actions of our military forces. While we all understand that these forces are always at work, our job as strategists is to ensure that strategy and national interests drive the force planning process to the maximum extent possible. How does national-level strategy influence theater strategy and force planning? How does strategy help to transform resources into means?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. “21 Solutions to Save the World,” *Foreign Policy*, May/June 2007, pp. 36-52. (This reading will also be used in session SSF-26)
2. Bartlett, Henry C., G. Paul Holman Jr., and Timothy E. Somes. “The Art of Strategy and Force Planning,” in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, read only pp. 17-23.
3. Owens, Mackubin Thomas. “Strategy and the Strategic Way of Thinking,” faculty paper, May 2007.

## **SSF-2 THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**A. Focus.** The culminating exercise of the National Security Decision Making course is the collective determination of a grand strategy designed to implement all elements of American foreign policy a generation hence. Students must, therefore, address the fundamental question: How does the world work? There is an extensive body of writing and thinking on this subject done by International Relations theorists. A theory purports to do three things: to describe the world, to predict how it might change, and to prescribe a response to the world. Thus, policymakers and practitioners of grand strategy must be familiar with how the abstract world of theory can work together with strategy and policy making. The three predominant theoretical perspectives -- realism, liberalism and constructivism (idealism) -- influence the ways in which policy makers look at the evolving international security environment as well as their efforts to develop an overall grand strategy. Phenomena such as international anarchy, balance of power, the spread of democracy and human nature itself are central to the discussion. One set of questions we must address is: Who are the “actors” we need to understand, which could include the international system, the nation-state, or the individual. Then we need to know what motivates the actors. It is important, therefore, to develop an understanding of and appreciation for the way you view the world at the outset of our effort to grapple with alternative grand strategies.

### **B. Objectives**

- Assess alternative theories of international relations. Understand the driving motives and level of analysis associated with each school.
- Understand why it is important to consider the international system, the nation-state and individual human behavior to comprehend how the world works.
- Examine linkages among the theories of international relations and begin to determine the implications for the development of grand strategy.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1d and 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Jack Snyder believes firmly that international relations theory is supposed to tell us how the world works. His article describes the three predominant theories of international relations that most experts feel have the most explanatory power in today's world: realism, liberalism and constructivism (idealism). He discusses briefly where these theories are useful and where they are deficient. He challenges the reader to determine whether and how the world's rules have changed as a result of 9/11. His illustrations and charts are simple but clear. This is a great stepping off point to think harder about each of these theories.

2. The four fundamental tenets of realism are: 1) states are the principal actors in world politics; 2) the behavior of states is determined primarily by the external environment 3) states act according to rational calculations about the relative balance of *power*; and 4) international politics is a zero-sum game. While there are many “schools” of realism, they all hue to the basic

beliefs above. Dmitri Simes defends what he labels “high-minded” realism. He holds that the U.S. should strive to do good at home and abroad, but should not be squeamish in the exercise of power. He suggests that “morality of results” should outweigh the “morality of intentions” demonstrated by the Clinton administration and that securing America’s “vital interests” should be the prime mover of foreign policy. How does this logic allow Simes to support the American global war on terror?

3. G. John Ikenberry describes a set of liberal assumptions about how the world works. The cornerstones of the liberal paradigm he lays out are: 1) that democracies tend not to fight among themselves; 2) that free trade leads to free countries; 3) that interdependence underpins a peaceful liberal world order; 4) that international institutions have an important role in maintaining a peaceful world order and that they are actually a useful tool for U.S. foreign policy; and 5) that there can be a liberal international society in the absence of world government. How do you assess the validity of these assumptions? Does the liberal theory of the “democratic peace” make sense to you?

4. Constructivism (sometimes called idealism) is the most difficult of the theories to get your arms around because it is not driven by one assumption: its basis is that *ideas* (of many shapes and sizes) can change the way collectives (or individuals) act in the international system. Its leading proponents suggest that world politics is “socially constructed,” rejecting the realist claim that material power is the sole driver of international politics. That is, international change can be driven by ideas that can affect the accepted standards of international behavior. Idealists defy the pessimism of the “balance of power” as a good predictor of behavior, suggesting that nations can just as likely see the benefit of accepting international law and conducting reassuring, rather than threatening, behavior. They emphasize the important role of transnational forces in the spreading of international norms, human rights and international justice. Alternatively, the theory helps understand the spread of *illiberal* transformational ideas, such as Islamist extremism. How seriously can you take a theory that does not see the nation-state as a central actor? Do these three theories acting in combination provide us all the explanatory power we need? Is it possible see the world operating completely in accordance with only one of these theories?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Snyder, Jack. “One World, Rival Theories,” *Foreign Policy*, November/December 2004, pp. 53-62.

2. Simes, Dmitri. “Realism: It’s High-Minded...and It Works,” *The National Interest*, winter 2003-2004, pp. 168-172.

3. Ikenberry, G. John. “Why Export Democracy?” in *Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty*, eds., 4th ed., Newport RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 6, pp. 79-87.

### **SSF-3      INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND GLOBALIZATION**

**A. Focus.** Economics focus on important decisions in the allocation of scarce resources, such as what goods and services are produced, how these items are produced, and how they are distributed. While economics address the optimal manner to allocate resources, the actual decisions are often subject to competing political demands and government intervention. International political economy explores the relationship between global economic and political power and how one impacts the other. Likewise, the world has moved from economic integration to interdependence to an increasingly globalized environment with both positive and negative consequences. Globalization, for its part, has come to be seen as one of the defining phenomena of the 21<sup>st</sup> century—a “widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the spiritual,” according to David Held and his colleagues. Understanding the underpinnings of these concepts and complex relationships will enable a greater appreciation of how the world works.

#### **B. Objectives**

- Understand the impact of such factors as geography, migration, trade, capital flows, and aid on economic growth and development.
- Identify and assess key political and economic relationships driving international relations today.
- Evaluate the positive and negative implications of globalization on the working of the international political system.
- Supports JCS Learning Area 1c and 3e.

#### **C. Guidance**

1. Economic growth provides the engine for global development, but why have some countries prospered while other have failed to develop? Collier points out that although 80 percent of the globe is developing and prospering, the poorest of the poor—the bottom billion—have seen the gap between rich and poor steadily worsen since the 1970s. Is there something about these countries that makes them destined to remain at the bottom of the heap—politically and economically disenfranchised and marginalized from the global society? He identifies four “conflict traps” that he holds accountable for this situation and claims that traditional development strategies are outmoded and ineffectual at remedying the situation. Do you agree with his assertion that a new approach is required? Is the lack of development primarily an economic or political problem? Given the poor international terms of trade, lack of sufficient capital inflows, and loss of human capital via migration, can the situation in the bottom billion be turned around? Or is the current international system so stacked against them that they will never truly “develop?”

2. Although the world has been “globalizing” for centuries, the past few decades have seen a dramatic acceleration driven by massive technological advancement, vastly empowered individuals, and the extensive reach and speed of global communication networks. Globalization 3.0, as Friedman calls it, is the triple convergence of “new players, on a new playing field,

developing new processes and habits for horizontal collaboration” that is “the most important force shaping global economics and politics in the early twenty-first century.” This facilitates the ability of empowered individuals and entire societies to better connect, compete, collaborate, and even destroy on a scale heretofore not seen in world history. If Friedman is correct and the world is truly “flattening,” what does this mean for the United States and its role as a superpower? With the rise of multiple new players, such as China, India, Russia, and even the rising nations of Eastern Europe and Latin America, on the global political and economic stage what are the implications for international relations? Is globalization more of a threat or opportunity to the existing world order?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Collier, Paul. “Falling Behind and Falling Apart: The Bottom Billion,” *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 3-13.
2. Collier, Paul. “On Missing the Boat: The Marginalization of the Bottom Billion in the World Economy,” *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 79-96.
3. Friedman, Thomas. “It’s a Flat World, After All,” *The New York Times*, April 3, 2005.

## SSF-4 SOURCES OF CONFLICT

**A. Focus.** Before national leaders can develop and implement a successful strategy, it is crucial to make a careful security assessment. Yet today's security environment is filled with uncertainty, risk, and complexity. Decision makers demand flexible strategies to achieve their objectives in a world full of risk, threats, vulnerabilities, and resource constraints, all of which are likely to change in the next 15 to 20 years. Many analysts have tried to project what that future security environment will look like and have arrived at a variety of different theories. The challenge for the strategist is to provide the policymaker with a coherent way to understand the changing conditions and future sources of conflict that could generate the need to revise strategy, policy, methods of operation, and force structure.

### **B. Objectives**

- Consider global forces and factors that have the potential to be sources of conflict.
- Assess the strategic implications and challenges that these sources of conflict foreshadow, to include recognizing specific levels of risk, threat, vulnerability, and uncertainty inherent in each alternative.
- Supports JCS Learning Area 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Samuel Huntington provided the most well-known and perhaps most pessimistic, vision of the future. Huntington argued that future conflicts will occur primarily along cultural fault lines separating seven or eight major civilizations, not states as had traditionally been the case. Are his scenarios plausible? What level of risk and uncertainty do you assign to your assessment of Huntington's analysis? What are the strategic implications and challenges for the future suggested in this scenario?

2. The thesis of Barnett's "The Pentagon's New Map" is as follows: "A country's potential to warrant a U.S. military response is inversely related to its globalization connectivity" [emphasis in the original] (p. 228). Thus, drawing on themes and concepts Thomas Friedman developed in his book on globalization, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, Barnett's brief essay purports to offer "an operating theory of the world." Is Barnett correct? If so, what new emphases must be made for strategy and action? If not, what better alternatives exist? What, specifically, do his arguments mean for the interests and capabilities of major powers, "pivotal states," and the so-called "developing" world.

3. Many argue that rising energy prices, dwindling supplies of important resources, and the impact of global climate change are likely to lead to a plethora of "resource wars" to control increasingly scarce commodities. David Victor believes "most of this is bunk." Victor argues that most conflicts result from the absence of good government, not a shortage of resources. Instead of looking to resource scarcity, the author points to other underlying causes to explain conflict in the future. Is Victor downplaying the role of resource competition in future conflict?

Will states be able to manage the competition for resources and if so, how? Are climate change, pollution, and water shortages likely causes for future conflict?

4. Using multiple examples from European history, Muller argues that political identities are often formed along ethnic lines and that peace and regional order has usually happened only after there has been a violent period that separates the ethnic groups. Thus, Muller maintains that “in areas where that separation has not yet occurred, politics is apt to remain ugly” and that “ethnonationalism will continue to shape the world in the twenty-first century.” In the end, partition may be the best and most humane solution for dealing with these conflicts rather than humanitarian interventions that will be costly and temporary. Critics argue that Muller may be correct for some instances of ethnic division but that a large majority of cases do not result in violence. Is the world likely to experience more ethnic violence in the future? Is partition the best response or is there another way to address this issue?

As you read these various arguments for the possible sources of future conflict, assess and rank the ones you think are most likely, least likely, and why.

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?” in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2004, Chapter 26. Read only 389-99, ending at “Civilization Rallying: the Kin-Country Syndrome.” The remainder of the essay is optional reading.

2. Barnett, Thomas P.M. “The Pentagon’s New Map,” *Esquire*, March 2003, 174-78 and 227-28.

3. Victor, David G. “What Resource Wars?” *National Interest*, November/December 2007, pp. 48-55.

4. Muller, Jerry Z. “Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism,” *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 2 (March/April 2008), pp. 18-35.



## SSF-5 NATIONAL INTERESTS

**A. Focus.** The national interests of the United States – to provide for the security, liberty and prosperity of its citizens, territory, and way of life – set the foundation for national strategy. In theory, all strategists would agree that defending and advancing national interests require the development and employment of appropriate instruments of power. In reality, the complex interdependence of competing interests, objectives, and priorities makes decision making and strategic planning extraordinarily complicated. This lesson offers ways to think about strategic interests, objectives, priorities and the evolving nature of security.

### B. Objectives

- Comprehend how U.S. interests and objectives are fundamental to strategic planning.
- Comprehend the central concept of security and its role in shaping strategy and force planning decisions.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2b, and 4a.

### C. Guidance

1. Liotta proposes that, at their most abstract level, U.S. national interests are simple: to ensure the security and prosperity of the American people in the global environment. But distinguishing core strategic interests – those for which Americans would be willing to die – from significant interests that *might* require commitment of treasure, blood, time, and energy is almost never easy. Moreover, the nature of security is evolving. A century ago, security focused on preservation of territorial integrity and the government. Today, security challenges encompassing a wide range of human and environmental challenges are creating a critical need for a “fundamental rethinking of interests.” Do you agree with Liotta’s position that, on a basic level, “national interests are enduring and unlikely to change” in the future? Is it important to understand the hierarchy of interests and their relationship to values and objectives? What challenges can the U.S. anticipate in communicating national interests, whether diplomatic, information, military, or economic, as a basis for action on the world scene? Can and should global interests be incorporated into a broad and foresighted concept of national interests?

2. In *Rethinking the National Interests*, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice attempts to find the right balance between realism’s emphasis on relationships with rising and traditional powers such as China, India, Brazil and Russia and the neo-liberal’s emphasis on values such as freedom and democracy believed to be critical to establishing a safe, orderly, and prosperous global security environment. Secretary Rice provides a powerful statement early in the reading: “As in the past, our policy has been sustained not just by our strength but also by our values.” She describes this approach to foreign policy as a “uniquely American realism”- an attempt to create a more democratic and free international order while clinging to tenets of realism. This tension only frustrates an already impatient American public anxious to see the benefits of their sacrifice. Is Secretary Rice correct when she says we must blend the realism (relations with great powers) with liberalism (promotion of values) in order to shape the future security environment? Which states in the international order might support Secretary Rice’s perspective and which states

might disagree with her? Why? Is she correct when she says “freedom and democracy are the only ideas that can, over time, lead to just and lasting stability....?”

3. In *Democracy Bound*, Mitchell tells us that spreading democracy is actually a very difficult thing to do and that the United States should think twice about placing the spread of democracy at the center of our national interests as Secretary Rice suggests. He says, “For the United States, it is time to make some decisions regarding the importance we accord to promoting democracy.” Using the post-Soviet state of Georgia as an example, Mitchell describes the often frustrating effort to promote democracy in a country with no history of self rule and few institutions in place necessary to support a healthy democratic state. Is Secretary Rice right or is Mitchell? How important should spreading democracy be to the United States? Is it really in our national interests? Why or why not?

4. The Human Security Centre’s *Human Security Report 2007* argues for greater attention to be paid to the concept of human security. Human security broadens the focus from the security of borders to the lives of people and communities inside and across those borders. While human security centers on the protection of individuals, the scope of the concept remains a topic of debate. The breadth of human security is important because, unlike traditional approaches that vest state organizations with full responsibility for state security, the responsibilities for human security involve a broad spectrum of actors and institutions. Is the concept of human security more appropriate in today’s security environment? How does the concept of global human security fit into the national interests of the United States? Does the concept of human security complement state security?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Liotta, P. H. “To Die For: National Interests and the Nature of Strategy,” Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 8.

2. Rice, Condoleezza. “Rethinking the National Interests,” *Foreign Affairs*, Council on Foreign Relations, July-August 2008, pp 2-26.

3. Mitchell, Lincoln A. “Democracy Bound,” *The National Interest*, Number 95, May/June 2008, pp 70-76.

4. Human Security Centre. “What is Human Security?” Human Security Report, Human Security Brief 2007, <http://www.humansecuritybrief.info/> (page 1).

## **SSF-6      TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES**

**A. Focus.** Transnational security issues have emerged as key challenges for states in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. They are defined as “nonmilitary threats that cross borders and either threaten the political and social integrity of a nation or the health of that nation’s inhabitants.” Often these issues involve (or are conducted by) nonstate actors, although in some cases, states may provide a facilitating environment, either through action or inaction. In addition, transnational security issues are often seen as the ‘dark side’ of globalization. Moreover, many military forces, despite preparations for major wars with rival states, often find that the bulk of their ‘security duties’ involve addressing transnational security issues. Demographic, economic, and social trends suggest that transnational security issues will remain major challenges to states in the decades ahead.

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand how the process of globalization helps to fuel and sustain transnational security issues.
- Understand aspects of the global narcotics trade.
- Understand contemporary trends in human trafficking.
- Comprehend current U.S. initiatives against proliferation of nuclear and radiological materials.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1d, and 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Transnational issues are often viewed as undesirable by-products of globalization. In the article “The Five Wars of Globalization,” Moises Naim proposes five key transnational threats (which he terms “wars of globalization”). These include (1) Drugs; (2) Arms Trafficking; (3) Intellectual Property; (4) Alien Smuggling; and (5) Money Laundering. He argues that governments are at a natural disadvantage in fighting these network-based threats. Globalization privileges nonstate actors engaged in these activities. Technological advances are more quickly exploited by criminal groups than by governments. “In one form or another,” Naim argues, “Governments have been fighting these five wars for centuries. And losing them.” Do you agree with Naim’s basic thesis? Do you agree with Naim’s list of transnational threats? Are these the most important threats?

2. In the post-Cold War era, the concept of security has been widened to include a number of nontraditional issues such as transnational crime. Authors Suante Cornell and Niklas Swanström argue that, within the category of transnational criminal activities, narcotics production and trafficking pose a full spectrum threat to state and human security. For example, narcotics trafficking affects societies “through addiction, crime, and disease.” It also undermines or weakens effective governance by fostering corruption: “The drug trade possesses a large

corrupting power over the political spectrum, with substantial implications for the functioning and legitimacy of the state.” It can also pose a traditional, military threat via its linkages to terrorism and insurgency. The authors then apply these concepts to Central Asia and argue that “the development of organized crime in the [Central Asian] region has profoundly affected the security of the regional states through three main sectors: the role of drugs in funding extremism and insurgency, the criminalization of states, and an impending public health crisis.” How does the narcotics trade affect state security (in Central Asia and elsewhere)? What are the linkages between the global narcotics trade and insurgencies and terrorism? Has this article changed the way you conceptualize security? Can you think of policy responses to the global narcotics trade that might be more effective than current ones?

3. Human trafficking has become a huge multi-billion dollar criminal enterprise around the world. According to the International Organization of Migration, human trafficking involves the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons” by means of force or the threat of force. Typically an organized crime group is involved, particularly if the trafficking entails the crossing of international borders. Tamara Makarenko provides a detailed examination into the mechanics of the human trafficking trade, which is estimated to involve between 600,000 to 800,000 victims per year. She classifies the particular actors involved in human trafficking as 1) ad hoc; 2) flexible; and 3) structured. What are the characteristics of these specific sub-types? What are the factors driving human trafficking? What role do forged travel or identity documents play in human trafficking patterns? What would be effective policy responses to this phenomenon?

4. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—and particularly nuclear or radiological materials—has become a major security concern in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. According to the 2006 statement of Acting Assistant Secretary Francis Record, U.S. Department of State, the world faces “the risk of a terrorist acquiring nuclear and radiological material from shadowy networks of smugglers, state sponsors of terrorism, and organized criminal elements, and then deploying such material in the form of a nuclear device or dirty bomb against one of our cities.” The U.S. government has initiated a number of programs and activities that are designed to address this threat, which were described in Mr. Record’s statement to Congress. What are these various initiatives? Do you believe that these programs can effectively curtail (or significantly diminish) the proliferation of WMD? Why or why not?

#### **D. Readings**

1. Naim, Moises. “The Five Wars of Globalization,” *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2003: 29-36.

2. Cornell, Svante E. and Niklas L.P. Swanström. “The Eurasian Drug Trade: a Challenge to Regional Security,” *Problems of Post-Communism* (July/August 2006): 11-28.

3. Makarenko, Tamara. “Chain of command—an examination of human trafficking,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, November 1, 2007.

4. Statement of Mr. Francis C. Record, Acting Assistant Secretary, International Security and Nonproliferation Department of State, *CQ Congressional Testimony*, May 25, 2006.

## **SSF-7     TERRORISM**

**A. Focus.** International terrorism has emerged as one of the top security challenges of our age. Terrorism is a tactic, used by dissatisfied groups or individuals, who seek to achieve some sort of political change. It is distinguished from crime because of its political nature. Terrorism was once believed to be a mere “nuisance” in the international system; however, the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. have demonstrated that terrorists have the intent and capability to inflict significant destruction against countries or individuals deemed “the enemy.” Moreover, the looming concern for many governments is the possible acquisition by terrorist groups of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand the strategic aspects of terrorism and its historical application.
- Understand the role of terrorism in the international system and its manifestation as a reaction to American primacy.
- Assess likely future scenarios in terrorism and understand possible methodologies that may provide a predictive tool for analyzing terrorism.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1d, and 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. In their article “Strategic Terrorism: the Framework and its Fallacies,” Peter R. Neumann and M.L.R. Smith argue that terrorism should not be viewed as irrational or as a product of relative privation, but instead “as a military strategy...that has been employed by actors who believe, rightly or wrongly, that through such means they can advance their agenda.” Such strategy is used by nonstate actors “to produce certain effects on a specific set of people in order to attain an objective of policy.” Unlike conventional warfare, terrorism seeks to employ violence “to break the spirit and create a sensation of fear within the target groups, which will cause it to initiate political change.” What current counterterrorism policies are productive and which are counterproductive? Will terrorism ever go away? Why or why not?

2. In his article, “The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror,” Richard Betts argues that it is the structure of the international system—and particularly the structure that features US hegemony or unipolarity—that encourages international terrorism. “American global primacy is one of the causes of this war,” he argues. “To groups like al Qaeda, the United States is the enemy because American military power dominates their world, supports corrupt governments in their countries, and backs Israelis against Muslims.” What do you think of this assessment? How does the structure of the international system shape terrorism and how, in turn, does terrorism affect the international system? Can you recommend any policy changes or adjustments as a result of this article?

3. In his article, "Terrorism in the Year 2020: Examining the ideational, functional and geopolitical trends that will shape terrorism in the twenty-first century," Paul Smith examines the past and likely future of terrorism around the world. He begins by describing the basic challenges governments face in attempting to predict (from a tactical point of view) imminent terrorism incidents. Smith argues for a broader, strategic approach which "prioritizes assessment of and response to longer-term trends that may shape the evolution of terrorism." Smith argues that, viewed from the perspective of modern history, terrorism is shaped by three broad factors: ideational, functional and geopolitical. Future issues that may shape terrorism include 1) globalization; 2) continued rise of transnational crime (and its association with terrorism); and 3) the spread of new technologies (including WMD) that may be employed by terrorist organizations. Can you identify other possible trends (related to terrorism) that were not mentioned in the article? Based on the information presented in this article, can you recommend changes to current U.S. counterterrorism policies?

#### **D. Readings**

1. Neumann, Peter R. and M.L.R. Smith. "Strategic Terrorism: the Framework and its Fallacies," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, (August 2005): 571-595.

2. Betts, Richard K. "The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror," *Political Science Quarterly*, v. 117, n. 1 (Spring 2002), pp. 19-36.

3. Smith, Paul J. "Terrorism in the year 2020: examining the ideational, functional and geopolitical trends that will shape terrorism in the twenty-first century," *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, v.1, n.1 (2008): 1-18.

## **SSF 8      GREATER MIDDLE EAST**

**A. Focus.** The Greater Middle East comprises Arabic-speaking countries from North Africa to Iraq, as well as Israel and Iran. This is a broad and diverse region where religion, culture, politics, and changing demographics intersect and overlap, and moreover is home to vast energy reserves on which the world depends. It has also long been a region plagued by conflict and violence as forces inside and outside the Greater Middle East struggle for control and supremacy. For a generation, this region has seen extensive U.S. military operations in a host of countries. In the near term, U.S. security concerns in the region remain focused on “big questions” such as Iraq, Iran, the war on terrorism, access to oil and gas supplies, furthering the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and promoting the transition to democracy. This complex and vital region demands the strategist’s closest attention to the interaction between often conflicting policy objectives, strategy, and force requirements.

### **B. Objectives**

- Identify U.S. and regional interests in the Greater Middle East.
- Identify and analyze threats, challenges, and opportunities for the United States and other nations in the Greater Middle East.
- Analyze and evaluate possible strategic alternatives in the United States and others in the Greater Middle East.
- Supports JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, and 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The Middle East is entering a new era that “will cause great harm to itself, the United States, and the world,” according to Haass. Moreover, the ability of the United States and other outside actors to influence regional events will increasingly be limited in the face of powerful local trends, such as the rise of Iran, continued chaos in Iraq, increased militarization of the region, the spread of radical Islam, and the failure of authoritarian regimes to reform. Haass sees the United States hobbled by its overreliance on military/security solutions and its misplaced belief in the transformational power of democracy to reshape the region. Is the United States really losing its ability to influence events in the Middle East? Is the issue one of U.S. strategic vision or the choice of tools to implement its strategy? If you accept Haass’s portrayal of the “new Middle East,” what strategic alternatives are available to advance and defend U.S. and regional interests?

2. Oil. It is an inescapable reason for the region’s importance to the industrialized world and one cannot understand the politics of the Middle East without a baseline comprehension of petroleum economics. How has the political economy of oil influenced the development of U.S. strategy in the Middle East? What, if anything, can the United States do to lessen the role and importance of “the oil factor” in shaping U.S. strategy in the region? To what extent are Gholz and Press right that fears about the oil supply are exaggerated?

3. The promotion of democracy is seen by the United States as an effective way to improve long-term stability and undermine the appeal of extremist ideology in the Middle East. However, U.S. policy has been generally opposed to “moderate Islamists” such as the influential Muslim Brotherhood. Washington has viewed greater democratization as a way to marginalize those who wish to increase the role of Islam in the region’s politics – though not always successfully. In their thought-provoking article, Leiken and Brooke maintain that the Muslim Brotherhood may be more a solution to the region’s problems than any obstacle. Do you think this revisionist approach is correct? Is the Brotherhood an enemy of the West, or merely charting a different path for majority-Muslim states? What effects on the GWOT might flow from a more positive U.S. policy vis-à-vis moderate Islamists in the region? What are potential down-sides for U.S. interests to growth in the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood?

4. In sharp contrast to the other readings, Luttwak, a noted scholar of strategy, military affairs, and economics, in his provocative article claims that the United States has consistently overestimated the strategic importance of the Middle East to American security and interests: “despite its oil, this backward region is less relevant than ever.” Do you think the contrarian Luttwak has a point? What does he see as the “mistakes” that U.S. policymakers constantly repeat? Should the United States move to disengage from the region? And how would it do so, and at what cost?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Haas, Richard. “The New Middle East,” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2006, pp. 1-7.

2. Gholz, Eugene and Daryl Press. “Energy Alarmism: The Myths that make Americans Worry about Oil,” *Cato Institute*, April 5, 2007, pp. 1-16.

3. Leiken, Robert S. and Steven Brooke. “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2007, pp. 107-121.

4. Luttwak, Edward. “The Middle of Nowhere,” *Prospect Magazine*, Issue 134, May 2007, pp. 1-5.



## **SSF-9 SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA**

**A. Focus** South and Central Asia is a region of growing importance, yet one that has received relatively less attention than other parts of Asia. India is a country on the rise with the world's 4<sup>th</sup> largest economy that has for the past decade registered economic growth rates over 7 percent. India has the 3<sup>rd</sup> largest active duty armed forces in the world behind China and the United States and is a nuclear power. Finally, India is a respected political player and often cited as a candidate for inclusion in the UN Security Council. India faces significant obstacles including over 350 million living in dire poverty and an economic infrastructure that needs serious repair. However, Indian leaders have ambitious aspirations for their country to become a prominent regional and global player. In recent years, the United States and India have also begun to grow a "strategic partnership" that has made significant improvements in the relationship. Pakistan has been an important U.S. ally, although the country's political system is in a state of transition, particularly after the February 2008 election which ushered in a new parliament and the decline of the General Musharraf era. Pakistan is also a nuclear power that continues to have a seemingly intractable boundary dispute with India over Kashmir. Central Asia is becoming a strategic region as an important source of energy resources and for its role in the war on terrorism. Finally, Afghanistan continues to struggle to develop the political institutions and central control of a functioning state. It is now battling a resurgent Taliban, despite the presence of 33,000 U.S. and NATO forces in the country. For all these reasons, South and Central Asia is a region of increasing importance and promise, but also one that contains significant challenges.

### **B. Objectives**

- Identify United States and regional interests in the South and Central Asian region.
- Identify and analyze threats, challenges, and opportunities to United States and other nations in the South and Central Asia region.
- Analyze and evaluate possible strategic alternatives for the United States and others in the South and Central Asian region.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, and 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Former director for South Asia at the National Security Council, Xenia Dormandy, maintains that India is a rising power that has done much to build international norms and is on the verge of becoming a responsible stakeholder in the international system. To support her argument, she assesses India's record on nonproliferation, energy and environmental cooperation, and its role in international and regional security. Dormandy finds the record mixed but is optimistic for India's future role in these areas. The crucial issue in the future, according to the author, is India's willingness to share the costs in addressing regional and international challenges. What role do you think India will play in a future international system? What obstacles will inhibit India's ability to play a larger role? Is the U.S.-India relationship likely to grow as a "strategic partnership" or are there serious limits to this relationship?

2. In her article titled “Pakistan’s Governance Imperative,” Paula Newberg assesses Pakistan’s political scene following the election of a new parliament in February 2008. She argues that the new Prime Minister, Yousef Raza Gillani, faces not only the challenges created by military rule, but also “the accumulation of decades of mangled constitutions, mixed civil-military law, weakened state institutions and fragmented political parties.” She further argues that bad governance is no longer an option in Pakistan, a country facing rapid population growth as well as declining health care, literacy, education and employment opportunities. Pakistani citizens need, according to the author, civilian leaders to “defy their own, and the world’s low expectations for [Pakistan’s] success.” How should the United States engage Pakistan, particularly as the country becomes more democratic and politically diverse? Is Pakistan’s geopolitical significance in South Asia rising or declining? Why? In light of the recent change in government, what are the long-term implications for the United States?

3. Author Lowell Dittner asserts that the rise of Central Asia has attracted the attention of major powers, namely Russia, China and the United States. Many Central Asian Republics are endowed with significant mineral wealth, including substantial energy reserves. Proven petroleum reserves range between 16.9 billion barrels and 33.4 billion barrels, “exceeding those in the United States or the North Sea.” The author describes the specific interests of Russia, China and the U.S.—what are these particular interests? The author describes an “emerging triangular dynamic”—what is this dynamic? From a long-term point of view, what do you see as the significance of Central Asia from a geopolitical perspective?

4. The Afghanistan security update published by *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment* (April 2008) provides a rather bleak analysis of the current security environment in Afghanistan. The report states, among other things, that “the post-Taliban security landscape is dire and worsening.” Moreover, rising instability in the country “could once again rupture along ethnic and religious lines.” The report lists an array of other security challenges facing the fledgling state. What are the major sources of insecurity in Afghanistan? If you were in a position to change or adjust current policies, what changes would you make?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Dormandy, Xenia. “Is India, or Will It Be, a Responsible International Stakeholder?” *Washington Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 113-124.

2. Newberg, Paula R. “Pakistan’s Governance Imperative,” MIT Center for International Studies Editor’s Picks (May 2008), [http://web.mit.edu/cis/editorspick\\_newberg08\\_audit.html](http://web.mit.edu/cis/editorspick_newberg08_audit.html).

3. Dittner, Lowell. “Central Asia and the Regional Powers,” *The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, v. 5, n. 4 (November 2007): 7-22.

4. “Security, Afghanistan,” *Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment* (April 30, 2008)

## **SSF-10 ASIA-PACIFIC**

**A. Focus.** The Asia-Pacific region is characterized by economic dynamism as well as political transition. According to the 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS), “East Asia is a region of great opportunities and lingering tensions. Over the past decade, it has been a source of extraordinary economic dynamism and also of economic turbulence.” From a security standpoint, the region has been generally stable and secure with the notable exception of North Korean nuclear and missile activity. Economic development in the region continues at a fast pace, fueled primarily by dynamic growth in China, with positive trends in most other states. In addition, the region is undergoing political transitions with new leaders in several countries including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Many people continue to predict the 21<sup>st</sup> century will be an Asian century making this a vital region to understand.

### **B. Objectives.**

- Identify United States and regional interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
- Identify and analyze threats, challenges, and opportunities to United States and other nations in the Asia-Pacific region.
- Analyze and evaluate possible strategic alternatives for the United States and others in the Asia-Pacific region.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, and 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. In his essay on U.S. strategy in Asia, William Tow argues that in a post-9/11 world, the United States has become fixated on the Middle East and various operations associated with the “war on terror.” However, such fixation has led to the strategic neglect of some of the most important geopolitical trends of the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, including the rise of China, nuclear weapons development in North Korea, the status of Taiwan, US-Japan relations, US-ASEAN relations, and various transnational and human security challenges. In order to be effective, the author argues, the United States needs to move away from a hierarchical, democracy-insistent posture to a more flexible and strategic posture. Has the “war on terror” (and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan) caused Washington to strategically neglect important actors and trends in the Asia-Pacific region? What should the United States do to address this problem?

2. Frost, Przystup, and Saunders argue “the balance of power in East Asia is stable and favors the United States, but the balance of influence is tipping toward Beijing.” Increasingly, China’s growing economic might, restrained security posture that promotes “peaceful development” and skillful diplomacy are slowly helping China expand its influence in the region. Most in East Asia no longer view China as a near-term threat and seek closer cooperation with Beijing. The authors argue that the United States needs to be a more active player in the region that “takes account of China’s growing power and legitimate interests and does not stoke

Chinese fears of containment.” In your view, what should be the basic principles of U.S. policy toward China? Should it be cooperation or containment? If the United States should contain China, how would it go about doing so?

3. One of the most difficult and intractable security issues in Asia is the problem of North Korea and its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Since 2003, a series of negotiations called the Six Party Talks that included North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States have attempted to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program. This article reviews the possible motivations North Korea might have for possessing this capability, the likelihood of a North Korean collapse, the role of China, and the provisions of the February 13, 2007 agreement that is guiding current efforts to denuclearize North Korea. Given these possibilities, is North Korea likely to give up its nuclear weapons program? If so, what would it take to convince or coerce them to do so? What are the alternatives should North Korea refuse to give up its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities?

4. Marvin Ott provides an overview of the security environment in Southeast Asia. He argues that a key overarching issue is the lingering effect of the 1997-98 financial crisis, which in the case of Indonesia led to the collapse of the country’s currency and government. Ott focuses much of his subsequent analysis on two challenges: (1) the rise of transnational terrorism in the region; and (2) the question of China’s growing power and influence in the region. On this second point, Ott asserts that China’s geopolitical challenge to the United States, for example, lies within the realm of China’s diplomatic, economic, institutional, and cultural influence “buttressed by the reality of growing power.” Do you agree that the issues raised by Ott reflect the critical and long-term security challenges facing Southeast Asia? What are some factors that have contributed to the rise of terrorism in the region? Do you agree with his list of recommendations for U.S. policy?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Tow, William T. “America’s Asia-Pacific Strategy Is Out of Kilter,” *Current History*, September 2007, pp. 281-287.

2. Frost, Ellen L., James J. Przystup, and Phillip C. Saunders. “China’s Rising Influence in Asia: Implications for U.S. Policy,” *Strategic Forum*, no. 231, April 2008, pp. 1-8.

3. Armstrong, Charles K. “North Korea Takes on the World,” *Current History*, September 2007, pp. 263-267.

4. Ott, Marvin. “Southeast Asian Security Challenges: America’s Response?” *JFQ*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter 2007, pp. 1-7.

## SSF-11 EUROPE AND RUSSIA

**A. Focus.** For most of the last century, Europe was at center-stage among America's security interests. Yet this began to change after the fall of the Soviet Union, and since the emergence of the Global War on Terror, Europe's place in American strategy has shifted. While Europe is viewed as a "safe" region for U.S. interests, the region remains of great importance. Europe has a larger population and larger economy than the U.S., and is home to many of America's most capable military partners, including nuclear states such as France and Britain, linked together in NATO. Although Americans and Europeans share many values, they do not always agree on foreign policy ends and means. Managing trans-Atlantic relations is critical to American security in Europe and beyond. Russia, flush with oil money and eager to reassert its prestige, is charting an increasingly confident and independent course. Though no longer a superpower, Russia still wields great influence in the region, can project significant military power, and can help or hinder U.S. initiatives all over the world. Europe also figures prominently in the GWOT, with concerns over weak and failing states in the Balkans and Caucasus, illicit trafficking of all sorts, and above all, worries that extremist groups are emerging among burgeoning and increasingly disenfranchised immigrant populations in Western Europe.

### B. Objectives

- Identify United States and regional interests in Europe and Russia.
- Identify and analyze key threats, challenges, and opportunities to United States and other nations in Europe and Russia.
- Analyze and evaluate possible strategic alternatives for the United States and others towards Europe and Russia
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, and 3e

### C. Guidance

1. The European Security Strategy outlines European views on global challenges, threats, and objectives. The article by Jean-Yves Haines, an EU security analyst, describes the evolution of the EUSS, its key points, and describes notable similarities and contrasts with the American NSS. At the broadest levels, is there a coherent European view of security, and how does the EU take on the security environment differ from that of the current U.S. Administration? Does the promulgated EU security strategy seem to be a realistic view of current threats and challenges? How do the U.S. and the EU compare in emphasizing different elements of national power? Given such differences, what challenges do you see for U.S.-EU cooperation?

2. One of the biggest and most consequential social, political, and security issues facing Europe today is the radicalization of first- and second-generation Muslim immigrants in Western European societies. In his *Foreign Affairs* article, Robert S. Leiken describes the problems faced by both the Islamic populations of Europe and the national leaders trying to deal with questions of assimilation and political enfranchisement. Lieken points to growing discontent among

European Muslims that has sometimes manifested itself in jihadist operations directed against their own societies (e.g. the Madrid and London bombings, Paris riots). How does this phenomenon challenge European – and American – interests? What are the possible alternatives for European leaders, and which should (or could) be implemented? How might this situation evolve over the next 10 or 20 years, and what implications might there be for American strategic planning?

3. Dmitri Trenin argues that the new Russia is neither “with us nor against us”. In the 1990s, Russia sometimes seemed on track to be a member of the Western club, at others to be in danger of sliding back into Communist control or outright chaos. Under Vladimir Putin, Trenin argues, Russia has stabilized and settled into a confident role as a major power with regional security interests – sometimes aligned with those of the U.S. and the EU, sometimes not. What are Russia’s major interests today? How do you see Russia evolving in the next 10 years? What sort of relations should the U.S. seek with Russia, and should we attempt to influence Russia’s domestic political evolution? Moreover, how should the U.S. react to Russia’s desire for influence in its “near abroad” (Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and South Caucasus)? How should Russia factor in U.S. plans for future missile defenses and strategic nuclear forces?

4. Skeptics have long predicted the demise of NATO. Some point to crises over Kosovo and Iraq; realist scholars simply doubt that any alliance can survive without a clear external threat. In contrast, Ryan Hendrickson argues that NATO remains a valuable asset and has shown itself to be surprisingly robust and flexible. What benefits does Hendricks claim for NATO, and what is his case for optimism? Do you agree, or will doubters prove correct? How has NATO performed in Afghanistan since Hendrickson wrote the article, and would serious setbacks in the war against the Taliban change your assessment? What future should the U.S. seek with, and for, NATO, especially vis-à-vis out-of-area operations? Should NATO “go global”, expanding to non-European partners like Australia or Japan? What about admitting ex-Soviet nations with significant internal (and external) security challenges, like Georgia and Azerbaijan?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Haines, Jean-Yves. “Idealism and Power: The New EU Security Strategy,” *Current History*, March 2004, pp 105-112.

2. Leiken, Robert S. “Europe's Angry Muslims,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2005, pp 120-135.

3. Trenin, Dmitri. “Russia Leaves the West,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2006, pp 87-96.

4. Hendrickson, Ryan. “The Miscalculation of NATO’s Death,” *Parameters*, Spring 2007, pp 96-114.

## SSF 12 AFRICA

**A. Focus** Now more than ever Africa matters to the United States. Following a period of post-Cold War disengagement from the continent, Africa “has assumed a new, strategic place in U.S. foreign policy and *in the definition of vital U.S. national interests*” (emphasis added), according to the high-level U.S. Africa Policy Advisory Panel. From the challenge of combating international terrorism and securing the flow of African oil exports to the United States to countering transnational and nontraditional threats (such as regional conflict, environmental degradation, and pandemic disease) and coping with humanitarian crises, the task before U.S. strategists and policymakers is enormous. This task is further complicated by severe resource limitations, diverging American, European, and African priorities, and the fragile state of emerging African democracies. Moreover, for the United States to be successful in advancing U.S. strategic objectives in Africa, new thinking will be required to construct an integrated and collaborative approach to this array of security challenges.

### B. Objectives

- Identify U.S. and regional interests in Africa.
- Identify and analyze threats, challenges, and opportunities for the United States and other nations in Africa.
- Analyze and evaluate possible strategic alternatives for the United States and others in Africa.
- Supports JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, and 3e.

### C. Guidance

1. The Congressional Research Service Report for Congress on Africa Command provides a concise view of the new command’s guiding principles and programs in light of defending and advancing U.S. interests in Africa. The report raises a number of critical questions and issues, including perceptions of U.S. military engagement by African countries and influential powers, such as China; the potential friction between DoD activities and diplomatic and development objectives; and overlapping or conflicting lines of authority between the military and other U.S. government agencies charged with advancing U.S. interests in Africa. It also highlights five factors—oil, global trade, armed conflicts, terror, and HIV/AIDS—driving a conceptual shift in how the United States views its interests in Africa. How can the United States best position itself to meet these challenges? What are the prospects for success given the proposed theater strategy?

2. The Horn of Africa has been a central focus of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in Africa since 2002 and will continue to pre-occupy policymaker attention. Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen, however, point out that Washington’s single-minded focus on countering terrorism and extremist ideologies in the region overshadow U.S. efforts to address long-term strategic objectives, such as conflict resolution and good governance. Is their proposed solution for attacking the underlying causes of insecurity and instability realistic? Has the United States

“militarized” U.S.-Africa counter-terrorism policy at the expense of other tools of national power?

3. Increasingly China has focused its attention on expanding its diplomatic, security, and especially economic ties with African countries. Chinese trade with Africa, for instance, has expanded tenfold in the past decade and may double again in the next few years. Vines highlights some of the reasons for this newfound interest and the growing competition between China and the West in Africa for influence and access to strategic resources, most notably oil. What type of challenge does China pose to U.S. interests in Africa? How should the United States react to this newfound activism? What kind of strategic initiatives should the United States undertake to protect and advance its interests in the years ahead?

4. In recent years African countries have made significant progress in addressing conflict, empowering their citizens, and promoting economic growth. Nonetheless, major challenges remain. Greg Mills identifies four areas: ethnicity; corruption and poor governance; high unemployment and income disparity; and lagging democratic development as the central challenges facing African governments. Does the United States have the ‘right formula’ in place to assist Africans in solving these problems? How can Washington ease suspicions of Western motives in Africa?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Ploch, Lauren. “Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa.” Wash, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 7, 2007, pp 4-24.

2. Prendergast, John and Colin Thomas-Jensen. “Blowing the Horn,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 2, March/April 2007, pp. 59-74.

3. Vines, Alex. “China in Africa: A Mixed Blessing?” *Current History* Vol. 106, No. 700, May 2007: pp. 213-219.

4. Mills, Greg. “The U.S. and Africa: Prisoners of a Paradigm,” *Current History*, May 2008, pp. 225-230.



## **SSF-13 WESTERN HEMISPHERE**

**A. Focus:** This region is home. We have strategic interests here; for example, three out of our five top oil providers are in the hemisphere. Other interests include major trade relationships, terrorism, migration, narcotics trafficking, and diplomatic partnerships to pursue common goals. Many issues can be described as “inter-mestic,” having a combination of domestic and international attributes. With 41 million *Latinos* in the U.S., the interest of the electorate in regional policy will likely increase. From Canada to Argentina there are shared experiences, but great variety in how countries assimilated colonial, indigenous, and African influences. The good news is the expansion of democratic government, although stressed in some places. Economic growth and reform continue. The bad news is the inability to translate growth into greater income equality and poverty eradication. Now, the advice is that Latin America should complete the “second generation” of institutional reforms. Populism remains an attractive, if destructive, path. Narcotics trafficking and gang activity threaten economic and political progress. Some observers complain that because the U.S. is in the same hemisphere as the Americas, it does not make the same effort to develop and execute policy as it does with other continents, or that it takes the Americas for granted. Countries around the Caribbean, our “third border,” have experienced lengthy U.S. military interventions. U.S. policy-makers must think about “diplomatic competitiveness” as a more sophisticated Latin America increasingly works without the U.S. or with partners new to the region such as China, India, and Iran. For example, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit will meet in Peru in November. We can approach this emerging “hemispherism” as either a threat or an opportunity to craft more effective relationships. Some of our most productive relationships now are with leftist governments committed to good governance. Canada has a similar challenge: how to adapt and pursue interests with the US in a changing security environment as part of the Americas.

### **B. Objectives:**

- Identify United States and regional interests in the Western Hemisphere.
- Identify and analyze threats, challenges, and opportunities to United States and other nations in the Western Hemisphere.
- Analyze and evaluate possible strategic alternatives for the United States and others in the Western Hemisphere.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, and 3e.

### **C. Guidance:**

1. Michael Reid asks why Latin America can grow, but not sustain prosperity and converge with the developed West like other regions. Despite resources, too often the tendency is to retreat inward and to prefer authoritarianism. Reid examines four possible explanations for this conundrum: dependency theory; cultural influences; policy mistakes; and institutional weakness. Dependency theory is essential to understand the sources of regional instability and latent anti-Americanism. Drawing on Iberian suspicion of the Reformation and Enlightenment, some claim

that culture inhibits the region's ability to accommodate capitalism and democracy. Others argue that leaders have simply made bad choices, e.g., making product locally rather than importing it at lower cost and higher quality (import substitution). Some believe that the "Washington Consensus" reforms required by international lending institutions disappointed countries not because open markets and free trade were unsuitable for Latin America, but because the reforms were too shallow. Reid opts for a combination to explain the continuing tension between "modernists and reactionaries, democrats and authoritarians, and privileged and excluded". What is so attractive about dependency theory? Is it a political or economic theory? Do you think Chavez is familiar with it? What are the roots of populism and how would you respond to it? Has the U.S. had too much or too little influence? To what degree are countries' progress influenced by their traditions? (Note: CEPAL – UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.)

2. Peter Hakim suggests that the region is the ideal place to begin to rebuild "trust and credibility" that he believes the U.S. has lost globally. The fact that much of Latin America has strengthened its democracies and economies and is more engaged with the world, including with China, marks a more mature relationship with the U.S. He recommends that Washington demonstrate respect for international institutions, follow rules it applies toward others, and ensure that policies address regional problems. Hakim recommends that the U.S. use a more multilateral approach toward counternarcotics and counterterrorism policy. What multilateral tools are available to us? Is there a role for the U.S. in the "rolling transition" taking place in Cuba? How will this rebuilt "trust and credibility" help with human security issues?

3. Fraser's article shows us the strategic environment through the prism of a Canadian foreign policy expert. A few years ago, Canada determined that its perception of its effectiveness did not match reality. The author argues that the subsequent effort to sharpen its strategic focus and rebuild its military has failed. He states that while the military has improved, the tools of diplomacy and development assistance have not. Canada is not taking advantage of its ability to craft separate and more attractive diplomatic paths to goals shared with the U.S., nor is it insisting that the US consult. Does Canada's view of the security environment differ from ours? Does the gap between aspirations and resources sound familiar? How would Brazil affect Canada's world position?

#### **D. Required Readings:**

1. Reid, Michael. "Chapter 2: The Latin American Conundrum," *Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America's Soul*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2007, pp 30-51.

2. Hakim, Peter. "Latin America: the Next U.S. President's Agenda," *Great Decisions*, January 1, 2008, Foreign Policy Association, pp 65-75.

3. Fraser, Derek. "Just How Effective in Canada's Foreign Policy?" *International Insights*, Canadian International Council, Toronto, Volume 5 Number 3.

## **SSF-14 GRAND STRATEGY AND POWER**

**A. Focus.** Power is the ability to shape the outcomes you want and change the behavior of others. In the context of military power, unipolarity dominates thinking about the U.S. position in the world, but recent foreign policy frustration highlights the limits of American power and illustrates that power relations are stratified. At the military level, U.S. power is unparalleled and unprecedented. At the economic level, the U.S. is checked by other great economic powers such as Japan, the European Union, and the People's Republic of China and through institutions like the World Trade Organization. And, at the transnational level, the U.S. is but one of many state and non-state actors that influence global events. According to Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Walter Russell Mead, the changing nature of power and the global nature of American interests require the U.S. to use all its tools of national power to achieve its national security objectives. Military power is not sufficient to achieve U.S. national interests.

### **B. Objectives**

- Evaluate the range of diplomatic and economic options available to the national security professional when developing grand strategy.
- Support JSC Learning Areas 1d, 2a, and 5c.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Yale historian Paul Kennedy supplies a useful definition of grand strategy. What are the key differences between tactics, strategy and grand strategy? What are the key elements of grand strategy? Kennedy asserts that grand strategy is the art of balancing ends and means, providing a good starting place for this portion of the SSF course. Perhaps most importantly, what are the long and short-term “ends” or goals that the United States should be pursuing in the 21<sup>st</sup> century? Which are very high priority, and which are not as important? How does the national interest shape the goals that a country pursues?

2. Walter Russell Mead refines Joseph Nye's distinction between soft and hard power. Hard power is coercive and includes "sharp" (military) and "sticky" (economic) power, while soft power co-opts and comprises "sweet" (cultural) and "hegemonic" (the totality of America's agenda-setting power). Mead argues that by using all tools of national power, the U.S. can construct a safer global order, which is a fundamental national interest. When designing strategy, how can a country achieve balance with the various tools of national power? What happens when an imbalance occurs? How does overemphasizing one tool of national power place strain on the other tools?

### **D. Required Readings**

1. Kennedy, Paul. “Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition,” in *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, Paul Kennedy, ed., New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991, pp. 1-5.

2. Mead, Walter Russell. *Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk*, Alfred A. Knopf, 2004, Introduction and Chapters 1-2 (pp. 3-40).

## SSF-15 STRATEGIC RESTRAINT

**A. Focus** Foreign policy planning and decisions are guided by *grand strategy*. The next four sessions discuss precisely what grand strategy is, and lays out the basic options that the United States has for the coming century. Our tour of grand strategies begins at the far end of the spectrum, with “strategic restraint.” This lesson examines a grand strategy that is called by a variety of names – “neo-isolationism,” “independence,” and “strategic disengagement” are among the most popular – all of which advise roughly the same approach. Restraint as a strategy has deep roots in American history, from the Founding Fathers to the present day. Advocates of strategic restraint define security threats and national interests narrowly, arguing that the United States need not play an active (let alone dominant) role in international affairs beyond those of foreign trade. They hold that U.S. security is not affected by the vast majority of problems, struggles and violence that occur beyond its borders. America is, in an important sense, safe. Indeed, restraint advocates say, it is our very involvement that often causes fear and anger directed against the United States, so that a less active America would actually face fewer threats and win more goodwill abroad. As described by political scientist Eric Nordlinger, the three pillars of strategic restraint are: minimal intervention in the security affairs of other countries; moderate activity to advance our liberal ideas among and within other states; and a fully activist economic diplomacy on behalf of free trade. In other words, it is not strict isolation – a restrained United States would not stop trading with the rest of the world. It would merely define its interests narrowly, and avoid the cost of being the “world’s policeman”. Restraint advocates place great faith in deterrence: the belief that due to America’s overwhelming retaliatory capability, attacks on the U.S. are extremely unlikely. Other strategies too consider deterrence to be an important tool of American power, and so we also explore the concept of deterrence in this lesson.

### B. Objectives

- Identify, analyze and evaluate the components of neo-isolationism: its underlying assumptions, key concepts, objectives, risks, and force requirements.
- Compare those elements to the security needs of the United States, and evaluate the strategy’s overall utility for 21<sup>st</sup> century policymakers.
- Understand and analyze the concept of deterrence and its applications in the current security environment.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1c, and 3e.

### C. Guidance

1. Gholz, Press and Sapolsky present one of the strongest cases for strategic restraint. Their proposed grand strategy does not suggest that the United States should completely disengage from the world, but rather that U.S. interests would actually be better served by a reduction of commitments abroad. What arguments do they use to defend their strategy? What would be some of the major criticisms, and how do they respond? How would U.S. economic interests be affected

by a grand strategy of strategic restraint? Do they recommend economic protectionism to go hand-in-hand with such a strategy? Finally, this paper was obviously written before 9/11. Does the war on terror invalidate their recommendations? How would their strategy need to be adjusted to take 21<sup>st</sup> century threats into account? What are the potential risks and rewards of strategic restraint in an age of terror?

2. One of the assumptions of strategic restraint is that America can rely on deterrence to counter many threats, and thus need not engage in many active military operations. Other strategies, too, place a high value on deterrence as a tool – it was at the core of America’s Cold War “containment” strategy, for example. What is deterrence, and what are the factors that determine its likely success or failure in a given situation? How, if at all, is deterrence against regional actors and “rogue states” different than was deterrence between the U.S. and Soviet Union? Can deterrence work against non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Gholz, Eugene, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky. “Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation,” *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 5-17, 30-48. Skim the section in the middle.

2. Bunn, Elaine. “Can Deterrence Be Tailored?” *Strategic Forum*, no 225, January 2007, pp 1–8.

## **SSF-16 BALANCE OF POWER REALISM**

**A. Focus** A second grand strategy alternative for the United States in the post-Cold War era is one that advocates a restrained, but judicious use of U.S. military power to pursue interests that are vital to U.S. security and prosperity. Traditional realism argues that U.S. policy makers should be focused exclusively on pursuing U.S. interests to the exclusion of all else and exercise U.S. power cautiously. However, others have argued that realism can include the promotion of values and humanitarian considerations so long as U.S. interests come first. Realism cautions that the United States not become overextended or squander its resources on international problems it cannot solve. In addition, this strategy supports the maintenance of U.S. alliance commitments to Europe and Asia to help address threats and balance rising powers, but would define our interests and these threats in realist terms.

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand the premises, concepts, objectives, and requirements of balance of power realism.
- Assess the role of alliances in developing a successful security strategy.
- Evaluate the utility of balance of power realism in determining force requirements to meet U.S. security challenges, including the global war on terrorism.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1c, and 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Robert Art maintains that the greatest danger for a country as militarily powerful as the United States is trying to do too much based on an “arrogance of power.” Instead, he argues for a grand strategy that is more restrained in its use of U.S. power, but also remains engaged in the world and working together with those that share U.S. interests. Art begins by outlining the six fundamental U.S. national interests, and after reviewing alternative grand strategies, provides an explanation for why balance of power realism (which he calls “selective engagement”) provides the best grand strategy for achieving these interests.

2. Nikolas Gvosdev argues that the United States needs to be more selective in its use of power and pursue a more prioritized set of national interests. Moreover, policy makers need to be more interested in the results of their actions rather than being concerned about the right intentions. However, Gvosdev maintains that the pursuit of a realist foreign policy need not be devoid of values, but must be done in a way that is sustainable and accepts the limits of U.S. power.

For Art and Gvosdev, do you agree with their formulation of and arguments for balance of power realism (selective engagement)? What would you change? What do you see as the strengths and weaknesses of this grand strategy?

3. Rajan Menon argues that the current military alliance structure fashioned by the United States during the Cold War is outdated. U.S. alliances, particularly NATO and those with Japan and South Korea, lead to rigidity and are irrelevant for today's security environment. Menon does not promote isolationism but rather more fluid alignments often, but not always, with many of the same partners. His prescription "sheds the formal military pacts of containment and employs flexible alignments to promote stability and to address the variety of transnational problems.... In short, this strategy combines realism with principle." Thus, Menon subscribes to realism but believes the role of alliances needs to be reconsidered. Are U.S. alliances relics of the Cold War that have little benefit for the current security environment? Do these alliances continue to play an important role in regional and global security? If not, would Menon's recommendations be an adequate replacement?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Art, Robert J. "America's Grand Strategy after Bush," in Richmond M. Lloyd (ed.) *Defense Strategy and Forces: Setting Future Directions*, William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics Papers, no. 3, Newport RI: Naval War College Press, 2007, chapter 1, pp. 13-22.
2. Gvosdev, Nikolas K. "The Value(s) of Realism," *SAIS Review* 25, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 17-25.
3. Menon, Rajan. *The End of Alliances*, Oxford University Press, 2007, Preface, pp. vii-xii, and Conclusion, pp. 181-200.

## **SSF-17 PRIMACY**

**A. Focus.** When the Soviet Union collapsed on Christmas Day in 1991, the United States found itself relatively more powerful than any other international actor. Since then, U.S. power has continued to exceed that of its rivals and no peer competitor has emerged to close the gap. This era of U.S. unipolarity is certainly with precedent. Throughout history, various states have exercised primacy to ensure their security, promote their interests, and shape the international environment as a reflection of their national values. For those that advocate primacy as a grand strategy, the U.S. should not only dominate international politics, but international politics should be “Americanized” – characterized by market-oriented democracies. Primacists seek a preponderance of power to not only dissuade new competitors from emerging, but also to promote democracy and free market values. An examination of the U.S. National Space Policy affords an opportunity to think through the implications of this strategy.

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand and assess the premises, concepts, objectives, and requirements of primacy.
- Evaluate the utility of primacy in determining force requirements and the implications for space activities.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1c, and 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Mac Owens argues that the best way to keep the United States safe, free, and prosperous is to follow a strategy of primacy which is focused on preserving American hegemony. The United States has the largest economy, a robust military capacity, and significant influence in international institutions. For Owens, primacy provides security, tranquility, prosperity, and maximizes influence. Owens also follows the logic of force planning to consider the implications of this strategy on the military’s size, structure, and capabilities. How can the United States benefit from its position in international affairs without provoking its allies or encouraging countries to form a counterbalancing coalition? What are the economic costs Owens suggests are warranted to sustain a strategy of primacy?

2. In August 2006, the United States updated its ten-year old national space policy that outlines the principles of U.S. space programs and activities. While there are cooperative overtones to the space policy, reactions have centered around U.S. actions to achieve hegemony in space. Why has this policy been interpreted as a strategy of primacy? What are the implications for DoD military capabilities? Given that supporting DoD documents outline capabilities to protect space assets and deny the use of space assets by adversaries, one major newspaper critiqued the space policy as a declaration of space as the 51<sup>st</sup> state. Dr. Johnson-Freese argues that a “unilateral declaration that the skies belong to the United States is not the answer.” Given that space is increasingly important to the global economy, as well as warfighting, what diplomatic and economic tools can be employed to preserve the freedom of space?



#### **D. Required Reading**

1. Owens, Mackubin Thomas. "A Balanced Force Structure to Achieve a Liberal World Order," *Orbis*, Spring 2006, pp. 307-325.
2. Johnson-Freese, Joan. "The New U.S. Space Policy: A Turn Toward Militancy?" *Science and Technology*, Winter 2007, pp. 1-6.
3. U.S. National Space Policy, August 31, 2006, pp. 1-10.

## **SSF-18 LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM**

**A. Focus.** The previous session introduced primacy, which emphasizes power supremacy to guarantee security. This session focuses on liberal internationalism, which emphasizes strong multilateral institutions as necessary to guarantee security. Like primacists, liberal internationalists favor the promotion of market-oriented democracies, but also include pressuring non-democratic allies to transform. By integrating more countries into the community of democratic states, the world benefits from the “democratic peace” thesis, which asserts democracies do not go to war with each other, and by integrating economies into a common global marketplace, countries economically benefit from free trade and become more intertwined.

### **B. Objectives**

- Assess the premises, concepts, objectives, and requirements of liberal internationalism.
- Evaluate the utility of liberal internationalism in determining force requirements.
- Understand the role of the United Nations in U.S. grand strategy.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1c, and 3e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. While critics have interpreted U.S. foreign policy in a unilateralist way, Colin Dueck argues that the “criticisms misinterpret both the foreign policy of George W. Bush, as well as America’s liberal internationalist tradition.” Dueck notes that America’s foreign policy has been dominated by a liberal internationalist force for more than 100 years and has promoted a liberal world order by building international institutions. By doing so, American presidents since Woodrow Wilson have sought to reduce defense expenditures by sharing burdens through collective defense and building international institutions to prevent or defuse crises. Dueck suggests, however, that successive administrations have failed to adequately fund the internationalist agenda leading to “a series of remarkably halfhearted, initially low-risk interventions, which only reinforced the impression that the United States was unwilling to suffer costs or casualties on behalf of its stated interests overseas.” What are the diplomatic and military requirements for liberal internationalism? What are the dangers of basing a foreign policy on promoting such an ambitious agenda? How does a grand strategy defined by liberal internationalism affect force planning choices?

2. The selected reading from Christopher Layne explains the tenets of the “democratic peace” theory. Basically, the idea is that democracies tend not to go to war against each other, preferring instead to use more legitimate conflict resolution measures because of 1) institutional constraints and 2) democratic culture. He also explores the logic of an “appealing vision of perpetual peace within a zone of democracy and prosperity” that is supposedly provided for by this theory, and the possible pitfalls of a foreign policy built on this premise. How would this type of foreign policy be viewed by other nations or international actors? What possible methods could be employed to advance and defend a democratic peace agenda, and are they sustainable?

3. While the United Nations is a reflection of its member states' political objectives, it remains the most inclusive international organization. The UN confers international legitimacy and remains an important force in international politics. Even after U.S. disappointment on how the UN Security Council handled Iraq, the United States returned to the UNSC after Operation Iraqi Freedom to recognize the new government, suspend sanctions previously imposed on Iraq, and assist with a reconstruction plan. While some critics argue that the UN is increasingly irrelevant to the United States, Shashi Tharoor argues that the UN is "a forum where sovereign states can come together to share burdens, address common problems, and seize common opportunities." How does the UN and its organs fit into U.S. grand strategy? In what ways does the UN further American strategic goals? How can the goals be hampered?

4. John Ikenberry argues that although the United States is the "world's foremost champion of multilateral rules and institutions," it is also reluctant to have its power and freedom of action constrained by these very arrangements. This ambivalence springs from a unique situation where the very state that advocates stability and predictability in an international system based on rule of law also has enough global power to act unilaterally. What is the proper balance between freedom of action and multilateral engagement for the U.S. to meet its national security objectives? How will globalization and increasing international interdependence impact this balance? Does increased multilateral integration enhance or constrain U.S. influence? Can (or should) the U.S. successfully operate outside an international system that it has historically promoted?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Dueck, Colin. "Hegemony on the Cheap: Liberal Internationalism from Wilson to Bush," *World Policy Journal*, Winter 2003/4, 1-11.

2. Layne, Christopher. "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19, no. 2 (Autumn 1994): 7-10, 45-49.

3. Tharoor, Shashi. "Why America Still Needs the United Nations," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2003, 67-80.

4. Ikenberry, John. "America and the Ambivalence of Power," *Current History* 102, issue 667 (November 2003): 377-82.

## **SSF-19 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY**

**A. Focus.** The National Security Strategy (NSS) serves as the grand strategy document for the United States. The NSS defines U.S. security interests, objectives, and goals, and provides guidance to those who are charged with executing that strategy, such as the Regional Combatant Commanders. For a variety of reasons that we will explore, the 2002 NSS was by far the most scrutinized, debated and controversial document of its kind; the 2006 update arrived with less fanfare, but it is no less important. This lesson will identify the most important aspects of the NSS and assess its strengths and weaknesses as a strategic guidance document for each regional command. In looking toward the future, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 requires each administration produce an NSS by June 15 of the first year it takes office and “regularly” thereafter, meaning a 2009 NSS will be written—possibly with far-reaching implications for the regional commanders.

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand the major elements of the NSS of the United States and contending viewpoints.
- Analyze the NSS critically and discuss possible changes for the next administration.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d.

### **C. Guidance**

1. The most recent U.S. National Security Strategy (2006) emphasizes what the President feels to be his “most solemn obligation:” to protect the security of the American people, which will be done with a two-pillar approach. The first pillar is “promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity,” by working to end tyranny, promote “effective democracies,” and extend prosperity through free trade and open markets. The second pillar is “confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies” to address the pressing global problems of the new century. The United States cannot solve many of these problems alone, but it is prepared to play the leading role in a global effort to make the world a better, safer, more just place.

2. One of the document’s main themes is that the spread of democracy and respect for human dignity are inseparable from the national interests of the United States. The 2006 NSS re-emphasizes many of the themes of its predecessor from 2002, and discusses the progress made and challenges still facing our efforts to champion aspirations for human dignity; strengthen alliances; help defuse regional conflicts; protect against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); ignite economic growth through free markets and free trade; encourage democracy; develop cooperative agendas with other global powers; and transform America’s national security institutions for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

3. Do these aims accurately capture the long-term security goals of the United States? Do you agree with the priorities outlined in the NSS? If not, what is missing (or what should be deleted)? Are roadmaps for achieving each goal clear and realistic? Would you change any

specific or general aspects of the NSS, perhaps to increase or decrease focus? Some have argued that these documents are more accurately thought of as national security *policies* rather than *strategies*. To what extent is this document truly strategic, as you understand the term? How much do politics seem to enter into its formulation?

4. Given the pending change in administration, what elements or themes of past national security strategies are likely to be maintained? Significantly changed? What future challenges and opportunities should the incoming administration address in drafting its new NSS? How will the new President's view of the world influence the formulation of the next NSS?

#### **D. Required Reading**

1. Bush, George W. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006.

## SSF-20 DEFENSE STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

**A. Focus.** Congress requires the President to publish an unclassified National Security Strategy – the focus of SSF-19. Additionally, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is required to submit a biennial report on the National Military Strategy (NMS). In 2005, the Secretary of Defense published the initial National Defense Strategy (NDS) to coincide with the release of the 2004 NMS. The NDS focuses on how the military instrument of power contributes to achieving national security objectives, while the NMS sets the strategic direction for the armed forces to implement the NDS by describing the ways and means to achieve supporting military objectives. The NDS and NMS also provided the strategic foundation for the mandated 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that refined and modified some of the elements of the NDS and attempted to “operationalize” the strategy. These documents provide the strategic guidance to translate national policy into military strategy and forces. The NDS, NMS, and QDR are the core documents that provide the common thread to integrate and synchronize the planning and activities of the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies

### B. Objectives

- Comprehend the major elements of the *National Defense Strategy*, the *National Military Strategy*, and the *Quadrennial Defense Review*.
- Critically analyze these documents, ascertaining their strengths and weaknesses, and the effectiveness of these documents in translating the national security strategies and policies into military capabilities and forces.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1d, 2b, 2d, and 3c.

### C. Guidance

1. The NDS supports the President’s *National Security Strategy* and informs the NMS. The document describes the strategic environment that includes violent extremist movements, transnational threats, and other irregular challenges. The NDS lays out the Department of Defense’s five strategic objectives: Defend the Homeland, Win the Long War, Promote Security, Deter Conflict, and Win our Nations Wars; articulates the five ways the Department will achieve those objectives: Shape the Choices of Key States, Prevent Adversaries from Acquiring or Using WMD, Strengthen and Expand Alliances and Partnerships, Secure U.S. Strategic Access and Retain Freedom of Action, and Integrate and Unify our Efforts; and discusses implementation of the strategy and managing risk. Given the pending change in administration in January 2009, is publication of this document necessary or useful? Do you agree with Secretary Gates that “this strategy is a blueprint to succeed in the years to come”?

2. The *National Military Strategy* outlines the strategic direction for the Armed Forces of the United States. Highlights include: an increased emphasis on homeland defense; a shift from “threat-based” to “capabilities-based” planning; replacing the requirement to prevail in two “nearly-simultaneous” major theater wars with the requirement to “decisively [defeat] an adversary in one of the two theaters in which U.S. forces are conducting major combat operations;” and an enhanced focus on transforming the U.S. military to a twenty-first century

force capable of responding to a variety of threats across the spectrum of conflict. Does it flow logically from the NSS and NDS? Are there inconsistencies between the NDS and NMS?

3. The 2006 QDR report represents the thinking and reflection of the Department's senior leaders since the development of the NMS and NDS. The QDR purports to be a snapshot in time of the Department's strategy, capturing the experiences of the armed forces over the last four years and the direction to take in the future. How does the QDR modify the NDS and NMS? Do the major shifts in the QDR better support the implementation of strategic guidance and correct any inconsistencies between the NDS and NMS?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Gates, The Honorable Robert M. *The National Defense Strategy of the United States*, June 2008, pp. 1-18; scan remainder.

2. Myers, General Richard B. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2004, pp. 1-13.

3. Rumsfeld, The Honorable Donald H. *Quadrennial Defense Review*, February 6, 2006, pp. 1-7, 19-21, 35-39.

## SSF-21 MARITIME STRATEGY

**A. Focus.** In June 2006, then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen, addressed the Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College, declaring that the nation's sea services would develop a new maritime strategy to provide strategic guidance for an age colored by both the War on Terror as well as the forces of globalization. Groups from the Naval War College, the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard Headquarters Staffs, and academic think tanks spent well over a year developing strategic concepts that best supported the maritime services' role in the implementation of America's National Security Strategy. "Conversations with America" were conducted in numerous cities, soliciting the most informed commentary from national business and civilian leaders. This process culminated in the October 2007 release of "A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower," a maritime strategy endorsed by all three chiefs of America's sea services. Acknowledging the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, the paper outlines the strategic imperatives they face as well as the force characteristics necessary to carry out these tasks. The Service Chiefs insisted that this strategic guidance document enumerate the capabilities required of the nation's maritime forces without explicitly listing platforms or programs.

### B. Objectives

- Evaluate the required capabilities of the sea services to support the *National Defense Strategy*, the *National Military Strategy*, and the *Quadrennial Defense Review*.
- Critically analyze the strategic imperatives and required capabilities enumerated in the Maritime Strategy and determine if they present any strategy-force mismatches.
- Synthesize the requirements set forth in the Maritime Strategy and offer force planning initiatives to respond to the challenges.
- Support JCS Learning Area 1a, 1d, 2a, 2d, 3c, and 5e.

### C. Guidance

1. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower* comes at a time when our nation is in its fifth year of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and states that "preventing wars is just as important as winning wars". Not only does it address the requirements of decisive combat power, but it places significant emphasis on issues normally referred to as *human security*, placing unparalleled emphasis on the maintenance of the global economic system and social stability. Homeland defense-in-depth, it avers, can only be sustained through sustained cooperative relationships with "an expanding set of international partners". The NDS and NMS also offer strategic estimates and capabilities requirements. Are the Maritime Strategy required capabilities in line with higher guidance? Is it reasonable that the nation focus its efforts away from Iraq at this crucial time? Is it useful to promulgate a maritime strategy without reference to naval platforms or programs?

2. Successful strategies are those which present the best possible connection among *ends, ways and means*. However, few strategies were able to capture the imagination of the American



strategic community as well as John Lehman's offensive sea control strategy of the 1980s. Frank Hoffman argues that, in addition to making strategic sense, the new maritime strategy will succeed as well as its predecessor only if it addresses the challenges posed by six factors. Some of these factors are based on classical strategy, such as being supportive of grand strategy and understanding one's adversary. Other factors can best be labeled *astrategic*, such as developing political consensus and building domestic support. Why should domestic support be listed on a par with adversary understanding?

3. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is known for its critical analyses of military strategy. Robert Work, its principal naval analyst, considers the logic as well as the implementability of the new Maritime Strategy in his most recent article.

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Roughead, Gary, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*, U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007, Washington D.C., pp. 1-10.

2. Hoffman, Frank. "A New Maritime Strategy: Navigating Uncertain Waters," Foreign Policy Research Institute [www.fpri.org](http://www.fpri.org), 2007, Philadelphia, PA.

3. Work, Robert W. *A Critique of the New Maritime Strategy*, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, Washington, DC. 2007.

## **SSF-22 THE LOGIC OF FORCE PLANNING AND RISK**

**A. Focus.** Force planning is the process of translating strategy into future force structure. The objective of force planning is to develop future military forces – by which is meant not only platforms but people and organizations – that will be able to carry out the military missions implied by the nation’s grand strategy in the future international environment, while doing so within resource constraints. Planning is complicated by the fact that in order to meet the requirements of an uncertain future, the force planner must make choices today for a future that might not develop as expected. Planners must balance the requirements of likely scenarios versus hedging against surprises. Likewise, they must balance resources between current operational needs, and investment in future capabilities. Force planning must answer, at a minimum, three questions: 1) What characteristics should the force possess? 2) How much is enough? 3) What risks are associated with the force and how can we manage them? This session reviews the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches or methodologies for planning future military capabilities, and looks at various forms of risk that force planners must analyze and mitigate.

### **B. Objectives**

- Understand the strengths and weaknesses of alternative approaches to force planning.
- Analyze and evaluate specific force planning methodologies and illustrative cases.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1c, 2a, 2b, 2d, and 5e.

### **C. Guidance**

1. In the second part of “The Art of Strategy and Force Planning,” Bartlett, Holman, and Somes discuss various approaches to force planning. These approaches range from capabilities-based planning to fiscally-based planning. For most of the past decade the U.S. Department of Defense has emphasized the use of scenarios and potential threats as the basis for planning. The Bush administration has shifted from threat-based to capabilities-based planning. The emphasis on transformation suggests that technology may also be a significant driver. The Services have long stressed core competencies and missions as major force planning drivers. What do you see as advantages and disadvantages of each approach?

2. The two readings by defense analyst Michelle Flournoy address the issue of risk. Her first reading, "Addressing Risk in the QDR", briefly lays out a framework for risk assessment that Flournoy proposed for the 2001 QDR. What are the major categories of risk that she identifies? Would you add or subtract from her list? What is meant by the notion of "balancing" risks? Flournoy’s second reading is her evaluation of the 2006 QDR in light of the 2001 risk framework. She argues that the 2006 QDR did not adequately address risk as an analytic issue, and that the current Administration's defense plans take too much risk in some areas, too little in others. What do you see as the major risks facing DoD in the next decade, and how would you try to mitigate them?

3. In May of 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave a speech in which he argued that DoD (particularly the Services in their institutional roles), were focusing too much on

preparing for the prospect of future peer competitor conflicts and not enough on current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Do you agree with Gates that the Services were taking too much operational risk and too little future challenges risk? If so, how would you change the defense program?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Bartlett, Henry C., G. Paul Holman, Jr., and Timothy E. Somes. "The Art of Strategy and Force Planning," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds., *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4th ed., Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004, Chapter 2. Read only second half of chapter pp. 23–33 (starting at "Alternative Approaches to Force Planning").
2. Flournoy, Michelle. "Assessing Risk in the QDR," in Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, eds, *Strategy and Force Planning 4<sup>th</sup> Edition*, Naval War College, 2004, pp 562 – 566.
3. Flournoy, Michelle. "Did the Pentagon Get the Quadrennial Defense Review Right?" *Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2006, pp 67 – 84.
4. Gates, Robert. "Remarks to the Heritage Foundation (Colorado Springs, CO)," May 13, 2008.

## SSF-23 CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING

**A. Focus.** In the previous lesson you were introduced to a variety of methods for planning future forces. In this lesson we look more deeply at the approach currently favored by the Department of Defense: “capabilities-based planning” (abbreviated CBP). PMP 14 (“Defense Resource Management”) introduced the concept of CBP as well as some of the processes and organizations designed to execute it within the DoD. In this lesson, we look more deeply at the ideas behind CBP and potential criticisms of the method.

Capabilities-based planning is intended to deal with future uncertainty: rather than focusing on specific threats and developing specific, tailored solutions to meet them, CBP calls for planners to consider a wide range of scenarios and to hedge their bets by building a portfolio of capabilities that will be useful under many different futures. Likewise, it calls for thinking in terms of enterprise-wide capabilities like “prompt global strike” that might be implemented by very different sorts of forces, for example from a conventionally-armed ICBM to a Special Forces direct-action team. These are heavy intellectual requirements, and critics argue that DoD is not yet considering appropriate scenarios, is using the ambiguity and uncertainty in CBP to invent rationales for existing programs, or is confusing itself with needless complexity.

### B. Objectives

- Understand capabilities-based planning as a general method of force planning.
- Analyze and evaluate the application of capabilities-based planning in specific cases.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1c, 2a, 2b, 2d, 5e, and 5f.

### C. Guidance

1. In his reading, RAND researcher Paul Davis (a key figure in CBP concepts for the Clinton and Bush administrations) describes a general methodological approach to CBP, introducing several key concepts. One foundational concept is the use of a range of scenarios to deal with uncertainty about the future. Another fundamental concept is the notion of viewing capabilities as *portfolios* -- sets of capabilities that are not optimized for one single future scenario, but instead are designed to balance effectiveness across a range of plausible futures. This is analogous to an individual holding a diverse portfolio of investments rather than betting everything on a few stocks that should do well in a single economic scenario. What do you see as potential advantages and disadvantages of this approach? How would you devise scenario sets? How would you balance risks between maximizing capabilities for the most likely scenarios vs. hedging against challenging but less likely scenarios?

2. A critical part of CBP is devising appropriate scenarios. The reading by Andy Krepinevich is an excerpt from an outside “red team” critique of the 2006 QDR. He argues that for all the talk of new approaches, the QDR focused too heavily on preparation for traditional high-intensity state-on-state conflict. In the QDR’s own terms – from the “quad chart” -- Krepinevich argues that insufficient resources are given to “disruptive”, “catastrophic”, and “irregular” challenges. Krepinevich suggests focusing the force planning process around a set of

generic scenarios he calls "color plans" -- scenarios against generic adversaries that are plausible, but not tied to specifics of geography, enemy orders of battle, etc. What do you think of his selected scenarios – are these the likely futures? What would you add or subtract?

3. In 1998, Carl Connetta and Charles Knight attacked the then-emerging doctrine of CBP. They argued that although the approach claimed to manage uncertainty, it really would become an expensive exercise in "what if-ism". They argued that "uncertainty hawks" would dream up implausible scenarios and that the Services would put forward "what ifs" for which their beloved platforms would be required. Therefore, Connetta and Knight recommended a return to threat-based analysis. In retrospect, does their critique have merit? Are we better off today for the DoD's CBP efforts over the last decade? One point to consider is that Connetta and Knight missed the prospect of the 9/11 attacks and subsequent U.S. responses. On the other hand, did the CBP advocates they discuss do any better at predicting the future?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Davis, Paul, Russell Shaver and Justin Beck. "Portfolio-Analysis Methods for Assessing Capabilities Options," *The RAND Corporation*, MG-662, 2008. pp 17 – 33.

2. Krepinevich, Andrew. "The Quadrennial Defense Review: Rethinking the U.S. Military Posture," *Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments*, 2005, pp 53 – 59; skim 59 – 76.

3. Conetta, Carl and Charles Knight. "Inventing Threats," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March/April 1998, pp 32 – 38.

## **SSF 24    RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS**

**A. Focus.** This course has offered several frameworks to guide the development of strategy and the choosing of future forces. Inevitably there are mismatches among the variables of ends, strategy, forces, security environment and available resources. Constrained resources introduce potential budgetary or affordability risks which are mismatches between plans, programs and budget. The art of strategic and force planning is to manage the risks resulting from such mismatches. With current defense guidance as a backdrop, this session will evaluate risks inherent in the latest Defense Budget.

### **B. Objectives**

- Assess the President's Defense Budget against current defense guidance in terms of national priorities, strategic alignments, and potential strategy-resource mismatches.
- Evaluate resource allocations in the President's Defense Budget in terms of operational, future challenges, institutional, and budgetary risks.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1c, 2a, 2d, and 5e, and 5f.

### **C. Guidance**

1. Dr. Gilmore discusses the significant difference between the Department of Defense budget projections made by the Congressional Budget Office and the President's budget. Based on historical pricing trends and current rates of expenditure, even if the number of deployed troops decreases to 70,000 from 200,000 in the years ahead, DoD will require a 28 percent higher budget than that requested. Gilmore also discusses "mandatory" spending pressures on the government such Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid which will continue to increase significantly in the decades ahead. Given that the DoD budget is "discretionary," what are some possible force planning alternatives to stay within projected budgetary topline? If Gilmore's projections are assumed to be true, what strategic, operational, and organizational risks does this impose? In the iterative process of force planning, will these resource pressures force a change in U.S. national interests or strategies in the decades ahead?

2. Echoing many of the same issues, Ashton Carter highlights a national security strategy-resources mismatch in terms of five future requirements that he believes should guide future investment choices. He presents a range of needed capabilities and strategies for: irregular stability ops, combating violent extremists, engagement and a "prudent hedge" against China, prevent/protect against WMD threats, and a conventional overmatch in more than one theater. This is a whole-of-government discussion, as he includes other agencies and competing resource pressures in his overall discussion. What are some of the strategic, operational, institutional, future challenges, and force planning risks in his proposals? What are some possible adjustments or alternatives to his recommendations that address today's force management risks and tomorrow's future challenges?

3. The Department of Defense budget release statement and associated briefing slides provide an overview of the President's Defense Budget and supporting rationale. What priorities

are supported by the budget? How does the budget address the operational risks the military faces today and the future challenges risks the military faces tomorrow? Do you agree that end strength should be increased by 92,000? How does that increase affect risks? Can the budget growth in the Future Years Defense Plan be sustained, especially given other competing national priorities? How would you better address budgetary risks?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Gilmore, J. Michael. "Federal Budget Trends and the Outlook for the Defense Program," *Defense Strategy and Forces: Setting Future Directions*, edited by Richmond M. Lloyd, William B. Ruger Chair of National Security, Economics Papers 3, 13-15 November 2007, 37-53.
2. Carter, Ashton B. "Defense Management Challenges in the Post-Bush Era," *Defense Strategy and Forces: Setting Future Directions*, edited by Richmond M. Lloyd, William B. Ruger Chair of National Security, Economics Papers 3, 13-15 November 2007, 23-30.
3. Department of Defense. "Fiscal 2009 Department of Defense Budget Release," February 2008. (FY2010 Budget Submission will be distributed when available.)
4. Department of Defense. "U.S. Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Request Slides," February 2008. (FY2010 Budget Submission will be distributed when available.)

## SSF-25 FUTURE OF MILITARY COMPETITION

**A. Focus.** This lesson explores the nature and style of future warfare by examining contrasting notions of conflict that might cause the U.S. to rethink its military strategy and force structure. Key elements of this debate include the role of technology and the character of conflict in the future. Not long ago, some proclaimed that technology, especially information technology, had changed the very nature of war, eliminating Clausewitzian “friction” and the “fog of uncertainty.” Recent operational lessons seem to have called such optimism into question. So, what will future war look like? What parts of war and conflict have changed and what have not? Are there new demands in war that require a change in the way we do business? What are the implications for how we plan and employ forces in conjunction with other instruments of power?

Since technology does play a prominent role in U.S. force planning, strategists must consider the current and future state of technology in evaluating adversary capabilities and potential concepts for future forces. The force planning process also has a key role in *creating* new technology as DoD funds a significant fraction of the nation’s R&D. Before 9/11 there was talk of “generation skipping,” or buying fewer platforms now and investing in transformational R&D. Today R&D is losing out to immediate needs like IED-resistant vehicles. Planners must consider strategic needs while balancing R&D funding to fill short-term capability gaps and also advance broader research that may eventually enable entirely new concepts.

### B. Objectives

- Understand alternative views of the future of war and analyze their strategic assumptions.
- Understand the relevance of these views to the development of strategy and on the selection of future military forces.
- Analyze the impact of technology on military competition and for incorporating technology into strategies and force plans.
- Assess the role of emerging technologies to either enable desired U.S. capabilities or to provide adversaries with disruptive new challenges to U.S. operational concepts.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1c, 2a, 2b, 2d, 3a, 5e, and 5f.

- **C. Guidance**

1. Owens provides an overview of the debates about future warfare and military competitions. In the 1990s, some argued that war was a thing of the past. If war did come, argued others, it would be very different from what went before because of technological advances, which had “changed the very nature of war.” Others contended the rise of China presage the return of great power confrontation. Still others, such as the former commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak, argued that future war would not be “the son of Desert Storm, but the bastard stepchild of Chechnya.” The Pentagon has argued that future war will adhere to four categories: traditional, irregular, disruptive, and catastrophic. Will war confine itself to discrete categories? What about the possibility of “complex-irregular warfare” or other hybrids?



Could a state (China) embrace “irregular” methods while non-state actors (Hezbollah) utilize some “traditional” methods of war? What does this bode for future military competitions?

2. Tim Benbow weighs into the future nature of conflict discussion with an analysis of the various views on fourth-generation warfare. Salient issues include the ability of non-state actors to use irregular warfare to challenge the legitimacy of the state, the enabling power of globalization, the role of technology, and the risks of either over-playing or underestimating the importance of this type of conflict. Has the world seen a fundamental change in the nature of war, or is this just more of the historical same as “strategists...notice insurgency?” Where does this type of conflict fit in policy, strategy, and force planning, especially since Benbow notes that “asymmetry is not synonymous with low technology?”

3. The diffusion of technological innovation is one security challenge that makes it hard to spot disruptive advances available to potential adversaries. The National Research Council examines the globalization of technology and suggests priorities and metrics for identifying technological threats. They expect commercially-driven advances in IT, nanotech, biotech, and other areas to lay the foundation for adversaries to develop militarily relevant capabilities. Can such emerging technologies change the character of military competition? What evolving technologies might threaten important U.S. capabilities? How do technology choices made by the U.S. impact future military competitions? The NRC is also concerned about the U.S. losing its technological edge with declining enrollments in science and engineering, the shift towards global R&D conducted by multinationals, and declining U.S. investments in basic science. Should planners be concerned about the viability of strategies that count on U.S. technological advantages? What should be done, especially since these trends are largely out of DoD’s control?

4. *Unrestricted Warfare* provides a non-Western view of future conflict. The authors believe that the tech-heavy American military is only postured for a traditional fight where they “hope war is like running into their own muzzle,” meaning that the enemy will meet the U.S. on its own terms. They instead discuss a combined method approach that incorporates all aspects of a nation’s power to “go beyond domains and categories.” Every avenue of “warfare” is available, including nuclear, diplomatic, financial, network, bio-chemical, ecological, psychological, and criminal, to name a few. What does this portend for future conflict? How do strategists and force planners, especially in open societies, prepare for a war of this type?

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. Owens, Mackubin Thomas. “Reflections on Future War,” faculty paper, June 2007.
2. Benbow, Tim. “Talking 'Bout Our Generation? Assessing the Concept of "Fourth-Generation Warfare,"” *Comparative Strategy* 27, no. 2 (March 2008), 148-163.
3. National Research Council. “Technology Warning: Motivation and Challenges,” Chapter 1 in *Avoiding Surprise in an Era of Global Technology Advances*. Washington, D.C.: The National Academy Press, 2005, 9–19.
4. Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui. *Unrestricted Warfare*. FBIS translation. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999. 141-51.

## **SSF-26 COURSE WRAP UP**

**A. Focus.** The Security, Strategy and Forces (SSF) course has introduced the student to a systematic thought process which enables the student to tackle national security challenges. In its purest form, this thought process ties together all the factors that generate a strategy, then leads directly to the determination of what America's future military should look like. This particular tool is presented in SSF because the vast majority of the students are active duty military and members of the Department of Defense. However, the principal takeaway of the course is not "what forces do we need", but rather the thought process that allows national security professionals to look at intractable security problems and determine workable solutions. This session will allow students to select one such issue and collectively work toward its solution, taking full advantage of their SSF frameworks, concepts and enhanced regional and strategic awareness.

### **B. Objectives**

- Apply the frameworks and concepts of the Security, Strategy and Forces (SSF) course to develop solutions to national security problems.
- Review the major takeaways from the SSF course.
- Support JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 2b, 3e, 4e, 5a, 5e and 6d (seminar dependent).

### **C. Guidance**

1. As we began the SSF course, the first session exposed the student to an article in which twenty one of the world's leading thinkers noted an important security issue facing the world (or the United States) and offered a solution to the problem. This article was designed to merely stimulate the interest of the students and to make them aware of the types of problems they would be facing during the semester of SSF. Now, as we conclude the semester, the students have the tools to view the world as national security professionals and have spent the semester being exposed to these and other security issues. Our students should now not only be able to "think big," but should also possess the tools to offer their solutions to security problems. Although the course has given special attention to the tools needed by military professional to develop the "military after next", the world's security problems need not be addressed exclusively by responsive military forces. Nation states have many tools at their disposal.

2. This session is designed to allow the seminar to explore solutions to security problems using all these tools. The starting point will be the course's first reading (below), however, the seminar need not be limited by the 21 choices presented therein. During the week prior to this session, the seminar and professor should agree on the precise national security problem to be tackled during this period. It can be from the required reading or be another issue, perhaps drawn from a student's research paper or simply one from recent headlines. What is crucial is that the members of the seminar know in advance the topic and come to this session prepared to drive to a solution to this problem, using those frameworks and concepts they have been exposed to during their semester in SSF.

#### **D. Required Readings**

1. “21 Solutions to Save the World,” *Foreign Policy*, May/June 2007. pp. 36-52. (This reading was issued in Session 1)
2. Optional – Topic and supporting article to be assigned one week in advance of this session in discussion with seminar and SSF professor.




# ANNEX E

## NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING FINAL EXERCISE

### STUDY GUIDE

**A. Focus.** The final exercise (FX) is the NSDM capstone event that provides you the opportunity to exercise selected concepts and material learned in NSDM. Each seminar will act as a national strategic planning working group to produce and present an executive-level global strategic estimate of the future operating environment over the next 20 years, a national security strategy and national military strategy that advances and defends U.S. national interests, and a prioritized list of new or improved concepts/capabilities. To test the validity of the proposed strategy and concepts, the group must provide implementation details on one aspect of the strategy or one proposed concept to demonstrate how this innovation can be executed. The product of your discussions will be organized and presented in a 40-minute PowerPoint brief and a position paper. This group exercise should generate creative discussions, but will be guided by figure 1. The arrows illustrate cross-cutting NSDM topics, the deliverables are depicted in the center, and faculty will facilitate discussions during teaching team consultations.

Figure 1: FX Methodology



## **B. Objectives**

- Exercise NSDM sub-course concepts through the development of a national security strategic assessment that describes the critical forces in the future security environment. It includes objectives and concepts that underpin your National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, presents a prioritized list of new or refined concepts or capabilities, and offers an implementation caselet of a seminar innovation.
- Effectively organize, develop and present a 40-minute PowerPoint presentation that defines your future operating environment assessment, outlines the seminar's proposed National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, and discusses your most significant innovation and its implementation.
- Persuasively explain and defend the seminar's conclusions by submitting a concise position paper that summarizes your key innovation and implementation caselet. The paper should be prepared as a "Position Paper" in accordance with JSM 5711.01C (January 2006).

## **C. Guidance**

- Your group is not writing actual national strategy documents. Instead, you are providing a 40-minute brief and a position paper that can facilitate development of the actual products. It is important to exercise imaginative and innovative thinking to create new or different capabilities to inform Joint Force development and can be supported within defense resource allocation processes. As appropriate, the seminar can identify and discuss individual programs and forces and offer specific solutions to capability needs.
- How the group organizes, manages time and knowledge, and handles group dynamics is crucial to success. The schedule provides dedicated time to assist the group in this effort; however, the project requires the seminar to leverage internal expertise and draw upon the content and work done in the three subcourses. Outside research will almost certainly be required.

## **D. Requirements**

- The main FX deliverables are a PowerPoint briefing and a position paper. The brief encapsulates the five components: future operating environment, national security strategy, national military strategy, new or refined concepts/capabilities, and an implementation caselet. The position paper only summarizes your key innovation and implementation caselet.
- The deliverables should follow the best practices as learned in NSDM and succinctly outline the seminar's strategic assessment and salient points of the NSS and NMS. There is no specific format or template for the briefing; it is up to the seminar to determine how best to communicate its ideas. Since the deliverables will be shared with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and other U.S. government departments and

agencies, care should be exercised in developing the products to ensure the seminar's best ideas are captured and fully explained. Additionally, two seminars will have an opportunity to brief a panel of senior government leaders.

- The seminar can determine the number of briefers that deliver the presentation to the faculty panel. All students are expected to contribute to the strategic conversation during the Q&A period.

### **Future Operating Environment Components**

- Identify any states, groups, or organizations in the security environment that may challenge the United States ability to advance and defend its national interests over the next *twenty years*.
- Identify the major strategic challenges the United States will face.
- Identify known or anticipated opportunities that the United States could leverage including those states, groups, or organizations that could potentially assist to advance and defend U.S. interests around the world.

### **National Security Strategy Components**

- Formulate an outline for a National Security Strategy (NSS) that broadly describes national interests and corresponding security objectives, the general methods to achieve those objectives across the instruments of national power, and the corresponding implications for allocating resources across those instruments.
- Lay out a detailed strategic vision that can help inform audiences about US government interests and intentions.
- Consider the implications on the U.S. government, national security organizations, and recommend appropriate changes. In deciding future direction, identify the critical gaps that may challenge the U.S. government's and the military's ability to perform its missions to advance the objectives outlined in your seminar's National Security Strategy.

### **Military Strategy Components**

- Formulate an outline for a new National Military Strategy (NMS) that broadly describes how the military instrument of power will advance and, when necessary, defend national interests and achieve the corresponding objectives in the proposed NSS. Describe how the NMS coherently supports the NSS.
- Broadly assess the risks inherent in your proposed military strategic approach. The 2008 National Defense Strategy provides one way to think about risk that considers operational risk, future challenges risk, force management risk, and institutional risk.

## **New or Refined Concepts/Capabilities**

- Articulate new or refined concepts or capabilities necessary to execute objectives of the National Security Strategy during the next twenty years. Identify and discuss the general methods to achieve those objectives to include strategic communication, pertinent economic tools, and diplomacy.
- Articulate new or refined concepts or capabilities necessary to execute objectives of the National Military Strategy during the next twenty years. Concepts/capabilities should represent the important Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, or Policy (DOTMLPF-P) capabilities that are necessary to advance the strategy. While not all DOTMLPF-P need to be addressed, this represents the spectrum of considerations (material and non-material) the seminar should consider.

## **Implementation Caselet**

- Choose one aspect of your seminar's discussions that represents a significant innovation, key principle, or a major idea. This could be a new foreign policy or national security initiative, a new operating concept or capability, or a major shift in national security objectives. It is expected that the caselet deal with a key innovation of the seminar's work.
- Address the full range of influences and obstacles to your proposed change. Consider service, joint or USG requirements; the interests and culture of affected organizations and branches of government; and the potential roles of the important interested and affected parties in both the domestic and international arenas.
- Propose measures to mitigate these issues in order to successfully implement your seminar's key innovation.
- Summarize these findings in a position paper.

## **E. FX Waypoints**

### *FX-4: Seminar Team Performance and Process Assessment Brief*

- Research indicates that high-performing teams do periodic “teamwork introspections” and process revalidation, then recalibrate as needed. The purpose of the team performance and process assessment is to encourage team members to candidly evaluate how their seminar is performing as a team, and whether the team is using processes that yield optimal decisions.
- This assessment should cover areas such as organization, decision-making, group dynamics and knowledge management. Is the seminar performing in line with your expectations? If not, what changes can be made?



#### *FX-7: Presentation Review*

- This is an opportunity for the seminar to practice and refine the briefing based on faculty feedback before the graded event. The faculty will review and critique your brief and position paper.

#### *FX-8: Faculty Evaluation*

- Brief and defend a 40-minute PowerPoint briefing to a panel of three faculty members. Because this is insufficient time to present the full spectrum of the seminar's analysis, rationale, and conclusions, the seminar should prepare to respond to questions from the faculty panel during a 20-minute Q&A period. To help the faculty evaluate your decisions and rationale, each seminar shall provide four pure black-and-white paper copies (2 slides per page) of its brief to the members of the faculty panel prior to the start of the presentation.
- Provide one position paper that summarizes the key innovation and implementation caselet. The paper should be prepared as a "Position Paper" in accordance with JSM 5711.01C (January 2006). An example is provided later in this guide.

### **F. Grading**

- Following the 40-minute presentation and 20-minute Q&A, the faculty panel will evaluate the seminar's content and its ability to clearly communicate in oral, visual, and written forms. Because the FX is a collective team effort, the seminar will receive one grade that will apply to all seminar members.
- Each faculty panel will select one seminar to present their brief to the faculty executive panel. At the conclusion of the executive panel presentations, two seminars will be selected to present their briefs to the entire college and a select group of national security professionals.
- Since certain individuals in a seminar might contribute to the FX process in a way perceived by peers to be "above & beyond" the seminar norm, the seminar will have the option to select up to five individuals deserving extra academic recognition to receive up to three extra points each. Alternatively, the seminar will also have the option of distributing one extra point equally among the group if a majority of students in the seminar perceive equality in effort.

## FX DAILY SCHEDULE

### Winter 2008-2009

Note: times are subject to change, so consult the weekly schedule

FX-1 (23 February) 0800-1515 (ODD) Seminar Rooms 0845-1600 (EVEN) Seminar Rooms	FX-1: Introduction and Assessment Methods
FX-2 (24 February) 0830-1600 (ODD/EVEN) Seminar Rooms	FX-2: Strategic Estimate
FX-3 (25 February) 0830-1600 (ODD/EVEN) Seminar Rooms	FX-3: National Strategy Development
FX-4 (26 February) 0830-1600 (ODD/EVEN) Seminar Rooms	FX-4: Seminar Performance Assessment/Product Development
FX-5 (2 March) 0830-1600 (ODD/EVEN) Seminar Rooms	FX-5: Seminar Product Development
FX-6 (3 March) 0830-1600 (ODD/EVEN) Seminar Rooms	FX-6: Seminar Product Development
FX-7 (4 March) 0830-1600 (ODD/EVEN) Seminar Rooms	FX-7: Seminar Presentation Review <b>Electronic copies of presentation and position paper due to teaching team NLT 1600 on 4 March</b>
FX-8 (5 March) 0830-1600 (ODD/EVEN) Specific times and locations provided in FX-7	FX-8: Seminar Presentations to the NSDM Faculty
FX-9 (9 March) 0800-1200 (ODD/EVEN) Specific times and location provided at FX-10	FX-9: Seminar Presentations to NSDM FX Executive Panel
FX-10 (10 March) 0800-1200 (ODD/EVEN) Pringle Auditorium	FX-10: Seminar Presentations to Senior National Security Professionals

## **FX-1 INTRODUCTION AND ASSESSMENT METHODS**

**A. Focus.** The FX builds upon the concepts, issues, and topics examined in NSDM and provides the opportunity to integrate that knowledge into a complex, group-focused exercise. The FX as a whole also requires the seminar to leverage its internal expertise to successfully develop the required products in the time allotted.

### **B. Objectives**

- Comprehend the FX scenario, process, and products.
- Organize as a staff to develop and present the required FX products.
- Supports JCS Learning Area 7a, 7b.

### **C. Guidance**

During the opening portion of this session, the faculty team will discuss the FX process including organization, group dynamics, decision-making, and knowledge management. In FX-4, the seminar will more formally assess itself in these areas. Use this session to understand the requirements, products, and processes of the FX.

The seminar should begin to organize as a staff. While there are many possibilities, seminars in the past have started with a Chief of Staff and a PowerPoint expert. The Chief of Staff ensures the seminar makes progress, while the PowerPoint expert captures the seminar's discussion to facilitate development of the FX deliverables. As the exercise progresses, it can be useful to organize by function to facilitate product development. Given the inter-related nature of the product, however, the teams cannot work in isolation of each other; integrating all deliverables is key to success.

## **FX-2      STRATEGIC ESTIMATE**

**A. Focus.** NSDM has provided several personal, organizational, and process assessment methods for the seminar to utilize in the strategic assessment of the future operating environment and the development of national strategies. Strategic assessment of the international political system provides an understanding of the future operating environment. Assessment of the domestic political system provides an understanding of the domestic political environment, national interests, and national will. In these assessments, it is important to understand strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats for the U.S. interests. This session provides an opportunity for the seminar to describe the future operating environment through strategic estimate and assessment. This assessment will inform the development of the NSS and NMS and cover the next twenty years.

### **B. Objectives**

- Identify any states, groups, or organizations in the security environment that may challenge the ability of the U.S. to advance and defend national interests.
- Identify known or anticipated opportunities the nation should leverage, including states, groups, organizations, or actors, to advance and defend U.S. interests
- Identify important strategic and operational challenges the nation will face in the security environment, and,
- Broadly assess the risk inherent in your group's description of the security environment.
- Supports JCS Learning Area 3e

### **C. Guidance.**

The faculty team will introduce the session with a short review and discussion of the assessment methods presented in NSDM. The seminar should consider their applicability to the FX process in order to develop their own approach to assessing the future operating environment.

## **FX-3      NATIONAL STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT**

**A. Focus.** Broadly conceived, strategy is an instrument of policy in both war and peace. In general, strategy describes how the national instruments of power, including military means, are applied to achieve national ends. As such, strategy constitutes a continual dialogue between policy on the one hand and such factors as geography, technology, and resources on the other. The expression of national strategy is contained in the National Security Strategy, which guides the state's use of all elements of national power. Using national strategy as a guide, military leaders develop a National Military Strategy. This document explains how the military instrument of national power will be used to secure national objectives and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces.

### **B. Objectives**

- Formulate an outline for a new National Security Strategy (NSS) that broadly describes national interests and corresponding security objectives, the general methods to achieve those objectives across the instruments of national power, and the corresponding implications for allocating resources across those instruments
- Formulate an outline for a new National Military Strategy (NMS) that broadly describes how the military instrument of power will advance and, when necessary, defend national interests and achieve the corresponding objectives in the proposed NSS. Describe how the NMS coherently supports the NSS.
- Consider the implications on current US government structure and recommend appropriate changes.
- Supports JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 3c, 5e, 7a and 7b.

**C. Guidance.** The faculty team will begin the sessions with a short review and discussion of the characteristics and types of strategy.

- The strategic assessment conducted in FX-2/3 should be used during strategy development. This assessment provides an understanding of the international political system and the future operating environment.
- The seminar should consider the use and employment of all elements of national power in the development of a National Security Strategy. This includes consideration of interagency coordination, multinational cooperation and contribution, and nongovernmental organization cooperation.
- In development of the National Military Strategy, the seminar should focus on the aspects and objectives from the National Security Strategy that will require the use of the military instrument of national power.

## **FX-4      SEMINAR PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT/PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT**

**A. Focus.** Process assessment is an important aspect of group planning or strategy development that leaders often use to calibrate progress and group performance. It is also a fundamental predictor of group performance and product quality, and has both tangible and intangible components. Tangible elements include work plans, responsibility designations and milestones. Intangible components, such as adaptation to new information, conflict resolution and individual contribution expectations, often differentiate high performance groups. The seminar will conduct a team performance analysis and process assessment and brief the faculty team on the results of their findings. This session also provides time for the seminar to continue developing FX products.

### **B. Objectives**

- Conduct a process assessment of the seminar's performance during the FX.
- Identify and prioritize critical joint force concepts/capabilities necessary to successfully accomplish the strategic and military objectives.
- Choose one innovation in your National Security Strategy or National Military Strategy, such as a concept, organizational change, or major shift in strategic objectives, and outline how you would formulate and implement this innovation.
- Supports JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 3c, 5e, 7a and 7b.

**C. Guidance.** This session will begin with a process assessment brief given by the seminar to the faculty team. The attached team performance and process assessment sheet provides the framework for the seminar to conduct its assessment. The assessment will include areas such as organization, behavior, decision-making, group dynamics and knowledge management.

## **FX-4      TEAM PERFORMANCE AND PROCESS ASSESSMENT TEMPLATE**

### **Seminar Guidance**

The goal of the assessment is to have a shared evaluation of the FX team's performance and processes. A team assessment is intended to optimally tap the potential of the team, and adjust the processes as necessary. The assessment presentation should be approximately 10 minutes. The balance of the session time is for product development.

#### Team Strengths:

- Team organization
- Decision-making
- Group dynamics
- Knowledge creation and management

#### Team Weaknesses:

- Team organization
- Decision-making
- Group dynamics
- Knowledge creation and management

#### Comments and way ahead:

## **FX-5      SEMINAR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT**

**A. Focus.** This session provides time for the seminar to continue drafting the PowerPoint brief and position paper.

### **B. Objectives**

- Effectively organize, develop and communicate a 40-minute PowerPoint presentation that outlines the seminar's strategic assessment, strategies, concepts, capabilities and implementation caselet.
- Persuasively explain and defend the seminar's conclusions by submitting a clear, concise and professional position paper that summarizes the implementation caselet
- Supports JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 3c, 5e, 7a and 7b.

**C. Guidance.** This session continues the preparation phase of the FX. The seminar should continue crafting its findings and conclusions into a final PowerPoint presentation and a position paper. In contrast to the brief, the position paper should only address the key innovation and implementation caselet. The paper should be prepared as a position paper in accordance with JSM 5711.01C (January 2006).



## POSITION PAPER

Subject: Communications Enhancements

1. Purpose. To whom? For what reason?

2. Key Points. Brief summary of points to be made.

a. Each point should be stated in one sentence.

b. Major points should stand alone and not require amplification by subordinate points.

3. Discussion

a. This type of paper should be used to provide rationale to support a decision or position the reader should take.

b. Remember to tailor discussion to the needs and knowledge of the reader. Subparagraphs such as Participants, Issues, Facts, Views, Opposing Views, Joint Staff Position, Fallback Position, or Conclusion may be used.

c. Write in a short, direct, conversational style that allows the reader to understand the key points of the issue and come to a logical conclusion. Use the active voice and avoid jargon.

d. General format is not as important as content. Tailor the paper to fit the need.

e. Do not exceed two pages.

4. Recommendation. The recommendation must flow logically from the Major Points and Discussion.

Prepared by: Ellen Lopez, Maj, USAF;  
TelCom Div, J-6; 697-1111

(name, rank, title)  
(division, directorate; phone no.)  
(if paper is being forwarded to OSD,  
do not include Action Officer's  
name or phone no.)

## **FX-6      SEMINAR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT**

**A. Focus.** This session provides time for the seminar to continue drafting the PowerPoint brief and position paper.

### **B. Objectives**

- Effectively organize, develop and communicate a 40-minute PowerPoint presentation that outlines the seminar's strategic assessment, strategies, concepts, capabilities and implementation caselet.
- Persuasively explain and defend the seminar's conclusions by submitting a clear, concise and professional position paper that summarizes the implementation caselet
- Supports JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 3c, 5e, 7a and 7b.

**C. Guidance.** This session continues the preparation phase of the FX. The seminar should continue crafting its findings and conclusions into a final PowerPoint presentation and a position paper. In contrast to the brief, the position paper should only address the key innovation and implementation caselet. The paper should be prepared as a position paper in accordance with JSM 5711.01C (January 2006).

## **FX-7      SEMINAR PRESENTATION REVIEW**

**A. Focus.** This session concludes the formal time for the seminar to complete its development of the FX products.

### **B. Objectives**

- Complete the strategic assessment of the future operating environment, national security strategy, national military strategy, concepts, capabilities, and an implementation caselet.
- Conduct a rehearsal of the seminar's product and receive feedback from the faculty team.
- Supports JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 3c, 5e, 7a and 7b.

**C. Guidance.** This session concludes the preparation phase of the FX. The seminar should be prepared to present the briefing in a format that closely resembles the final product that will be graded in FX-8. The faculty team will use the attached FX Presentation Review sheet as a baseline to review the presentation and provide constructive feedback.

By the end of this session, the seminar will complete FX product development and revise the presentation as appropriate. After the final changes are made, electronically submit the Powerpoint Brief and position paper to the faculty team.

## PRESENTATION REVIEW CHECKLIST

	<b>Delivery Rubric</b>
<b>CONTENT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Meets FX requirements</li><li>• Estimate, Strategy, and Concepts Aligned</li><li>• Innovative</li><li>• Well argued</li></ul>
<b>STRUCTURE</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Material logically presented</li><li>• Clear beginning, middle, and end</li><li>• Key concepts evident</li><li>• Strong concluding position</li></ul>
<b>SUPPORT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Credibility of material</li><li>• Verbal / Powerpoint synergy</li><li>• Clear discussion of risks</li></ul>
<b>STYLE</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Persuasively presented</li><li>• Professional, engaging</li><li>• Pace, tempo, delivery clarity</li><li>• Audience contact</li></ul>
<b>SUPPLEMENTAL</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Responds well to questions</li><li>• Seminar participation in Q&amp;A</li></ul>

## **FX-8 SEMINAR PRESENTATION TO THE NSDM FACULTY**

**A. Focus.** The seminar will brief an assigned panel composed of NSDM faculty members.

### **B. Objectives**

- Effectively communicate the seminar's national security analysis in a 40-minute PowerPoint presentation.
- Discuss the seminar's strategic assessment of the critical forces in the future operating environment.
- Present the outline for the seminar's national security strategy and national military strategy.
- Present a prioritized list of new or refined concepts or capabilities.
- Discuss in greater detail an implementation strategy for at least one aspect of the seminar's strategy or capabilities proposals. A discussion may include major IPS/DPS actors, organizations, or rules affected by this aspect and specific implementation steps to overcome any associated DPS and IPS resistance.
- Effectively answer questions asked by the faculty panel for 20 minutes in a clear, articulate and complete way.
- Persuasively explain and defend the seminar's key innovation through the submission of clear, concise and a professional position paper to the faculty panel.
- Supports JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 3c, 5e, 7a and 7b.

**C. Guidance.** The faculty team will provide additional guidance separately on the conduct of FX-8, including specific time and location. The seminar must provide four black & white copies of the presentation (handout format, two slides per page, pure black and white) for use by the faculty panel. Since the FX is a team effort, it is important that all seminar members engage during the Q&A period.

At the completion of all briefings, the faculty panel will provide feedback to the seminar and assign a grade.

### **D. Primary Grading Criteria**

- Are the strategic estimate, strategic vision, and new or refined concepts/capabilities in alignment? Does the presentation consider geography, culture, and religion when appropriate? Does the brief present a reasonably complete, broad overview of the significant military, economic, political, or social issues that would likely concern the United States? Is the information presented in a clear, logical and organized way?

- Does the brief clearly articulate national priorities including the relative importance of the various instruments of national power in addressing the future operating environment? Does the seminar's strategy address the issues identified in the security assessment?
- Does the seminar link the capabilities to the security assessment? To what extent can a "golden thread" be found linking the security assessment, strategies, and concepts?
- To what extent does the seminar's presentation provide innovative, well-argued and imaginative approaches to meet security environment challenges anticipated in the next eight to twenty years?
- Does the seminar explore one aspect of the brief to explain a key innovation and explore implementation details? How well did the seminar consider service, joint or USG requirements, the interests of affected organizations, branches of government, and interested parties; recommended timeline, and specific DOTMLPF-P adjustments? Is the implementation plan realistic?
- How well do the brief and position paper reflect the seminar's ideas?
- How well did the seminar as a whole interact with the faculty panel?

## **FX-9 SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS TO NSDM FX EXECUTIVE PANEL**

**A. Focus.** Selected seminars will brief senior NSDM faculty who will select two seminars to brief a panel composed of senior national security professionals during FX-12.

### **B. Objectives**

- Effectively communicate a 40-minute PowerPoint presentation on the seminar's assessment of the future operating environment, national security strategy, national military strategy, concepts, capabilities, and an implementation caselet.
- Persuasively explain and defend the seminar's conclusions by effectively answering questions posed by the panel members in a clear, articulate and complete way.
- Supports JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 3c, 5e, 7a and 7b.

**C. Guidance.** The faculty team will provide additional guidance separately on the conduct of FX-10, including specific time, sequence, and location. The two seminars selected will receive the Naval War College's James Forrestal Award for Excellence in Force Planning.

## **FX-10 SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS TO SENIOR NATIONAL SECURITY PROFESSIONALS**

**A. Focus.** The final session concludes the NSDM final exercise. Two seminars present their findings to senior national security professionals. Following the seminar presentations, the representatives will provide the entire class an update on their respective portfolios.

### **B. Objectives**

- Effectively communicate a 40-minute PowerPoint presentation on the seminar's assessment of the future operating environment, national security strategy, national military strategy, concepts, capabilities, and an implementation caselet.
- Persuasively explain and defend the seminar's conclusions by effectively answering questions asked by the panel members in a clear, articulate and complete way.
- Supports JCS Learning Areas 1a, 1c, 1d, 2a, 2b, 3c, 5e, 7a and 7b.

**C. Guidance.** The faculty team will provide additional guidance separately on the conduct of FX-10, including specific time, sequence, and location. All seminars must attend all presentations.





**ANNEX F—NSDM MASTER SCHEDULE  
WINTER TRIMESTER, AY 2008-2009  
NOVEMBER 2008**

<b>MONDAY</b>	<b>TUESDAY</b>	<b>WEDNESDAY</b>	<b>THURSDAY</b>	<b>FRIDAY</b>
3	4	5	6	7
10	11	12	13	14
17	18	19	20	21
		<b>0800-0830 Pringle Auditorium</b> NSDM-1 ODD/EVEN “Course Overview” <b>0845-1015 Seminar Rooms</b> NSDM-2 ODD “Introductory Seminar” <b>1030-1200 Seminar Rooms</b> NSDM-2 EVEN  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-1 ODD “Introduction to SSF” SLS-1 EVEN – “Introduction to SLS” <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> SLS-1 ODD SSF-1 EVEN  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0830-1600</b> Student Preparation/Tutorials/Physical Fitness
24	25	26	27	28
<b>0800-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SLS-2 ODD “Ideas About Leadership” PMP-1 EVEN “Introduction to PMP” <b>1015-1215 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-1 ODD SLS-2 EVEN  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-2 ODD “Theories of International Relations” PMP-2 EVEN “Introductory Case Study: ‘Lebanon Revisited’” <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-2 ODD SSF-2 EVEN  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	Thanksgiving Recess	Thanksgiving Recess	Thanksgiving Recess

DECEMBER 2008				
MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
1	2	3	4	5
<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-3 ODD “International Political Economy and Globalization” PMP-3 EVEN “The International Political System (Part I)” <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-3 ODD SSF-3 EVEN  <b>1330-1600</b> *NCC Preparation for NSDM-3 – International Student Perspective	<b>0800-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SLS-3 ODD “Civil-Military Relations and Ethics” <b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-4 EVEN “The International Political System (Part II)” <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-4 ODD <b>1015-1215 Seminar Rooms</b> SLS-3 EVEN <b>1330-1500 Pringle Auditorium</b> PMP-5 ODD/EVEN - Religion Panel	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-4 ODD “Sources of Conflict” PMP-6 EVEN “Religion” <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-6 ODD SSF-4 EVEN  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-5 ODD “National Interests” SLS-4 EVEN “General Lee and General Bragg” <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> SLS-4 ODD SSF-5 EVEN  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0830-1600</b> Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness
8	9	10	11	12
<b>0800-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-6 ODD “Transnational Security Challenges/SSF Writing Skills Workshop” <b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-7 EVEN “Case Study: The United States and Russia – Rekindling the Cold War” <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-7 ODD <b>1015-1215 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-6 EVEN <b>1330-1500 Pringle Auditorium</b> PMP-9 ODD/EVEN Domestic Political System Lecture	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SLS-5 ODD/EVEN “General Petraeus”  <b>*SLS Paper Topic Due*</b>	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-7 ODD “Terrorism” PMP-8 EVEN “Interest Groups, Public Opinion, and the News Media” <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-8 ODD SSF-7 EVEN  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-8 ODD “Greater Middle East” PMP-10 EVEN - “Congress and the Military” <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-10 ODD SSF-8 EVEN  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0830-1600</b> Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness
15	16	17	18	19
<b>0830-1600</b> Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness	<b>0800-1030 Pringle Auditorium</b> NSDM-3 ODD/EVEN “International Officers’ Perspective” <b>1045-1215 Seminar Rooms</b> SLS-6 ODD/EVEN “Indira Gandhi”	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-9 ODD “South and Central Asia” PMP-11 EVEN “Case Study: The Next Tanker” <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-11 ODD SSF-9 EVEN <b>*SSF Paper Topic Due*</b>  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0800-1200 Seminar Rooms or on-line</b> PMP-12 ODD/EVEN “Midterm Exam”  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0830-1600</b> Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness
22	23	24	25	26
HOLIDAY RECESS	HOLIDAY RECESS	HOLIDAY RECESS	HOLIDAY RECESS	HOLIDAY RECESS
29	30	31		
HOLIDAY RECESS	HOLIDAY RECESS	HOLIDAY RECESS		

JANUARY 2009				
MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
			1	2
			HOLIDAY RECESS	HOLIDAY RECESS
5	6	7	8	9
<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-10 ODD "Asia-Pacific" SLS-7 EVEN "Mandela and DeKlerk" <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> SLS-7 ODD SSF-10 EVEN	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SLS-8 ODD/EVEN "Admiral Rickover"	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-11 ODD "Europe and Russia" PMP-13 EVEN "Analytical Perspectives" <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-13 ODD SSF-11 EVEN  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Room</b> SSF-12 ODD "Africa" PMP-14 EVEN "The Rational Actor Perspective" <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-14 ODD SSF-12 EVEN  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0830-1600</b> Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness
12	13	14	15	16
<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-13 ODD "Western Hemisphere" PMP-15 EVEN "The President and the Making of National Security Policy" <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-15 ODD SSF-13 EVEN <b>1330-1500 Pringle Auditorium</b> PMP-16 ODD/EVEN "Defense Resource Allocation" (Lecture)	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SLS-9 ODD/EVEN "General Lejeune"	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-14 ODD "Grand Strategy and Power" PMP-17 EVEN "The National Security Council and Interagency" <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-17 ODD SSF -14 EVEN  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-15 ODD "Strategic Restraint" PMP-18 EVEN "The Joint Strategic Planning System" <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-18 ODD SSF-15 EVEN  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0830-1600</b> Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness
19	20	21	22	23
HOLIDAY	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-16 ODD "Balance of Power Realism" PMP-19 EVEN "The Organizational Behavior Perspective" <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-19 ODD SSF-16 EVEN  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SLS-10 ODD/EVEN "Admiral Zumwalt"  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-17 ODD "Primacy" PMP-20 EVEN "Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution" <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-20 ODD SSF-17 EVEN <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0830-1600</b> Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness
26	27	28	29	30
<b>0830-1600</b> Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-18 ODD "Liberal Internationalism" PMP-21 EVEN "The Governmental- Politics Perspective" <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-21 ODD SSF-18 EVEN  *SSF Draft Paper Due	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SLS-11 ODD/EVEN "Louis Gerstner and IBM"  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-19 ODD "National Security Strategy" PMP-22 EVEN "Case Study: Iraq and the Bush Administration, 2003" <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-22 ODD SSF-19 EVEN  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0830-1600</b> Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness

FEBRUARY 2009				
MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
2	3	4	5	6
<b>0830-1600</b> Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness	<b>0800-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-20 ODD “Defense Strategic Guidance/SSF Paper Peer Review” <b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-23 EVEN “The Cognitive Perspective” <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-23 ODD <b>1015-1215 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-20 EVEN	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-21 ODD “Maritime Strategy” SLS-12 EVEN “Sean O’Keefe” <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> SLS-12 ODD SSF-21 EVEN  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-22 ODD “Logic of Force Planning and Risk” PMP-24 EVEN “Case Study: The 1973 Arab-Israeli War” <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-24 ODD SSF-22 EVEN  <b>1330-1630 Electives</b>	<b>0830-1600</b> Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness
9	10	11	12	13
<b>0830-1600</b> Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness	<b>0800-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-25 EVEN “Current Policy Analysis” <b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-23 ODD “Capabilities-based Force Planning” <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-23 EVEN <b>1015-1215 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-25 ODD  <b>*SSF Paper Due*</b>	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-24 ODD “Resource Constraints” SLS-13 EVEN “USAF and C-17” <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> SLS-13 ODD SSF-24 EVEN	<b>0800-1300 Seminar Rooms</b> PMP-26 ODD/EVEN PMP Final Exam <b>or on-line</b>	<b>0830-1600</b> Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness
16	17	18	19	20
<b>HOLIDAY</b>	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-25 ODD “Future of Military Competition” SLS-14 EVEN “Rumsfeld and Gates” <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> SLS-14 ODD SSF-25 EVEN	<b>0830-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-26 ODD “Course Wrap-up” <b>1015-1145 Seminar Rooms</b> SSF-26 EVEN	<b>0800-1000 Seminar Rooms</b> SLS-15 ODD/EVEN “Conclusion to SLS”   <b>SLS Paper Due</b>	<b>0830-1600</b> Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness
23	24	25	26	27
<b>0800-1515 Seminar Rooms</b> FX-1 ODD “Introduction and Assessment Methods” <b>0845-1600 Seminar Rooms</b> FX-1 EVEN “Introduction and Assessment Methods”	<b>0830-1600 Seminar Rooms</b> FX-2 ODD/EVEN “Strategic Estimate”	<b>0830-1600 Seminar Rooms</b> FX-3 ODD/EVEN “National Strategy Development”	<b>0830-1600 Seminar Rooms</b> FX-4 ODD/EVEN “Seminar Performance Assessment/Product Development”	<b>0830-1600</b> Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness

MARCH 2009				
MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY
2	3	4	5	6
<b>0830-1600 Seminar Rooms</b> FX-5 ODD/EVEN “Seminar Product Development”	<b>0830-1600 Seminar Rooms</b> FX-6 ODD/EVEN “Seminar Product Development”	<b>0830-1600 Seminar Rooms</b> FX-7 ODD/EVEN “Seminar Presentation Review”	<b>0830-1600 Seminar Rooms</b> FX-8 ODD/EVEN “Seminar Presentations to the NSDM Faculty”	<b>0830-1600</b> Student Preparation/Tutorials/ Physical Fitness
9	10	11	12	13
<b>0830-1200 Designated Rooms</b> FX-9 ODD/EVEN “Seminar Presentations to the NSDM FX Executive Panel”	<b>0800-1200 Pringle Auditorium</b> FX-10 ODD/EVEN “Seminar Presentations to Senior National Security Professionals” <b>1330-1500 Seminar Rooms</b> NSDM-4 EVEN “FX and Course Review” <b>1515-1645 Seminar Rooms</b> NSDM-4 ODD			
16	17	18	19	20
23	24	25	26	27
30				

## ANNEX G

### NSDM Primer: Writing to convince the Reader

**Derek S. Reveron, Ph.D.**

**Andrew L. Stigler, Ph.D.**

In addition to this primer, read the NWC Writing Guide closely. It is filled with great hints on improving your writing. It is located on the NSDM portal:

<https://portal.nwc.navy.mil/academics/NSDM>

#### Effective Thesis

A thesis is the central idea of your writing and serves as the backbone of the essay. It directly answers the exam question or a research question by providing your ultimate conclusion. Every successive thought and piece of evidence presented should be linked to the thesis. Use the thesis to better organize and develop your argument. Because the thesis provides your ultimate conclusion, it should be revised as you encounter evidence, evaluate competing claims, and make your final edits.

The convincing thesis should:

***Advance a significant proposition, which rules out vague statements.***

- Vague and too general: “Terrorism is a threat to U.S. national security.”
- Focused: “Al Qaeda rallies international opinion against the United States.”

***Answer a specific question.***

- “How does al Qaeda undermine the United States’ global standing?”
- Refer to this question as you write to remind you what you are explaining.

***Be revised when necessary to reflect new arguments or evidence.***

- “Through its propaganda efforts, al Qaeda undermines the United States’ global standing.”

This last point is worth reinforcing. Be sure to keep an open mind about your thesis – even the most elegant thesis can be proven wrong. You should be prepared to revise your thesis as you work.

#### Effective Organization

Effective organization will always make your writing more convincing to your reader. A well-organized paper demonstrates a connection between its claims and its proofs, and it allows the reader to follow the author’s train of thought.

What makes organization effective?

People often describe a well-written paper as “having good flow.” This term is vague and hard to translate into a concrete result. “Flow” implies a natural, effortless process, but organizing a paper is anything but that. While many experienced writers have internalized some effective patterns of organizing ideas in writing, organization is and should be **actively constructed**. Creating a well-organized paper involves attention to all levels of the way the paper is put together, both in terms of content and style (word choice and word order).

***Outline your points before you start writing.***

- Drawing up an outline at the start of the process will force you to concretely address the main points you plan to make in the paper, and will provide you with a general framework on which to build the paper. Outlines help maintain a strong focus in your paper. If you are writing an exam, a few minutes spent outlining general points before you write will give you a reference point as you write, and it will keep your focus on the exam question.
- Organization is also selection—you may find as you are arranging your evidence and its presentation that something might fall away because it doesn’t “fit.” This will keep you from spinning your wheels with evidence that doesn’t support your central thesis. While that evidence or idea may be interesting, it may be better placed as a footnote or saved for another writing assignment.

***Write the conclusion and the introduction last.***

- These elements of your paper should frame the body of the paper, and they are not the place to introduce or develop new ideas. It is usually easier to write these at the end of the process, when you have fully developed your argument and presented all of your evidence. Allow your ideas to be tested against the evidence.

**Effective Evidence**

***Pay close attention to the order of the evidence you present.***

- As you are identifying your research question and deciding how you are going to answer it, you will need to consider the order in which you present the evidence you collect. Again, a broad-stroke outline will help you to do this. Rearrange your arguments and evidence in various ways to see whether it is more suitable to present the strongest piece first or last. If you can, before you start writing the body of the paper, present your outline to someone else to test its effectiveness. Are your ideas faithfully conveyed by your outline?

***Vet your sources.***

- The Web is a useful research tool – and a dangerous one. Some websites (government sources, for example) can be very useful sources of information. Electronic databases such as Lexis-Nexis, Proquest, and JSTOR are invaluable. However, some sites such as blogs, commercial sites, and personal pages are often poor sources of information. If you find a useful piece of information from a suspicious source, use Lexis-Nexis or Proquest to try to find the same piece of information from a more reputable source. The library



maintains a list of subscribed databases:  
<http://www.nwc.navy.mil/LIBDB/dblinks/ezliblocal.htm>

***Beware of opinions.***

- Individual opinions can be unreliable. It is far better to build your case on factual evidence rather than “Professor X states that he agrees with this paper’s thesis.” If you find a particular opinion convincing because it is well-supported, offer the evidence that supports the opinion rather than the opinion itself. Of course, there are exceptions to this guideline, such as the opinion of an individual in a position to offer unusual insight (for example, a diplomat who participated in a series of negotiations).
- Be skeptical of statements that may be politically motivated. Policymakers often have reasons to make policy statements they do not plan to execute, or may state opinions they do not actually hold. Carefully consider the potential motives for making a statement you use as evidence and that the person’s opinion might just be wrong.

***Address Counterclaims and contradictory evidence.***

- *Try to deal with evidence that contradicts your argument.* If, in the course of your research, you encounter evidence that runs against your thesis, try to include this contradictory evidence and offer a reason why you believe that evidence does not invalidate your thesis. Keep in mind that the reader may well be aware of the contradictory evidence you have discovered, and if you include it in your paper you may considerably strengthen your argument.

***Logically organize your evidence.***

- Consider using one of these patterns of organization:
  - Present evidence in order of importance
    - Most to least important—to catch reader’s interest
    - Least to most important—to end with strongest point
  - Present evidence in order of generality
    - From most particular to most general
    - From most general to most particular
  - Present evidence using comparison and contrast
  - Present evidence in the context of cause and effect

***Cite your evidence accurately.***

- The reader should be able to locate the reference in question. Use page numbers where appropriate. Online sources should offer the electronic link and the date accessed.
- Use the *Naval War College Style Guide* located at <https://portal.nwc.navy.mil/academics/NSDM>

## **Revision**

After you have completed the first draft of a research paper, distance yourself from it for a day or two. Have someone read this paper for you — not only to proofread it, but to see how focused the paper is. What does he or she think the paper explains? Does their interpretation agree with yours? Is there anything that should be further explained? Are there redundant paragraphs? Can it be better organized? A fresh perspective will almost always reveal flaws and potential improvements. Even experienced scholars with hundreds of publications seek colleagues' perspectives on drafts of their work.

Be careful that you “revise globally” as well. Making a change to one section of your paper without considering how it relates to other sections could cause a break in the coherence of your writing.

Repeat this process as time allows until you are satisfied with the paper as a whole. Serious revisions will help to ensure you do justice to your thoughts and ideas. Keep your mind open to the possibility that the paper would be improved by making dramatic revisions, and possibly even a major reorganization of the paper.

## ANNEX G

### NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING SECURITY, STRATEGY, AND FORCES

#### Research and Analysis Paper Instructions and Proposal Format

**Description:** Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce described the Naval War College as "a place of original research on all questions relating to war and the statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of war." With this spirit, you will conduct research and analysis on a topic that supports the overall course objectives of the Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF) sub-course, and *write a 3,000 to 3,500-word research paper based on your findings*. You may select from the wide variety of topics covered by this sub-course; the table of contents in the syllabus provides a starting point to identify topics you might select to research. Each session provides an overview of the subject, core questions to consider, and a preliminary reading list.

Your final product will do more than compile a set of facts – it will offer an explanation or an exploration of an existing strategy or force planning problem. Your paper must *make an argument, justify its importance* in terms of the themes of the SSF sub-course, and *defend that argument* using logic, evidence, and analysis. You may also want to consider likely counterarguments and explain their weaknesses.

Most of all, your research paper should be able to answer a “why” question, one that connects your topic with the broader questions of grand strategy, force planning, or the security challenges the United States is likely to face in the future. Why is this topic important? Why should the United States follow the course you recommend? The answers to these questions should come from your conception of the proper future course for U.S. foreign policy and force planning. While the past and present can provide inspiration for your research, the paper must have a future element to it.

It will be important to draw upon existing thinking and evidence about your subject in order to make a compelling argument. Previous work on a subject affords researchers a starting place and an opportunity to see if previous conclusions about past events can help interpret new events. For example, previous research on why alliances formed focused on the presence of a common external threat. However, the persistence and enlargement of NATO after the external threat subsided called for a better explanation of why alliances persist. Thus, new research on alliances focuses on solidaristic and material benefits of alliance membership.

As you consider answering an SSF research question, your research process should be guided by one of the SSF frameworks or one of the principal theories or concepts discussed within the course. Your paper should not be a case study that simply addresses the pros and cons of a case or describes the complexities of a particular phenomenon. Rather, the course demands forward-leaning papers that examine a problem or issue in the overall context of the security environment, U.S. grand strategy, and force planning.

While publication of this graduate college-level effort is not the primary goal of this assignment, student papers have evolved into articles published in leading professional journals such as the *Naval War College Review*, the *Army War College Parameters*, the *Marine Corps Gazette*, the *Joint Force Quarterly*, or the *Air and Space Power Journal*. At a minimum, it is expected that your paper is well researched and written to compete for the annual Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff essay contest or one of the many Naval War College annual paper competitions.

## MILESTONES

**17 December 2008.** Submit your research proposal in the format listed below. Since a clear research question and intended research approach underpin a successful paper, you must meet with your SSF faculty member at least once prior to your proposal submission. Your faculty member will provide feedback on your proposal submission. As necessary, you should continue to consult with your professor during the research and writing process.

**27 January 2009.** Submit two (2) draft copies of the paper to your SSF faculty member.

**3 February 2009.** Participate in an in-class moderated peer review and feedback session.

**10 February 2009.** Submit two (2) copies of the completed paper to your SSF faculty member.

**23 February 2009.** Graded papers will be returned to student mailboxes after 1500.

**6 March 2009.** Final date for eligible students to confirm with their SSF faculty member they **do not wish** a copy of their paper retained for further study within the Naval War College. “A” and above papers will be forwarded to the library for retention unless a student notifies his or her SSF faculty member otherwise.

## EVALUATION CRITERIA

The Security, Strategy, and Forces research paper will comprise **28 percent** of your overall NSDM grade. Specific grading standards are provided in the National Security Decision Making study guide. In general, the greatest weight is placed on your ability to think critically. The more you think originally, not just paraphrase another's work or a governmental position, the more credit will be given to you. The overall evaluation of your paper will be based upon the following general criteria: a clear thesis statement, logical organization, effective evidence, sound analysis, and consistent style and format.<sup>1</sup>

**Clear thesis statement:** A thesis is the central idea of your writing and serves as the backbone of the essay. It directly answers the research question by providing your ultimate conclusion and should be located within your first paragraph. A thesis statement should be clear, concise, and to the point. The convincing thesis should: advance a significant proposition, which rules out vague statements; answer a specific question; and be revised when necessary to reflect new arguments

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<sup>1</sup> For more details on writing, see the *NSDM Primer: Writing to Convince the Reader* and the *NWC Style Guide*.

or evidence. Every successive thought and piece of evidence presented should be linked to the thesis. Use the thesis to better organize and develop your argument. As the thesis provides your ultimate conclusion, it should be revised as you encounter evidence, evaluate competing claims, and finalize your paper.

**Logical Organization:** Effective organization will always make your writing more convincing to your reader. A well-organized paper demonstrates a connection between its claims and its proofs, and it allows the reader more easily to follow the author's train of thought. These are short papers and do not afford you the opportunity to make long synopses at the end, so conclusions should be short and should not introduce new evidence.

**Effective Evidence:** Since the writing process begins with a clear research question, you must identify a body of evidence to analyze to answer your question. The evidence can take the form of information about military deployments, a national strategy, a service transformation roadmap, public opinion data, or media coverage of a specific event. Because information of all qualities are readily available through the Internet, do be wary of sources that may not be legitimate; the more credible the source is, the more persuasive the evidence will be.

**Sound Analysis:** Your conclusions must be based upon your analysis of the problem, review of the evidence presented, and examination of other pertinent factors. Your thesis is expected to be original and solidly supported by logic and facts. The research that you did should support your thinking and analysis, *not be your thinking*. None of the citations should stand alone without your thoughts introducing the citation; the only reason they are in your paper is to support your line of reasoning. It is not enough to let the facts speak for themselves; rather, you must draw conclusions and illustrate their significance. Sound analysis also recognizes competing points of view and alternative explanations, and as such, it addresses these differences directly in a well-reasoned fashion.

**Consistent Style and Format:** Prepare the paper in a professional journal style following the Naval War College *Style Manual*.

**The title page should contain your name, paper title, seminar number, date, and word count.** Do use endnotes or footnotes for citations, which will not count against the 3,000 to 3,500-word limit. A table of contents and an abstract are not necessary; illustrations and tables should only be included if they are essential to the paper and are well explained in the text. A bibliography is not required, but your endnotes should contain bibliographic references. Notes can also be used to elaborate on an important point, but does not quite fit in the body of your text. Your paper is expected to be free of grammatical errors, well-documented, and well-written. While spell checkers prevent you from making spelling errors, only proofreading will prevent you from making word choice errors.

**Plagiarism:** Occasional incidents of plagiarism require this reminder. The Naval War College defines plagiarism as: 1) Duplication of an author's words without *both* quotation marks *and* accurate references or footnotes; 2) Use of an author's ideas in paraphrase without accurate references or footnotes. Students are expected to give full credit in their SSF paper when borrowing from, or referring to, the work of other writers or their own previous work. Failure to do so may constitute plagiarism, a serious violation of academic integrity. Further guidance can be obtained

from your faculty member. A good rule of thumb is that you may be rewarded only once for each research project you undertake.

**Sources for Paper Topics:** Your SSF faculty member will be your primary source for ideas and feedback on your proposed research topic, but you might consult previous SSF papers that received a grade of “A-“ or above. These papers are located in the Naval War College Library (classified section). Additionally, reviewing current issues of major journals in the Strategy field will spark thoughts. Consider military professional journals previously mentioned and *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, *Orbis*, *Current History*, or *The Washington Quarterly*. Finally, your research must support one of the Security, Strategy, and Forces’ session objectives, so review the study guide for ideas that merit further study. Since a research proposal must be submitted before the course shifts to questions of force planning, you should review syllabus pages for the last quarter of the course to see if force planning questions interest you.

In addition to the above sources, the **JPME Prospective Research Topics Database (PRTD)** provides prospective research topics solicited by the Joint Staff J-7 from Combatant Commands, Supporting Commands, the Services, the Joint Staff, and Service Centers for Lessons Learned. See <http://jdeis.cornerstoneindustry.com/jdeis/eduResearch/users/intro.jsp>

Another important source of research topics is Service-oriented journal essay contests like *Parameters* and Naval Institute *Proceedings* or annual Naval War College paper competitions or the CJCS essay contest. See [http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/CJCS\\_Essays.html](http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/CJCS_Essays.html)

## Research Proposal Format

**Research Question:** This is a neutral question, which serves as the guiding question during the research process.

**Research Thesis:** This is a tentative statement that answers your research question. It should be open to change as you conduct your research.

**Research Importance:** In a paragraph or two, this section provides the context for your research and illustrates the relevance of your proposed line of research. This should be based on a basic understanding of important questions that remain in a particular field of study. This section also squarely places your research question within the Security, Strategy, and Forces curriculum. The research should focus on a topic that addresses issues of strategy, elements of the security environment, force planning or other issues that have significant national security implications for the United States. Your paper must support either one or more of the overall course objectives or one or more of the individual session objectives.

**Research Approach:** In a paragraph or two, this section describes how you will answer your research question.

**Key References:** To be able to formulate a good research question, it is important to know what has been written previously about the subject. Once you conduct a cursory review of the literature, identify at least three to five key references that you would use to begin your research. While it is easy to compile a very long list of references on a subject, do your best to narrow the field to select the sources you think are best.

## **Example Research Proposal (Security Environment)**

**Research Question:** *Why is countering ideological support to terrorism a key piece of the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terror and what are the planning considerations?*

**Research Thesis:** The United States is waging a war of ideas against al Qaeda and lacks the cultural awareness to properly plan.

**Research Importance:** The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review outlines the “Long War.” Within this Long War, countering ideological support for terrorism is a key component of the National Military Strategic Concept for the War on Terrorism. In order to counter the terrorists’ ideology, it is essential to understand its origins and its focus.

**Research Approach:** Beginning with an understanding of what constitutes an ideology, I will analyze Osama bin Laden’s statements since 1993.

### **Key References:**

Berner, Brad K. *Jihad: Bin Laden in His Own Words Declarations; Interviews and Speeches*, (North Charleston, South Carolina: BookSurge Publishing, 2006).

Gerring, John. “Ideology: A Definitional Analysis,” *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (December 1997).

Henzel, Christopher. “The Origins of al Qaeda’s Ideology: Implications for US Strategy,” *Parameters*, (Spring 2005), pp. 69-80.

Myers, Richard B. *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006).



## **Example Research Proposal (Force Planning)**

**Research Question:** How do the requirements of the Global Strike Joint Integrating Concept (JIC) impact future force characteristics?

**Research Thesis:** The Global Strike JIC is technologically-biased and ignores a number of military capabilities necessary for expeditionary warfare.

**Research Importance:** Since 2001, the United States has been moving toward capabilities-based planning, which does not consider threats directly. In the past, U.S. military planners considered appropriate counters to Soviet military capabilities. Today, concepts drive force planning decisions; a concept is a notion or statement of an idea--an expression of how something might be done. A capabilities-based approach focuses more on how the United States can defeat a broad array of capabilities that any adversary may employ rather than who the adversaries are and where they may engage joint forces or U.S. interests.

**Research Approach:** Relying on Mac Owens' "logic of force planning," I will outline the Global Strike concept, evaluate the current force structure in light of the global strike requirements, and evaluate future capability options.

### **Key References:**

*Global Strike Joint Integrating Concept*, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005).

Joint Defense Capabilities Study Team. *Joint Defense Capabilities Study Final Report*, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2003).

Myers, Richard B. *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005).

Owens, Mackubin. "Strategy and the Logic of Force Planning," in *Strategy and Force Planning*, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition edited by Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004).

Rumsfeld, Donald. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006).

## Citation Format Guidance

As a rule, you want to include a citation for every fact, number, idea or argument included in your paper that you first read somewhere else. If you have any questions about what should or should not be cited, feel free to ask.

For purposes of this paper, you may use footnotes or endnotes – not parenthetical citations or some other system of your own creation. *No extra bibliography is necessary.*

**If you are using Microsoft Word, footnotes and endnotes can be inserted automatically using the tool found under the “Insert” pull-down menu.** Order them sequentially (Word does this for you), giving every footnote its own number.

Proper footnote/endnote formatting:

### Books:

Johnny Author, *Book Title* (New York: Macmillan, 2003), p. 18.

### Journal/magazine articles:

Johnny Author, “Article Title,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (August 1996), pp. 23-24.

### Multiple authors:

Johnny Author and Tim Co-Author, *Book Title* (Washington: Brookings, 1999), p. 16.

### Chapter in an edited volume:

Tim Author, “Explaining Everything,” in Alan Twining, ed., *Book with Lots of Chapters* (New York: Random House, 1996), pp. 25-47.

### Websites (this is somewhat flexible):

Johnny Author, “Title of Webpage,” June 2004, available at <http://www.website.com/article>, accessed October 11, 2005.

**NOTE:** When citing a work for a second or more time, the full citation is not required. You may simply note the author’s last name, title and page number.

### Second reference to a book:

Author, *Book Title*, p. 6.

### Second reference to a journal article:

Fettweis, “Getting Good Grades,” p. 9.

**ANNEX H**  
**NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MAKING DEPARTMENT**  
**FACULTY BIOGRAPHIES**

**Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese** teaches the Senior Leadership Seminar (SLS). She has held the position of Chair, Department of National Security Decision Making Department, since August 2002. Previously, she was a Professor of National Security Studies at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, HI, and the Air War College, and Director of the Center for Space Policy & Law at the University of Central Florida. Within the realm of international and national security studies, Dr. Johnson-Freese has focused her research and writing on space security issues, including technology transfer and export, missile defense, transparency, space and development, transformation, and globalization. Her book publications include: *Heavenly Ambitions: Will America Dominate Space?* forthcoming 2009; *Space As A Strategic Asset*, 2007; *The Chinese Space Program: A Mystery Within a Maze*, 1998; *Space: The Dormant Frontier, Changing the Space Paradigm for the 21st Century*, 1997; *The Prestige Trap: A Comparative Study of the US, European and Japanese Space Programs*, with Roger Handberg, 1994; *Over the Pacific: Japanese Space Policy Into the 21st Century*, 1993; and *Changing Patterns of International Cooperation in Space*, 1990. Articles written by Dr. Johnson-Freese have been published in such journals as *Joint Forces Quarterly*, *Nature*, *Space Policy*, *Issues in Science & Technology* and *The Nonproliferation Review*. She is a Fellow of the International Academy of Astronautics; a Visiting Fellow at the Watson Institute of International Affairs at Brown University; a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies; on the Space Studies Board of the National Research Council; the Editorial Board of *China Security*; and has testified before Congress on multiple occasions regarding space security and China. She also teaches courses on Globalization & Terrorism and Space & Security at Harvard.

**Dr. Hayat Alvi-Aziz** teaches the Policy Making and Process (PMP) and Contemporary Staff Environment (CSE) courses. She has served as the Director of International Studies at Arcadia University in Glenside, PA. Prof. Aziz also taught political science at the American University in Cairo, Egypt, for four years. Her specializations include International Relations, Political Economy, Comparative Politics, Islamic Studies, and Middle East and South Asian Studies. She is proficient in Arabic and Urdu. Her publications include numerous journal articles and these books: *Regional Integration in the Middle East: An Analysis of Inter-Arab Cooperation* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2007). *An Introduction to International Studies: Exploring Frontiers* (Deer Park, NY: Linus Publications, 2006). *The Arabian Nights Reader* (Deer Park, NY: Linus Publications, 2006).

**Captain George “Bud” Baker, U.S. Navy**, teaches the Senior Leadership Seminar (SLS) and the Leading Organizations Effectively (LOE) courses. He has been a member of the National Security Decision Making faculty since July 2004. He earned a BS in Electrical Engineering from the United States Naval Academy in 1979, an MA in Adult Education from the University of Rhode Island in 2000, and a MA from the Naval War College in 2005. Captain Baker’s interests include Lead Six Sigma and Personality indicators. His service includes two SSBN tours in the Pacific, and two SSN tours in the Atlantic. His 38-month command tour on the USS Sand Lance (SSN 660) included an ICEX, a UNITAS, and decommissioning in Bremerton, WA. His shore duty assignments were on Submarine Operational Staffs in Yokosuka, Japan (CSG-7:

1983-85), and in Bangor, WA (CSG-9: 1990-92). He was an instructor at the Navy's Command Leadership School prior to coming to the NWC.

**Professor Deborah Bolton** is the Department of State Senior Advisor to the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island and teaches the Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF) and Strategy & Theater Security (STS) courses. After graduating from St. Joseph's University with a degree in International Relations, she entered the Foreign Service. She was appointed to the Senior Foreign Service rank of Counselor in 1999 and to the rank of Minister-Counselor in 2003. She has held assignments in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and the Department of State. In 1982 she began language training to serve as Chief of the Consular Section in Budapest, Hungary. In 1986 she became Country Officer for Uruguay and Paraguay and remained in Washington as European Affairs Officer for the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism. In 1990 she became Chief of the Consular Section at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, Cuba. Ms. Bolton spent the 1992-93 academic year at the U.S. Air Force War College at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama, earning a diploma in Security Studies. She returned to Washington in summer 1993 as Deputy Director for International Security and Peacekeeping Operations in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. From January 1997 until July she served at the Embassy in Hanoi, Vietnam. In August 1997 she was assigned to open the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City where she was Acting Principal Officer until May 1998, then the Deputy until her May 1999 departure. In July 1999 she was Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Valletta, Malta. In September 01 she became the Chief of Mission in Curacao, Netherlands Antilles. From September 04 until July 07 she served as Political Advisor (POLAD) to the Commander, NORAD and U.S. Northern Command in Colorado Springs.

**Commander Brent Boston, U.S. Navy**, earned a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from Vanderbilt University with high honors, a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College, and teaches the Policy Making and Process (PMP) and Contemporary Staff Environment (CSE) courses. He served on one Trident ballistic missile submarine and three fast attack submarines, operating in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean. He was designated a Master Training Specialist while teaching Aspects of Reactor Plant Operations at the Naval Nuclear Power School. He was as an Associate Fellow on the Chief of Naval Operations' Strategic Studies Group. CDR Boston worked on the Navy staff as an Education and Training Analyst and later as the Undersea Warfare Test and Evaluation Section Head. He was the Deputy Director of the NATO Staff Officer Orientation Course at National Defense University in Washington.

**Dr. David T. Burbach** teaches Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF) and Strategy & Theater Security (STS). Dr. Burbach received a B.A. in Government from Pomona College, and earned a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2004. Before coming to Newport, Dr. Burbach was a Visiting Scholar at MIT's Security Studies Program, then spent two years on the faculty of the U.S. Army's School of Advanced Military Studies in Leavenworth, KS. He has also served as a defense policy analyst for the RAND Corporation, and as a technology consultant to several private-sector firms. Dr. Burbach has written on the politics of American national security policy, particularly on the relationship between Presidential decision-making and public opinion. His other areas of expertise include nuclear

strategy and arms control, European regional security, energy and environmental policy, and force planning.

**Professor William M. Calhoun**, Captain USN (Ret), and a former naval aviator, joined the faculty of the Naval War College in 1988. He teaches the Senior Leadership Seminar (SLS) and the Leading Organizations Effectively (LOE) courses. Previously, he was a member of the teaching faculty for five years and served as the Policy Making and Implementation Course Director before becoming the Dean of Academics in 1993. He served as Dean for over seven years, and also served as acting Provost before returning to the NSDM teaching faculty in March of 2001 as the Decision Making and Implementation Course Director. Professor Calhoun has published numerous case studies and articles for curriculum use, primarily in the policy and decision making field. He has been a contributing editor and author for Case Studies in Policy Making and Implementation, published by the Naval War College Press (in its 10th edition). He has also published articles and book reviews in the Naval War College Review, for the Claremont Institute and other publications. He is a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College, and also is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and the University of Georgia School of Law.

**Professor Robert L. Carney** has been a member of the NSDM faculty since July 2004 and currently teaches the Contemporary Staff Environment (CSE) and Policy Making and Process (PMP) course for the College of Distance Education. He is a 1979 graduate of the United States Military Academy and holds a Master's Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. Professor Carney is also a graduate of the Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and The Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. While on active duty, Professor Carney served in various command and staff positions to include Battalion Commander in Korea, Action Officer on the Department of the Army Staff, Theater Missile Defense Officer for U.S. Central Command, and Senior Advisor to the Combined Forces Air Component Commander for Ground-Based Air Defense during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

**Lieutenant Colonel Jim Cook, U.S. Army**, joined the NSDM faculty in May 2007, and currently teaches Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF) and Strategy & Theater Security (STS). He was commissioned into the Air Defense Artillery in May 1985 upon graduation from the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, and is a 2000 graduate of the Naval War College (CNC&S). He has served in a variety of command and staff assignments in Army tactical units located within the United States and Germany. He served on the Army staff (G-8, Force Development) as the Theater Air and Missile Defense Systems Integrator, and was the Air Defense Artillery Colonels Assignment Officer at U.S. Army Human Resources Command. LTC Cook was appointed as the US Army exchange officer at the United Kingdom's Joint Services Command and Staff College where he received an M.A. in Defense Studies from King's College London. His most recent assignment was as the Chief, Air and Missile Defense and Deputy G3 for the 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York, that included a deployment as the Deputy CJ3, CJTF-76, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan.

**Dr. Anthony J. DiBella** joined the faculty in 2005, and teaches the Senior Leadership Seminar (SLS) and the Leading Organizations Effectively (LOE) courses. His area of expertise is

organizational behavior with special interests in change management, executive development, and organizational learning. He holds a Ph.D. in organization studies from the MIT Sloan School of Management where he was also a visiting scholar at the Center for Organizational Learning. Previously, he taught at Boston College and Worcester Polytechnic Institute. Dr. DiBella has consulted for a variety of private and public sector organizations including Amgen, the Boston Police Department, IBM Global Services, the Mellon Foundation, NSA, PLAN International, and USAID. His work has appeared in such publications as the *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, the *Journal of Management Studies*, and the *Sloan Management Review*. Books include *How Organizations Learn: An Integrated Strategy for Building Learning Capability* (Jossey-Bass, 1998) and *Learning Practices: Assessment and Action for Organizational Improvement* (Prentice-Hall, 2001). Professor DiBella is a founding member of the Society for Organizational Learning.

**Professor Roger H. Ducey** recently joined the NSDM faculty after teaching in the JMO Department, and currently teaches the Senior Leadership Seminar (SLS) and the Leading Organizations Effectively (LOE) courses. He retired from the Air Force in 2006 and served as the Senior Air Force Advisor to the Naval War College. Prior to coming to the NWC he was the 319<sup>th</sup> Support Group Commander at Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota. He began his military career as a missile launch officer, attended undergraduate pilot training, and flew KC-135A, R, R/T, and EC-135 aircraft. He served as operations officer and commander of the 99th Air Refueling Squadron, deputy commander, 19th Operations Group, and commanded deployments in support of Operations RESTORE HOPE, RESTORE DEMOCRACY, DELIBERATE FORCE, and DENY FLIGHT. Prior to his arrival at the Naval War College he commanded the 319<sup>th</sup> Air Expeditionary Group (Provisional) deployed to Shaikh Isa Air Base, Bahrain in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM from October 2001 to March 2002. He served in various staff positions at Headquarters, Strategic Air Command and served as Deputy Chief, Aircrew Operations and Training Division, Headquarters, Air Mobility Command. He holds a Bachelors of Business Administration Degree in International Finance from the University of Miami and Masters Degrees in Aviation Management from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and a graduate degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College.

**Dr. Stephen A. Emerson** teaches Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF) and Strategy & Theater Security (STS). He is an African affairs specialist with over 25 years experience working on African political and security issues. Dr. Emerson has taught, lived and traveled widely throughout most of the continent. Prior to joining the faculty at the U.S. Naval War College, Dr. Emerson worked for the U.S. Department of Defense as a political-military analyst for southern Africa and was Chair of Security Studies at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. His professional interests include southern African area studies, conflict and political instability, and American foreign and security policy in the developing world. Dr. Emerson is the author of numerous governmental and academic articles and studies on African politics, U.S.-Africa policy, and intelligence issues. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science/Comparative Politics and MA in International Relations from the University of Florida.

**Dr. Thomas R. Fedyszyn** is the Course Director for the Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF) and Strategy & Theater Security (STS) courses. He joined the faculty after a 31-year Naval

career, serving in six different cruisers and destroyers. His most recent military assignments included serving as the U.S. Naval Attaché to Russia and two tours at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. A former surface warrior, he commanded the USS Normandy (CG 60) and USS William V. Pratt (DDG 44). He served in numerous strategy, policy, and long-range planning billets for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Naval Operations including the Navy's Strategic Concept Branch (OP-603) and the CNO Executive Panel (OP-00K). He was a principal contributor to both the Lehman-era Maritime Strategy and NATO's New Strategic Concept following the Cold War. He received a Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University in Political Science and taught political science at the U.S. Naval Academy. His most recent contributions have appeared in the *Providence Journal* and the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*. He specializes in NATO, naval strategy, and Russian security affairs. His most recent research interest is the Indian Navy.

**Dr. Nikolas Gvosdev** joined the NSDM faculty in July 2008 and teaches the Contemporary Staff Environment and Policy Making and Process courses. He was previously the Editor-in-Chief of the bi-monthly foreign policy journal, *The National Interest*. He started as executive editor of the magazine in 2001 and became editor in 2005. He was also a senior fellow for strategic studies at The Nixon Center, a Washington, DC think-tank. He received his Ph.D. as a Rhodes Scholar at St Antony's College, Oxford. He also holds masters' degrees from Oxford (in Russian and East European affairs) and Georgetown University (in international affairs). He writes widely as a specialist on U.S. foreign policy as well as international politics, especially as they affect Russia and its neighbors in the Eurasian space and the Greater Middle East. He also focuses on the interrelationship of politics, history, religion and culture. Prior to coming to *The National Interest*, he taught at Baylor University and was associate director of the Institute for Church-State Studies. He has also been an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University and George Washington University in Washington, D.C. He is the author or editor of seven books, including *The Receding Shadow of the Prophet: The Rise and Fall of Political Islam* and *Russia in the National Interest*.

**Lieutenant Colonel Scott Halverson, U.S. Army**, joined the NSDM faculty in May of 2007 and teaches the Contemporary Staff Environment and Policy Making and Process courses. He was commissioned in 1990 through the Army ROTC program at Utah State University. Serving as an Army Aviator, Lieutenant Colonel Halverson has extensive operational experience including tours as Squadron Executive Officer in OIF I, and Task Force Operations Officer in OEF VI. He is a Master Aviator with over 2000 flight hours in the UH-1, AH-1P, AH-64A, AH-1W, and AH-64D Longbow Apache. Most recently, Lieutenant Colonel Halverson served as an Observer Controller with the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. Lieutenant Colonel Halverson is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College's Intermediate Level Education (ILE) and holds a BS degree in Aerospace Technology and a MA in Business Administration.

**Professor Norman Hitchcock** currently serves as the College of Distance Education (CDE) NSDM Final Exercise Director and also teaches in the Fleet Seminar Program, Newport seminar, and Web-based courses for CDE. A career Marine he taught at the Naval War College on the NSDM resident faculty for two years and was on the War Gaming faculty for three. Professor Hitchcock holds Baccalaureate and Masters Degrees in Education, an MA from the Naval War

College and he is a graduate of the Army War College. In his 29 years as a Marine he served in a number of command and staff billets as an artillery officer deploying numerous times from the East Coast and Hawaii. In addition to five years as a faculty member at the Naval War College his non-fleet assignments included command of a Marine Security Guard Company, duty as Assistant Naval Attaché in Madrid, a tour as a Naval ROTC Marine Officer Instructor and recruiting duty.

**Dr. Christopher Jasparro** joined the NDSM faculty in July 2008 and teaches Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF) and Strategy & Theater Security (STS). His area of topical expertise is non-state and irregular security threats as well as environmental security. His is an Asia-Pacific regional specialist with additional interest in Africa. He holds a Ph.D. in geography and Graduate Certificate in Transportation Systems Management from the University of Kentucky. Dr. Jasparro also holds and M.A. in geography from the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill and a B.A. in anthropology and geography from the University of Vermont. Before joining the Naval War College he served two years on the faculty of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Before that, he spent eight years at the Department of Defense's Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. Dr. Jasparro also served on the faculty of Framingham State College and has additional teaching experience with Harvard and Hawaii Pacific Universities. Dr. Jasparro is a former U.S. Navy Reserve officer and also has professional experience as a field archaeologist, economic development policy, and transportation/town planning.

**Professor Kevin P. Kelley** is deputy to the Chair of the National Security Decision Making Department at the Naval War College where he teaches the Policy Making and Process course. Prof. Kelley's expertise lies in the areas of U.S. defense resource allocation systems and in the way national security policy making, and its implementation, are influenced. He has developed and executed programs on defense resource allocation processes and a systematic approach to national security strategy development and military force planning in support of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies initiatives and for the Partnership for Peace. For over 20 years, Prof. Kelley served as a logistician in the U.S. Navy, including tours of duty in Japan and Scotland. A 1984 Distinguished Graduate of the NWC, Professor Kelley has an undergraduate degree in economics from the College of the Holy Cross and he earned his Masters Degree in Business Administration from New Hampshire College. He was awarded a U.S. Department of Defense Executive Leadership Development Program fellowship in 1994. He taught at the Marshall Center under a one-year fellowship from July 1998 to June 1999.

**Professor Henry Kniskern** joined the NSDM faculty in July 2005, and teaches the Senior Leadership Seminar (SLS) and the Leading Organizations Effectively (LOE) courses. He has a BA and MA in Psychology from Michigan State University and MBA from Seton Hall University. His main areas of interest are adaptive decision making methodologies and organizational strategy. He is currently involved with the CDHAM Afghanistan Healthcare Sector Reconstruction Project. Professor Kniskern has held numerous management positions in AT&T, Lucent and Bell Labs in the arenas of technology operations and competitive strategy. He spent four years as operations systems Director for Europe and the Middle East working with large telecom organizations in transformation which merged into competitive, deregulated markets during the 1990's. As a consultant, he was also involved in developing operations



strategies and implementation plans in Brazil and Saudi Arabia. He has taught international business at Salve Regina University and is on its business advisory council.

**Dr. Stephen Knott** teaches the Contemporary Staff Environment and Policy Making and Process courses. Prior to accepting his position at the Naval War College, Dr. Knott was Co-Chair of the Presidential Oral History Program at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. He also served for seven years as an Associate Professor in the political science department at the United States Air Force Academy. Knott received his B.A. in Political Science from Assumption College and his Ph.D. in Political Science from Boston College. He has taught courses on intelligence, national security, Congress, the Presidency, and foreign policy. His books include *The Reagan Years*; *Alexander Hamilton and the Persistence of Myth*; and *Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency*. He is the author of numerous essays and reviews and is currently at work on a book based on the Ronald Reagan oral histories.

**Dr. David W. Kriebel** joined the NSDM faculty in February 2006 and teaches the Contemporary Staff Environment and Policy Making and Processes. He holds an M.A. and Ph.D. in anthropology from the University of Pennsylvania, an M.F.A. in creative writing from the University of Maryland at College Park, and a B.A. in archaeology from Haverford College. He has also performed graduate work in Near Eastern studies at Johns Hopkins and theology at St. Mary's Seminary and University. He has taught at the University of Maryland, Loyola College in Maryland, Villa Julie College, and Towson University. Prior to embarking on his academic career he served in a variety of analytical and staff positions at the Department of Defense. Research interests include the anthropology of religion, cognitive anthropology, and medical anthropology.

**Dr. Richmond M. Lloyd** teaches the Senior Leadership Seminar (SLS) and the Leading Organizations Effectively (LOE) courses, and holds the William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economics. Previously, he served as Course Director for the Security, Strategy, and Forces course and as Director of the US Naval War College's Latin American Studies Group, which coordinates all college activities in Latin America. His research and teaching interests include strategy and force planning, national security and economics, defense and international economics, and logistics. He is the editor of the William B. Ruger Chair of National Security Economic Papers and coeditor of eight textbooks for the Naval War College on *Strategy and Force Planning*. He lectures on contemporary national defense topics at various sites throughout the United States and South America. He chaired the Naval War College's Self-Study efforts that led to Congressional authorization for the college to award a M.A. degree in National Security and Strategic Studies and to the accreditation of this degree. He received a Ph.D. in business administration and a B.S. in mechanical engineering from the University of Rochester, and an M.B.A. from the University of Chicago.

**Dr. Elena Mastors** teaches the Contemporary Staff Environment and Policy Making and Processes courses. Previously, she held various senior intelligence and policy positions in the office of Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and received numerous performance awards from the Defense Intelligence Agency. Mastors earned a BA in political science from Eckerd College and a political science MA from University of South Florida. She received her Ph.D. in

political science with a concentration in international relations and political psychology from Washington State University, where she focused on leadership, conflict and terrorism. She writes frequently on understanding leaders and group dynamics, from a political-psychological perspective. She is also a frequent lecturer on the important role of individuals and group dynamics in armed groups and is currently conducting field work in Northern Ireland on the leaders of banned armed groups. Dr. Mastors is published in *Political Psychology Journal*; authored *Introduction to Political Psychology* (Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates, 2004); “*Understanding and Influencing Leaders of Armed Groups*” (Naval War College, 2008); *The Lesser Jihad: Recruits and the al-Qaida* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2007); *Breaking Al-Qaida* (Potomac Press, forthcoming, 2008); *The Psychology of Terrorism* (Blackwell, forthcoming 2009); and *Introduction to Political Psychology*, 2nd edition (Lawrence Erlbaum and Associates, forthcoming 2009).

**Professor Laurence L. McCabe** teaches the Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF) and Strategy & Theater Security (STS) courses. A recently retired Navy surface warfare officer, Professor McCabe was assigned to cruisers and destroyers in Hawaii, California, South Carolina and Pennsylvania. He has deployed to every ocean in the world including the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. Ashore Professor McCabe served as Flag Secretary to a Commander of a Carrier Battle Group on the aircraft carrier USS Constellation. He also served in the Pentagon as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy for Resources and Programs. Professor McCabe also served as the Military Group Commander, U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic for three years. Currently, as Deputy Director of the Latin American Studies Group, he has presented lectures in Mexico, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Chile, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Brazil. In the Africa region, Professor McCabe has lectured in Cameroon, Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar. Professor McCabe lectures on global security and economic development, maritime security, national and military strategy, and globalization.

**Commander J. Scott McPherson, U.S. Navy**, is a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College and one of the first officers selected for the NWC’s Permanent Military Professor Program, currently teaching the Senior Leadership Seminar (SLS) and the Leading Organizations Effectively (LOE) courses. He has served as a Naval Flight Officer and instructor in several carrier aircraft including the E-2C, A-6E, and EA-6B. From 2000-2003, he served in the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Directorate of Operations (J-3) as Executive Flag Assistant to the Director for Information Operations, Psychological Operations Officer, and Branch Chief of the Special Activities Division in support of world-wide operations including ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. He is currently working towards his PhD in the ethical aspects of space weaponization.

**Commander Gene V. Milowicki, U.S. Navy**, joined the NSDM faculty in November 2006 and currently teaches the Contemporary Staff Environment and Policy Making and Process courses. He is a 1985 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy with a B.S. in Aerospace Engineering, and a 2000 graduate of the Naval War College (CNC&S) with a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies. A Naval Flight Officer, his most recent tour was as Safety Officer on USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67) from September 2003 to October 2006. Operational flying tours in the S-3B Viking included the VS-30 Diamondcutters from July 1993 to December 1996 and

the VS-31 Topcats from January 1997 to January 1999. He has over 2000 flight hours, over 400 carrier arrested landings, and has deployed aboard USS SARATOGA (CV 60), USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65), USS JOHN C. STENNIS (CVN 74), and USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV 67). Originally a Submarine Warfare Officer, his experience includes a tour on USS GATO (SSN 615) from June 1987 to January 1991 and a ballistic missile deterrent patrol aboard USS WILL ROGERS (SSBN 659) in 1988. Joint experience includes a tour from August 2000 to August 2003 as the Security Cooperation Plans Division Chief in the J-5 at U.S. Southern Command in Miami, Florida.

**Professor Alan J. Neff** joined the military faculty of the National Security Decision Making Department in 2000. He retired from the Marine Corps and accepted a civilian appointment in the College of Distance Education (CDE) in 2004, currently teaching the Leading Organizations Effectively (LOE) and Decision Making and Implementation courses (DMI) for CDE. He holds a BA in International Studies from The Ohio State University, an MBA from Webster University, and an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. Professor Neff's Marine Corps career involved operational assignments in numerous Marine aviation organizations. A helicopter pilot by training, he served in Hawaii, North Carolina, Okinawa, Japan; California; Quantico, Virginia; and at sea. Duties included Operational Test Director, Marine One Advance Officer, and staff assignments with 3d Marine Division, 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Marine Forces Southwest Asia, and Coalition Forces Support Team, Marine Forces Somalia. He served as executive officer of Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 1, Marine Helicopter Training Squadron 302, and Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 465, and commanded Marine Corps Air Facility Quantico, Virginia from July 1997 to July 1999.

**Dr. Thomas M. Nichols** holds the Forrest Sherman Chair of Public Diplomacy and is a former Secretary of the Navy Fellow in NSDM, currently teaching the Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF) and Strategy & Theater Security (STS) courses. He previously taught international relations and Soviet/Russian affairs at Dartmouth College and Georgetown University. He is a former chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, for which he was awarded the Navy Civilian Meritorious Service Medal in 2005. He holds a PhD from Georgetown, an MA from Columbia University, the Certificate of the Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union at Columbia, and a BA from Boston University. Dr. Nichols was personal staff for defense and security affairs in the United States Senate to the late Sen. John Heinz of Pennsylvania, and was a Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. He has been an Associate of the Davis Center for Russian Studies at Harvard University, and he is currently a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs in New York City and a Fellow of the International History Institute at Boston University. During academic year 2008-2009, Dr. Nichols will be a Fellow in the International Security Program at the John F. Kennedy School at Harvard, where he also teaches a course on "The Future of War." He is the author of several books and articles, including *The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Conflict Over Soviet National Security, 1917-1992*, *The Russian Presidency: Society and Politics in the Second Russian Republic*, and *Winning the World: Lessons for America's Future from the Cold War*. His most recent book, about the revolutionary changes taking place in the way nations go to war, is *Eve of Destruction: The Coming of Age of Preventive War* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

**Dr. Richard J. Norton** is a former Policy Making and Process Course Director, currently teaching the Senior Leadership Seminar (SLS) and the Leading Organizations Effectively (LOE) courses. Professor Norton holds a doctorate in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy; and retired from the United States Navy in 1996 with the rank of Commander. While on active duty, he served extensively at sea on cruisers and destroyers. He also served on Capitol Hill as a Senate Liaison Officer with the Navy's Office of Legislative Affairs and with several political-military assignments on senior military staffs. His military professional experience was focused on surface naval operations and national security policy. He has published articles on failed states, humanitarian early warning, emerging security issues as well numerous chapters in books on case studies related to national security decision making. Three national security volumes he has edited have been published by the Naval War College Press. He also teaches courses on military history. His most recent area of research is in South American and African regional military affairs and related peacekeeping, humanitarian and refugee operations. In 2004 his pioneering work on the phenomenon known as "feral cities" was included in the *New York Times* "ideas of the year."

**Professor Jeffrey H. Norwitz** joined the NSDM faculty in 2001 after graduating from the College of Naval Warfare, currently teaching the Senior Leadership Seminar (SLS) and the Leading Organizations Effectively (LOE) courses. He is an active special agent for the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) with 35 years experience in complex criminal, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism investigations. Following Army service as a commissioned officer, Mr. Norwitz entered law enforcement in Colorado Springs as a patrol officer. His specialties included SWAT team sniper programs and was commander of the Bomb Squad. He joined NCIS in 1985 and served tours in California, Washington DC, and Japan and afloat with USS Belleau Wood ARG deploying with 31MEU throughout PACOM. His last assignment was in Rhode Island where he was Counterintelligence Supervisory Special Agent for New England. He twice received the Navy's Meritorious Civilian Service Medal. His scholarly work appears in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment* (McGraw-Hill: 2003), *American Defense Policy 8th ed.* (The Johns Hopkins University Press: 2005), and *Practical Bomb Scene Investigation* (CRC Press: 2006), *Defending the Homeland: Historical Perspectives on Radicalism, Terrorism, and State Responses* (University of WV Press: 2007), and just completed a book entitled *Armed Groups; Studies in National Security, Counterterrorism, and Counterinsurgency* (Naval War College: 2008). He frequently lectures at some of the nation's most influential academic institutions and overseas to foreign navies and military audiences. Mr. Norwitz holds the John Nicholas Brown Chair of Counterterrorism at the Naval War College

**Dr. Mackubin Thomas Owens** is Associate Dean of Academics for Electives and Directed Research and currently teaches the Senior Leadership Seminar (SLS) and the Leading Organizations Effectively (LOE) courses. He is also the editor of *Orbis*, the quarterly journal of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He specializes in the planning of US strategy and forces, especially naval and power projection forces; the political economy of national security; national security organization; strategic geography; energy security, and American civil-military relations. From 1990 to 1997, Dr. Owens was Editor-in-Chief of the quarterly defense journal *Strategic Review* and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at Boston University. Dr. Owens is a contributing editor to *National Review Online*, writing primarily on security affairs

and the character of American republican government. His articles on national security issues have appeared in such publications as *International Security*, *Orbis*, *Armed Forces Journal*, *Joint Force Quarterly*, *The Public Interest*, *The Weekly Standard*, *Defense Analysis*, *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, *Marine Corps Gazette*, *Comparative Strategy*, *National Review*, *The New York Times*, *The Los Angeles Times*, the *Jerusalem Post*, *St. Louis Lawyer*, *The Washington Times* and *The Wall Street Journal*. He is co-editor of the textbook, *Strategy and Force Planning*, now in its third edition, for which he also wrote the chapters entitled "The Political Economy of National Security" and "Thinking About Strategy." He currently is working on a book for the University Press of Kentucky tentatively entitled *Sword of Republican Empire: A History of US Civil-Military Relation*. Dr. Owens served for 30 years in the Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve, retiring as a colonel in 1994. He earned his Ph.D. in Politics from the University of Dallas, a Master of Arts in Economics from Oklahoma University, and his BA from the University of California at Santa Barbara.

**Professor Glenn C. Powers** has been on the NSDM faculty since 1993 and has held the position of Division Head, National Security Decision Making, College of Distance Education, since August 1999. While he has taught all elements of NSDM, he currently teaches the Security, Strategy and Forces (SSF), Strategy & Theater Security (STS), and FX segments of the course in the day and night seminar variants as well as on the web and CD ROM. Professor Powers is a retired U.S. Navy Captain with a specialty in Anti-Submarine Warfare in the HS, VX and VP communities. He has lectured on national security issues across the country and in South America. He is nationally-acknowledged for his distance education expertise, having been the co-recipient of "The Crystal Award" presented by the Association for Educational Communications and Technology for his part of the development of the NSDM web-enabled course. Publications (as editor for various editions) include: *Resource Allocation: The Formal Process*, and *Case Studies in Policy Making and Implementation*.

**Dr. Ronald E. Ratcliff** teaches the Senior Leadership Seminar (SLS) and the Leading Organizations Effectively (LOE) courses within NSDM. Additionally, he teaches electives in personnel management and Asian national security issues. He received his Ph.D. in Humanities from Salve Regina University, and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration from the University of Montana, a Master of Science degree in Financial Management from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. He retired from the U.S. Navy in the rank of Captain after 31 years of service primarily in destroyers and frigates including command of USS Gary (FFG-51). Other notable assignments included duty as the Naval Attaché to Malaysia and as an instructor at the French Naval Academy where he authored an English-French naval terms dictionary. His most recent areas of research and publication include maritime strategy and strategic leadership.

**Dr. Mary Raum** joined the NSDM faculty in February 2006 and is presently Course Director for the Senior Leadership Seminar (SLS) and Leading Organizations Effectively (LOE) courses. Professor Raum has a PhD in Engineering and Public Affairs from the University of Washington, three years PhD studies at the George Washington University School of Business and Government and Science Policy Program, School of Arts and Sciences; an MAS from Johns Hopkins University and a BS from the University of Maryland in Technology and

Management. Prior to joining the Naval War College, she was Associate Professor of Organizational Leadership and Human Resources with Chapman University College. She specializes in cognitive decision making, leadership and organizational behavior and complex technical systems. Her recent publications include “*I Think Therefore I Proliferate*” and a monograph on the group dynamics of terrorist cells. She was a Research Associate at the University of Washington School of Engineering and consecutively served as senior staff advisor for the Washington State Governor's Office on technical policy issues. As Vice President of a consulting firm she oversaw the financial and administrative elements of the development phases of middle management, project management and matrix management training programs for small and mid-size manufacturing and research and development firms. As a Research Associate in the George Washington University Program of Science Policy she wrote and presented a variety of science and technology policy issues before legislative and corporate bodies in conjunction with the National Science Foundation, National Academy of Sciences and the Presidential Science Advisory. While a faculty member at the University of Maryland, she served as the lead curriculum development member creating an academic program in technology management which emphasized the political and systems elements of evolving issues in science and society. She served on the administrative staff of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Submarine Technology Division and additionally, for three years, was a professional ballerina for Pacific Regional Ballet.

**Dr. Derek S. Reveron** teaches the Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF) and Strategy & Theater Security (STS) courses. He received an MA in political science and a Ph.D. in public policy analysis from the University of Illinois at Chicago. He specializes in security cooperation, democratization, political violence, and intelligence. His books include *Inside Defense: Understanding the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Military* (2008, co-editor), *Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism* (2006, co-editor), *America's Viceroy: the Military and U.S. Foreign Policy* (2004, editor), and *Promoting Democracy in the Post-Soviet Region* (2002). He serves as a senior editorial board member for the *Defense Intelligence Journal* and editorial board member of the *Naval War College Review*. Before joining the Naval War College faculty, Dr. Reveron taught political science at the Joint Military Intelligence College, National Defense University, and the U.S. Naval Academy. As a serving officer in the Navy Reserves, LCDR Reveron is currently second-in-command of a unit that supports special operations. Prior to this command assignment, he supported the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Secretary of Defense, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, and various Navy units.

**Dr. Terence Roehrig** teaches the Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF) and Strategy & Theater Security (STS) courses. He is the author of two books, *From Deterrence to Engagement: The U.S. Defense Commitment to South Korea* (2006) and *The Prosecution of Former Military Leaders in Newly Democratic Nations: The Cases of Argentina, Greece, and South Korea* (2002) and coeditor of *Korean Security in a Changing East Asia* (2007). He has published articles and book chapters on North Korea's nuclear weapons program, Korean and East Asian security issues, the U.S.-South Korea alliance, human rights, and transitional justice. Dr. Roehrig received his PhD in political science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and is the current President of the Association of Korean Political Studies.

**Dr. John R. Schindler** has been at the Naval War College since 2005. He joined NSDM in 2007 and currently teaches the Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF) and Strategy & Theater Security (STS) courses. He was previously an intelligence analyst and counterintelligence officer with the National Security Agency, with particular emphasis on counterterrorism and counterespionage, and operational experience in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. He has also served as an officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve. He holds a Ph.D. in European and military history from McMaster University, and has published widely on international security, intelligence, and terrorism, and is the author of *Isonzo: The Forgotten Sacrifice of the Great War* (Greenwood, 2001), *Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa'ida, and the Rise of Global Jihad* (Zenith, 2007), *The Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Operational Views of Al-Qa'ida* (Naval Institute, 2008), and the forthcoming *Agents Provocateurs: Terrorism, Espionage, and the Secret Struggle for Yugoslavia, 1945-1990*.

**Commander John Segerson, U.S. Navy**, joined the NSDM faculty in November of 2007 and teaches the Policy Making and Process, and Contemporary Staff Environment courses. A Naval Flight Officer for Maritime Patrol Aircraft, he has extensive operational experience from numerous detachments and deployments to EUCOM, CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM. His military career includes his initial tour in VP-11, an instructor tour at VP-30, and Operations Officer in VPU-1. He also served as a Catapult and Arresting Gear Officer (Shooter) on the USS AMERICA (CV-66), a Staff Officer for Commander Patrol Wing FIVE, Action Officer for J-6 on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Enlisted Community Manager for all Aviation Ratings. His educational experience includes a BS in Chemical Technology in Textiles from the University of Rhode Island, a MS in Human Resources Development from Webster University, and MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College.

**Professor Albert J. Shimkus, Jr.** joined the National Security Decision Making (NSDM) faculty in December 2006 and was appointed Course Director for the Policy Making and Process (PMP) and Contemporary Staff Environment (CSE) courses in May 2007. He enlisted in the U.S. Air Force in 1965, served as an independent duty medic at Bucks Harbor Radar Site, ME and completed a tour of duty at Bien Hoa Air Base, RVN in 1967 and 1968. After earning an honorable discharge he attended and subsequently graduated from Memorial Hospital School of Nursing, Worcester, MA and Salem State College, Salem, MA with a Bachelor of Science in Nursing. He was then appointed to the faculty of Salem Hospital School of Nursing. Professor Shimkus received a direct commission in the Navy as a Lieutenant Junior Grade in 1977 and was assigned to Naval Hospital Annapolis, MD where he practiced in the intensive care unit. He graduated from George Washington University in 1981 with a Bachelor of Science in Nurse Anesthesia and practiced as a nurse anesthetist (CRNA) for over 25 years with numerous tours in support of deployed forces. He earned an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College in 1993. He had numerous leadership tours while on active duty to include executive officer, U.S. Naval Hospital, Naples, Italy; commanding officer, U.S. Naval Hospital, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and joint task force surgeon, JTF GTMO; Navy Medicine's team leader for BRAC 2005; deputy commandant, Naval District Washington; and commanding officer, medical treatment facility USNS COMFORT. Professor Shimkus taught in the Naval War College's National Security Decision Making Department for 2 years as a military faculty member and in the College of Distance Education for 6 years. Professor Shimkus retired from the Navy as a Captain (06) in 2007 after a 39 year career. His areas of interest are the

application of America's soft power as an element of the national security strategy and strategic health policy.

**Dr. Paul J. Smith** teaches the Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF) and Strategy & Theater Security (STS) courses. He specializes in transnational security issues and the international politics of East Asia (with particular emphasis on the People's Republic of China). In addition, he studies the impact of such issues as narcotics trafficking, terrorism, human smuggling, small arms trafficking and infectious disease on governance and regional security. He has published in *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, *Harvard Asia-Pacific Review*, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, *Orbis*, *Parameters* and *Survival*. His chapter contributions have appeared in such books as *Fires Across the Water: Transnational Problems in Asia* (Council on Foreign Relations, 1997) and *Tiger's Roar: Asia's Recovery and its Impact* (M.E. Sharpe, 2001). His edited books include *Human Smuggling: Chinese Migrant Trafficking and the Challenge to America's Immigration Tradition* (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997) and *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability* (M.E. Sharpe, 2004). He is author of the book *The Terrorism Ahead: Confronting Transnational Violence in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (M.E. Sharpe, 2007). Dr. Smith frequently provides commentary for national and international news organizations, including the *International Herald Tribune*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Defense News*, *Japan Times*, among others. He has been a member of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) Transnational Crime working group. Dr. Smith has lived and studied in the People's Republic of China, Taiwan and the United Kingdom and is conversant in Mandarin Chinese. He earned his Bachelor of Arts from Washington and Lee University, his Master of Arts from the University of London and his Juris Doctorate (law) and PhD (political science) from the University of Hawaii, at Manoa.

**Lieutenant Colonel Reginald R. Smith, U.S. Air Force**, joined the NSDM faculty in August 2008 and teaches the Leading Organizations Effectively (LOE) and Senior Leadership Seminar (SLS) courses. He has a Master's degree in Aeronautical Science and Aviation Management from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and Bachelor of Aerospace Engineering degree from the Georgia Institute of Technology. He has completed Squadron Officer's School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College programs in addition to mobility specialization through the USAF Air Mobility Operations Course. Most recently he was the Commander, 353d Combat Training Squadron Det 1 at Elmendorf AFB, AK where he stood up the new RED FLAG-Alaska major force combat employment training exercise. In addition, he has major command staff experience as the Tactical Airlift Branch Chief, Directorate of Operations, Headquarters Air Mobility Command, where he won the 2003 USAF Chief of Staff Team Excellence award. He is a command pilot with more than 4,400 flight hours including combat experience in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM flying several variants of the C-130 Hercules aircraft.

**Colonel Charles F. Spencer, Jr., U.S. Air Force**, is an Air Force Command Pilot with 6,000 flight hours in the C-12F, C-141B, C-137B/C, C-32A, and C-40B, and currently teaches the Security, Strategy, and Forces (SSF) and Strategy & Theater Security (STS) courses. He holds a B.S. in Ceramic Engineering from the University of Missouri-Rolla, an M.S. from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, an M.A. from Air Command and Staff College, and an M.A. from the



Naval War College where he graduated with distinction. Prior to arriving in Newport, he was the Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Airlift Squadron at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, providing direct support to the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Cabinet Secretaries, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He also served as Commander, 407<sup>th</sup> Expeditionary Operations Support Squadron at Ali Base, Iraq, and Chief, Program Objective Memorandum Branch at Headquarters Air Mobility Command.

**Dr. Andrew L. Stigler** joined NSDM in 2003 and teaches the Policy Making and Process (PMP) and Contemporary Staff Environment (CSE) courses. He has previously taught courses in international relations theory and military strategy at both Dartmouth College and Wesleyan University. He holds a BA in Government from Cornell University, an MA in International Relations from the University of Chicago, and a PhD in Political Science from Yale University. Stigler's research foci include diplomacy, national influence, health diplomacy, countering ideological support for terrorism, and military coercion. He is currently at work on an effort to assess the United States' prospects in the struggle for hearts and minds.

**Colonel Dana E. Struckman, U.S. Air Force**, joined the NSDM faculty upon his graduation from the Naval War College in June of 2006 and teaches the Contemporary Staff Environment and Policy Making Process courses. He was commissioned in 1987 through the Air Force ROTC program. A career missile and space officer, Col Struckman has extensive operational missile experience, certified combat ready in both the Peacekeeper and Minuteman III weapon systems. Additionally, he has served in a variety of staff assignments at headquarters Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado and as a Program Element Monitor, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Pentagon, Washington D.C. Col Struckman also served as a military advisor on space and missile issues to the Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, D.C. as well as an on-site US Government Verification Officer for NATO missile destruction compliance in Eastern Europe. Most recently, Col Struckman served as a squadron commander in the 91<sup>st</sup> Space Wing, Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota. He holds a Bachelor's degree in Biology from the University of Nebraska, a Master's degree in Human Resource Management from Lesley University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and a Master's degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the United States Naval War College.

**Professor Sean C. Sullivan** teaches Policy Making and Process, and the Contemporary Staff Environments. He is a subject matter expert on defense planning and the Department of Defense Formal Resource Allocation processes. Professor Sullivan coordinates all curriculum development on Defense Resource Allocation and is the author of numerous related articles, readings, and case studies on formal defense planning processes. A retired naval officer, Sean Sullivan served in the United States Navy for twenty-three years. He served at sea for over fifteen years in various surface combatants, amphibious ships, and afloat staffs. He deployed five times to the Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf and once to the South Eastern Pacific Ocean. Sean Sullivan attended the Naval War College, graduating in March 1999 with a Master of Arts Degree in Strategic Studies and National Security Strategy. He also holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from in Political Science from the University of Rochester.

**Colonel Douglas Wadsworth, U.S. Marine Corps**, teaches the Policy Making Process (PMP) and Contemporary Staff Environment (CSE) courses. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy class of 1983 and is a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College, having earned a Masters Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies. A CH-53 helicopter pilot, Colonel Wadsworth has been assigned to both aviation and infantry units; has participated in combat and contingency operations throughout the Middle East and Africa (to include Operation Desert Storm in Kuwait, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, and Operation Support Hope in Uganda/Rwanda); and has deployed extensively throughout the Pacific. He commanded the HMH-362 *Ugly Angels*. His staff tours include assignment as the G-3 Rotary Wing Air Officer at Marine Forces Pacific; Operations and Executive Officer at Marine Aircraft Group 24; and Senior Marine in the SECNAV Office of Program Appraisal. Most recently Colonel Wadsworth was assigned as the Secretary of the Navy's Military Assistant where he was responsible for advising the Secretary on Navy and Marine Corps matters, coordinating staff efforts, and providing oversight of the Secretary's domestic and international travel. In this role he worked closely with U.S. embassies, foreign ministries, and a broad spectrum of government agencies at home and abroad, at sea, and in combat zones.

**Professor Kathleen (Kate) Walsh** teaches the Policy Making and Process (PMP) and Contemporary Staff Environment (CSE) courses. In addition to teaching in NSDM, Professor Walsh studies China and the Asia-Pacific region, particularly security and technology issues. She is author of numerous publications, including "National Security Challenges and Competition: Defense and Space R&D in the Chinese Strategic Context," *Technology in Society* (July 2008); *Post-Conflict Borders and UN Peace Operations: Part 1: Border Security, Trade Controls, and UN Peace Operations* (Henry L. Stimson Center, 2007); and *Foreign High-Tech R&D in China: Risks, Rewards, and Implications for US-China Relations* (Stimson Center, 2003), as well as Congressional testimonies and numerous high-level government briefings. Prior to joining the NWC, Walsh was a Senior Consultant to several think tanks (CSIS, Monterey Institute, and Stimson Center), a Senior Associate at the Stimson Center and at a defense consulting firm. She has conducted numerous US Government- and foundation-sponsored studies, including for the Defense, State, and Commerce Departments, among others. She was appointed in 2007 a member of the National Research Council's *Committee on Assessing the Need for a National Defense Stockpile* and as a Member of the ODNI's Summer Hard Problem (SHARP) Program. She has an M.A. in International Security Policy from the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University and a B.A. in International Affairs from the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.

**Lieutenant Colonel Michael Waters, U.S. Air Force**, joined the NSDM faculty in July of 2008 and teaches the Leading Organizations Effectively course. An Air Force senior pilot, he has flown the B-1 Bomber with deployments to Operations DESERT FOX and ENDURING FREEDOM, where he logged over 200 combat hours. He has also flown the UV-18B, the plane used for the parachute programs at the U.S. Air Force Academy, where he flew aerial demonstrations with the Wings of Blue demonstration team. Lt Col Waters most recently served as an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the U.S. Air Force Academy teaching courses in geopolitics, American government and national security, international organizations, and international political economy. Prior to that, he served in various operational assignments in the B-1 ranging from Assistant Director of Operations, Chief of Wing Scheduling, Standardization

and Evaluation Flight Commander to Squadron Mobility Officer, and was a B-1 instructor and evaluator pilot. Lt Col Waters holds a B.A. in Political Science from Montana State University and a M.A. in International Relations from Salve Regina University. He was commissioned through Air Force ROTC.